Faculty Publications

Title

Deterrence games and social choice: Asymmetry, aggregation of preferences, and a conjecture about uncertainty

Document Type

Article

Journal/Book/Conference Title

International Interactions

Volume

15

Issue

3-4

First Page

203

Last Page

226

Abstract

Rational choice principles of mutual deterrence in 2 × 2 games elaborated for Prisoner's Dilemma and for Chicken are generalized to a variety of other, asymmetric games in which players’ preferences satisfy a Condition for Mutual Deterrence. Players’ preferences are taken to be aggregations from the preferences of subsidiary participants. It is shown that, unless all subsidiary actors hold deferrable preferences, the ordering of the player cannot be guaranteed to be deferrable. Uncertainty regarding the preferences of subsidiary actors is conjectured to make it more likely a player will adopt a deterrence strategy, no matter the opponent's preferences in fact. © 1990, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

Original Publication Date

3-1-1990

DOI of published version

10.1080/03050629008434730

Share

COinS