Document Type
Article
Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 attempts to address the problem of global warming by establishing national greenhouse gas emissions targets and timetables. To reduce emissions, the protocol outlines a tradeable pollution permit system. The system would allow countries with high abatement costs to purchase permits from countries with low abatement costs, equalizing global marginal abatement costs. The protocol, however, is destined to fail because of the free-rider problem and the problem of trade leakage. Given the correct guidelines, a tradeable pollution permit system would provide a market-based, cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Publication Date
Spring 2003
Journal Title
Major Themes in Economics
Volume
5
Issue
1
First Page
67
Last Page
74
Copyright
©2003 by Major Themes in Economics
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Recommended Citation
Mellem, Adam
(2003)
"Flaws in the Kyoto Protocol's Pollution Permit System,"
Major Themes in Economics, 5, 67-74.
Available at:
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol5/iss1/7