"The Effect of a Loser-Pays Rule on the Decisions of an American Litiga" by Jaime Leigh Loos

Article Title

The Effect of a Loser-Pays Rule on the Decisions of an American Litigant

Authors

Jaime Leigh Loos, University of Northern IowaFollow

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Decisions made by litigants are often not beneficial to society. A rule governing fee allocation in tort cases should encourage meritorious suits and discourage frivolous suits. America is one of the only countries in the world that does not use a loser-pays rule to assign legal costs. Employing a loser-pays rule could make the legal system more efficient and more equitable. The effect of a loser-pays rule is analyzed with economic theory and empirical evidence. Possible limitations of the rule are also considered. A carefully applied system of loser-pays may positively affect the U.S. legal system.

Publication Date

Spring 2005

Journal Title

Major Themes in Economics

Volume

Issue

First Page

Last Page

Copyright

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Language

File Format

application/pdf

Recommended Citation

Loos, Jaime Leigh (2005) "The Effect of a Loser-Pays Rule on the Decisions of an American Litigant," Major Themes in Economics, 7, 31-45.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol7/iss1/4