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Open Access Thesis

Keywords

Allied Intervention in the Soviet Union (1918-1920); Soviet Union--History--Allied intervention, 1918-1920; Soviet Union; 1918-1920; History;

Abstract

The interventions by the Western powers and Japan in revolutionary Russia during the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 constitute a sorry chapter in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and its capitalist adversaries. The United States took an active, if reluctant, role in two of these misadventures. In July 1918, President Woodrow Wilson authorized the diversion of United States military forces to Vladivostok for participation in the Siberian Intervention, and to Murmansk and Archangel for participation in the Northern Intervention. The events of the intervention in the l atter zone, Murmansk and especially Archangel, are the subject of this thesis. Chapter one presents a background sketch of the world events--World War I and the Russian Revolution--that led to the intervention. Special consideration is given to Wilson's decision to sanction and participate in the military interventions. Wilson had initially been staunchly opposed to any interference in Russia, and his change of heart has been subjected to a great deal of historiographic analysis. No attempt has been made here to reproduce and evaluate all of the various interpretations of Wilson's action that have been advanced. Instead, the discussion centers on an analysis of documents relating to the Russian question, especially the document known as the Aide-Memoire, in which Wilson agreed to participate in the interventions, described the limitations of this participation, and defended his decision to intervene. In this context, special attention is given to the justifications Wilson presented, especially the plight of the Czech Legion. Chapters two through four are concerned with the course of events in North Russia from August 1918 through September 1919. The emphasis is on military actions, and the narrative draws heavily upon various accounts written by participants. In addition to descriptions of military strategy and tactics, topics including the failure of the Archangel government, interallied relations, leadership, and the mutinies of White, American and other allied units are discussed when appropriate. Chapter two describes the failure of the initial allied offensives in the late summer and early fall of 1918, as the British general in command in Archangel, General F. C. Poole, attempted to invade deep into the Russian interior with a multi-national army far too small to accomplish its task. Chapter three shows how a new British commander (General William Edmund Ironside) and a more realistic appraisal of the military situation led to a holding action in North Russia in the fall and winter of 1918. This period was marked by the growing strength of Trotsky's Red Army and the beginning of a Red counterattack that led to allied reverses on several fighting fronts. Special attention is given here to the loss of the city of Shenkursk which was a crushing loss for the allied cause . Chapter four covers events in the winter, spring, and summer of 1919. Important events of this period included the continuation of t he Red offensive, the withdrawal of United States forces, and finally the withdrawal of the British and other allied forces from North Russia. Chapter four presents an evaluation of the intervention in North Russia and a discussion of the lessons that might have been garnered from the experience. The position that the intervention was a total failure, both militarily and politically, is defended. The intervention had no significant impact on the war against the Central Powers, and it may have actually strengthened the position of the Bolshevik government. This chapter closes with a comparison of the intervention in North Russia and United States foreign policy after World War II, concluding that many of the same mistakes t hat had been made with regard to Russia in 1918 were again committed in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.

Year of Submission

1987

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Department of History

First Advisor

Timothy E. O'Connor

Second Advisor

Donald R. Whitnah

Third Advisor

Donald E. Shepardson

Comments

If you are the rightful copyright holder of this thesis and wish to have it removed from the Open Access Collection, please submit a request to scholarworks@uni.edu and include clear identification of the work, preferably with URL.

Date Original

1987

Object Description

1 PDF file (138 leaves)

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Included in

History Commons

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