Reversal of fortune: Dick Clark, John Culver, and Iowa politics in the 1970s

Clinton R. Boddicker

University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst

Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you

Recommended Citation

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst/4

This Open Access Presidential Scholars Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) by an authorized administrator of UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.
Reversal of Fortune: Dick Clark, John Culver, and Iowa Politics in the 1970s

96:19P
Presidential Scholars Senior Thesis/Project

Mr. Thomas G. Ryan
Department of History

By
Clinton R. Boddicker
#271103

Cedar Falls, Iowa
March 1, 1993
Introduction

In January of 1975, Iowa Democratic Party activists and office holders could not have been happier. In the previous November's mid-term elections, Iowans had elected or reelected five of the six Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, including newcomers Michael Blouin, Berkley Bedell, and Tom Harkin.¹ In addition, Democrats now controlled both branches of the state legislature. About the only thing for the state's Democrats to be unhappy about was the situation in the Iowa Executive Council, where the GOP controlled all seven offices (including that of governor).² Even so, what probably excited loyal Democrats more than anything else was the election of former Second District Congressman John C. Culver to the United States Senate.³ The Culver election, coupled with the election two years earlier of Culver's legislative assistant Dick Clark over then-incumbent Sen. Jack Miller, marked only the second time in the state's history that two Democrats had been elected in the same decade to the highest legislative body in the nation.⁴ Iowa had finally become a competitive two-party state.

What those jubilant Iowa Democrats did not know was that, within six years, Iowa's two liberal Democratic senators would be replaced by two conservative Republicans as a result of the 1978 and 1980 elections. Possible reasons for the 1972 and 1974 victories of Clark and Culver and their

²Ibid., 164-169.
³Ibid., 160-161.
subsequent defeats in 1978 and 1980 will be the focus of this paper. Limited background information about Clark and Culver will be utilized to familiarize the reader with the two candidates. Through the use of newspaper articles and public opinion polls from the *Des Moines Register*, the author will attempt to explore the situational context of each of the four races. Maps and charts will show the geographical distribution and characteristics of the vote as well as a way to link various demographic characteristics, such as urban/rural, ethnicity, and religion (especially considering the alleged importance of the issue of abortion and religion in politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s) with noticeable shifts of voters to or from either candidate from one election to the next. In addition, resources such as *The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government* will help to put national perspective on the elections. In the interest of clarity, the election and defeat of Clark will be discussed before the election and defeat of Culver. Throughout the Culver section, then, the author will look for similarities and differences between the two candidates and their election contests.

**Dick Clark and the Elections of 1972 and 1978**

The story of Dick Clark's 1972 success in the race for the U.S. Senate is the classic story of "home-town boy makes good." Clark was born shortly before the Great Depression on his grandfather's farm in Linn County. After his family moved to the Buchanan County town of Lamont in 1938, Clark spent most of his childhood and teenage years helping his parents run their general store. He was also an exceptional athlete in high school, playing baseball well enough to be considered by a scout of the St. Louis Cardinals.6

---

5Unless otherwise noted, the percentages in this paper have been compiled and tallied by the author.
Following a short stint as a truck driver, Clark attended Upper Iowa University in Fayette. Although his college career was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Clark managed to finish school and later enroll in graduate studies at the University of Iowa in 1954 to study European history. The Clark that emerged from college and military service (he added fluency in German and Russian to his knowledge of European history) differed markedly from the Clark who had never excelled academically in high school. After receiving his M.A. in history, he returned to Upper Iowa University to teach Russian, history, and political science. Clark also served as a Democratic precinct captain in Fayette.

As a result of the success of his election-day canvassing in Fayette, Clark was introduced to Second District Congressional Candidate John Culver and, subsequently, became Culver’s most important assistant from his first congressional campaign in 1964 until Clark left his staff in 1971. As Culver’s chief assistant, Clark spent most of his time in Cedar Rapids rather than Washington, D.C., continuously gauging local political sentiment, informing Culver of community developments in the Second District, and helping to build a successful constituent-service network system. In this way, Clark became well-known to party activists in the area.

Most Iowa Democrats expected Culver to challenge incumbent Sen. Jack Miller for the Senate in 1972 and Clark to succeed Culver as Second District

---

6 James Flansburg, "The Story of Dick Clark's Success," Des Moines Register, 12 November 1972, 1 (B) and 3 (B).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, 1950-1974 (Iowa City, Iowa: Iowa State Historical Department, Division of the State Historical Society, 1980), 143-144. Also Flansburg, 3 (B).
10 Larew, 157.
Congressman. After researching the idea and deciding that Miller was too entrenched politically to be challenged successfully, Culver publicly announced that he would not be a candidate for the Senate. Less than two weeks following Culver's surprise announcement, Clark declared his own candidacy for the Senate. Clark apparently was encouraged by the absence of a bitter primary fight for the nomination (as a result of the assumption that Culver would be the automatic nominee) and the vulnerable voting record of Miller, which Clark had researched for Culver in 1971.

