Open Access Honors Program Thesis
This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues, referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.
Date of Award
Department of Philosophy and World Religions
University Honors Designation
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation University Honors
1 PDF file (1 volume (unpaged))
©2016 Hansen Garlington Breitling
Breitling, Hansen Garlington, "Intellectual virtues and the epistemic evaluation of disagreement" (2016). Honors Program Theses. 208.