Faculty Publications

Race And National Football League Player Salaries After Controlling For Fantasy Statistics And Arrests

Document Type

Article

Keywords

Collective Bargaining Agreement, compensation, discrimination, National Football League, productivity, quantile regression, salary

Journal/Book/Conference Title

Journal of Sports Economics

Volume

22

Issue

4

First Page

359

Last Page

386

Abstract

This paper provides a novel contribution to studies of race and labor-market outcomes by using fantasy football statistics as a measure of performance across offensive skill positions and arrest data as a proxy for negative off-the-field behavior. We investigate whether the determinants of salaries and employment vary between 2005-06 and 2015-16, as the 2011 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) introduced extensive regulation of rookie contracts. As expected, fantasy football statistics are strong predictors of salaries and employment in both time periods, whereas race and arrests are not. Fantasy statistics and experience have diminishing marginal returns for both outcomes.

Department

Department of Economics

Original Publication Date

5-1-2021

DOI of published version

10.1177/1527002520975823

Repository

UNI ScholarWorks, Rod Library, University of Northern Iowa

Language

en

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