Literally unknown outside the Second District, Clark waged an underdog campaign from the beginning, attacking Miller's record on Vietnam, Medicare, Social Security, insurance rates, and the eighteen year-old vote. In the closing days of the campaign Clark launched a blistering attack on Miller, accusing him of being beholden to special interests in the insurance industry. The weekend before the election, the Register predicted that Miller would win by a margin of 52-47%, but a closer look at the Iowa Polls conducted by the paper shows that Clark had been gaining on Miller since May, as indicated in the graph on the following page.

When all the votes were counted, Clark had upset Miller by garnering 55.5% of the two-party vote. In the days following the election, Clark

11 Ibid., 169.
12 Ibid., 170.
13 William Simbro, "Clark Credits Success to His 1,300-Mile Hike," Des Moines Register, 8 November 1972, 7 (A).
14 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1971-1972 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1972), 522, 538, 551, and 556. In all the graphs containing head-to-head races, the polls with asterisks denote the final numbers that the Register predicted for each candidate based on the leanings of the remaining undecided voters.
attributed his success to his now-famous 1,300-mile walk across the state during the summer of 1972.  

The walk itself, during which he donned a khaki safari outfit, apparently gave Clark enough visibility to overcome his unknown status and Miller's edge in statewide name recognition. In addition, the Des Moines Register credited other factors for Clark's success, such as the aforementioned well-placed attacks on Miller and the fact that Clark's campaign war chest, at over $200,000, was incredibly well-stocked for a challenger. Clark also benefitted from the first ever attempt of the Iowa Democratic Party to initiate a voter identification and get-out-the-vote drive. In addition to Clark's victory, Democrats won three of the six House races and provided George McGovern with 41% of the state's popular vote, his

---

16 Simbro.
18 Larew, 170-171.
ninth best showing in the country.\textsuperscript{19}

On a national scale, the success of Democratic candidates was mixed. President Richard M. Nixon won a landslide of historical proportions, getting 521 electoral votes from forty-nine states. At the same time, however, Nixon appeared to have short coattails as the GOP only gained twelve seats in the House and had a net loss of two seats in the Senate.\textsuperscript{20} According to\textit{ Congressional Quarterly}, Clark would be part of a slightly more liberal Senate as six of the thirteen new Senators were tagged as either liberal or moderate which was an increase, considering that nine of the thirteen they were replacing were regarded as conservative.\textsuperscript{21}

The information given about the reasons for Clark's victory can only serve as speculation, both on the part of Clark and on the part of the\textit{ Des Moines Register}. Clark's attacks on Miller's record, his walking campaign style, and what was happening on the national scene cannot really be translated into concrete, quantifiable explanations for his success. One way to produce such quantifiable explanations for Clark's electoral success is through comparing and contrasting a particular race or with other contests in the same geographical area. Another method of obtaining quantifiable results is by examining the geography of the election and then attempting to link various demographic characteristics with the vote in certain areas of the state. Both methods will be used in this paper. The information needed for such analysis will be included within the text (in the case of charts) or at the end of the paper (in the case of maps). Map 1 at the end of this paper shows all of the

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 5.
counties in the state and their names. This map will serve as a reference for the reader.

Map 2 shows the percentage of the Democratic vote in Iowa counties in the Clark-Miller race. From this map, a few general statements can be made regarding the geographical distribution of the vote. First, Clark did well in the large majority of counties, winning seventy-three of the ninety-nine. Clark's victory was also relatively widespread, but he did particularly well in the Second District counties of Linn, Jackson, and Dubuque where he had been working full-time building Culver's constituent-service network. Clark also scored over 60% in Benton and Johnson counties (both bordering on the Second District) as well as in Des Moines, Wapello, Story, and Carroll counties. The few pockets of anti-Clark counties or pro-Miller counties were located in extreme northwest and southwest Iowa. In addition, four counties in the Third District (Butler, Bremer, Franklin, and Grundy counties) also voted heavily for Miller.

Map 3 shows the relative change in the percentage of the Democratic vote from 1966 to 1972. One would expect Clark's percentages to show marked increases over those that the Democrat in 1966, E.B. Smith, received in his poor showing against Miller. From the map, one can see that Clark had, at the very least, a 20% increase in every county in the state. The largest increases came in the northwest corner of Iowa, a traditional Republican stronghold, and the eastern one-quarter of the state, the part of Iowa where Clark was best-

---

22 Ahern, 162-163.

23 Ibid. Also Lamberto, 411-412. The term "relative change" throughout this paper, as compared to the term "absolute change," means that, for example, if Clark received 20% of the two-party vote in 1972 and 40% of the two-party vote in 1978, his relative percentage increase would be 100%, because he doubled his earlier showing. Clark's absolute percentage increase, however, would only be 20%, i.e., Clark only gained twenty points in absolute terms from 1972-1978.
known.

