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Document Type

Article

Abstract

Two beliefs which serve to prevent teaching, defining, or progress in ethics and morality are: 1. That we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is." We supposedly cannot derive value statements from factual statements. 2. That we cannot define ethical terms in terms of non-ethical terms (naturalistic fallacy). But can we derive an "ought" from an "is?" Does it ever make sense to do so? Let's take a case as it may arise. It is cold outside. I know that a chill may bring on a cold and I wish to avoid catching cold. I then conclude "I ought to wear my coat." When I put on my coat, I derive an ought from an is.

Publication Date

December 1980

Journal Title

Iowa Science Teachers Journal

Volume

17

Issue

3

First Page

26

Last Page

32

Copyright

© Copyright 1980 by the Iowa Academy of Science

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

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