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Faculty Publications
Deterrence Games And Social Choice: Asymmetry, Aggregation Of Preferences, And A Conjecture About Uncertainty
Document Type
Article
Journal/Book/Conference Title
International Interactions
Volume
15
Issue
3-4
First Page
203
Last Page
226
Abstract
Rational choice principles of mutual deterrence in 2 × 2 games elaborated for Prisoner's Dilemma and for Chicken are generalized to a variety of other, asymmetric games in which players’ preferences satisfy a Condition for Mutual Deterrence. Players’ preferences are taken to be aggregations from the preferences of subsidiary participants. It is shown that, unless all subsidiary actors hold deferrable preferences, the ordering of the player cannot be guaranteed to be deferrable. Uncertainty regarding the preferences of subsidiary actors is conjectured to make it more likely a player will adopt a deterrence strategy, no matter the opponent's preferences in fact. © 1990, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.
Department
Department of Geography
Original Publication Date
3-1-1990
DOI of published version
10.1080/03050629008434730
Recommended Citation
Fogarty, Thomas, "Deterrence Games And Social Choice: Asymmetry, Aggregation Of Preferences, And A Conjecture About Uncertainty" (1990). Faculty Publications. 4599.
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/facpub/4599