Intellectual virtues and the epistemic evaluation of disagreement

Author

Hansen Garlington Breitling, University of Northern IowaFollow

Award/Availability

Open Access Honors Program Thesis

First Advisor

Reza Lahroodi

Keywords

Virtue epistemology;

Abstract

This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues, referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.

Year of Submission

2016

Department

Department of Philosophy and World Religions

University Honors Designation

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation University Honors

Date Original

5-2016

Object Description

1 PDF file (1 volume (unpaged))

Copyright

©2016 Hansen Garlington Breitling

Language

EN

File Format

application/pdf

Recommended Citation

Breitling, Hansen Garlington, "Intellectual virtues and the epistemic evaluation of disagreement" (2016). Honors Program Theses. 208.
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/hpt/208