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Document Type

Article

Abstract

One reason firms engage in research and development is to lower production costs. Strong patent protection provides an additional incentive because firms may earn royalties from licensing their discoveries. This paper models the decision to engage in process research and development in a duopoly. A three stage game is posited and the equilibrium quantity and price of knowledge is calculated under various assumptions.

Publication Date

Spring 2004

Journal Title

Major Themes in Economics

Volume

6

Issue

1

First Page

3

Last Page

22

Copyright

©2004 by Major Themes in Economics

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

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