When compared to the other statewide races, Clark's win was impressive indeed. The statewide Democratic ticket only received about 44% of the vote. Clark thus did almost twelve points better than the other Democrats running statewide. The question is, however, did Clark do about twelve points better than his fellow Democrats everywhere? By examining the statewide results for a relatively obscure race, Auditor of State, one can attempt to answer the above question. Map 4, the percentage of the Democratic vote for the 1972 Auditor's race, when compared with Map 2 shows that, in quite a few counties, Clark ran better than twelve points ahead of the Democratic candidate for Auditor. It should be noted that the Democratic candidate for Auditor ran behind the statewide Democratic ticket, 40.9% compared with 44%; as a result, Clark did about fifteen points better than the Democratic candidate for auditor.

In only nine counties did both Clark and the Democratic candidate for Auditor of State receive similar enough percentages of the vote to put those counties in the same category in the legends on the two corresponding maps (Mills, Montgomery, Page, Butler, Sioux, Lyon, Shelby and Dallas). For example, Mills County was in the group of least Democratic counties for both contests. In the other ninety counties, Clark's percentage of the vote was usually much higher than the Auditor candidate's percentage. As a result, the counties in the over 60% Democratic and the 50.1-59.9% Democratic groupings in Map 2 are

24 In this paper, the term "statewide Democratic ticket" refers to all races in a given year in which the two major-party candidates for those offices ran in all ninety-nine counties, with the exception of the U.S. Senate contest. For example, in 1972, the statewide ticket consisted of the Democratic candidates for President, Governor, Secretary of State, Agriculture, Treasury, Attorney General, and Auditor of State.
25 Ahern, 168-169.
usually found in the 40-49.9% Democratic or the less than 40% Democratic groupings in Map 3. Clark scored about the same percentage ahead of the Auditor, and probably the other statewide candidates, in nearly every part of the state.

The three demographic characteristics mentioned at the beginning of this paper will now be accounted for. When the data contained in Map 16 is combined with the average Democratic vote in each of the four categories listed on that map, one can compare Clark's vote in urban areas with that in rural areas.\(^{26}\) In the least urban counties, Clark received an average of 49.4% of the vote, or about six points under his statewide figure. The more urban the county, the larger percentage of the vote Clark received, with one small exception, as Table 1 below indicates. Interestingly, the category containing the most urban counties was the only category for this demographic characteristic in which Clark did better than he did in the state as a whole.

**Table 1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-23 (n=23)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-45.9 (n=44)</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-68.9 (n=19)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-92.1 (n=13)</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 17 shows the percentage of Iowa counties' German-born populations in 1885.\(^{27}\) German-Americans are by far the largest ancestry group in the state, making them the obvious group to examine in an attempt to try to


\(^{27}\)The State of Iowa, *Census of Iowa for the Year 1885* (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1885), 164-166.
determine how much relationship, if any, existed between ancestry and voting behavior. Assuming that the influence of the German-born in Iowa in 1885 can be extended to the types of people that still live in those counties today, one can proceed with the same type of analysis that was used in the preceding paragraph. The counties that could be classified the least German in 1885 were the weakest supporters of Clark's candidacy in 1972; likewise, the most German counties in 1885 were the most pro-Clark, as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% German</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 (n=47)</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 (n=31)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 (n=14)</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-or more (n=7)</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The upward progression in the percentages as the counties got more and more German was uninterrupted, i.e., there appears to be a direct relationship between Clark's percentages and the counties with heavy German ancestry, even though the relationship between German ancestry and voting behavior was weaker than that between urbanism and voting.

The final demographic characteristic is religion. The subject of religion has been divided into three distinct categories representing the three largest denominations in the state: Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and United Methodist. As with urbanism and German ancestry, the larger the Catholic percentage of church members (see Map 18), the larger Clark's share of the vote in 1972, as indicated in Table 3 on the following page.\(^{28}\) The reason for the strong pro-

\(^{28}\)National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980: An Enumeration by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported by 111
Clark vote in heavily Catholic counties probably stems from the fact that Catholics have long been part of the Iowa Democratic Party's base of support.

Table 3.

The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Catholic</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-14 (n=30)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=24)</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-81 (n=8)</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between the pro-Clark vote and the counties with large percentages of their respective populations belonging to a Lutheran church is less convincing than the other characteristics mentioned thus far, i.e., there is no clear, direct relationship between the 1972 Senate vote and Lutheran church membership. As Table 4 below indicates, Clark received a majority of the vote in each of the four categories shown on Map 19, but the percentages establish no clear pattern and, hence, no direct causal relationship.29

Table 4.

The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Lutheran</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 (n=33)</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=20)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-71 (n=9)</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final demographic characteristic dealing with religion, the percentage of counties' populations classified as Methodist, is also the final demographic characteristic that is used in this study.30 Unlike any of the

29 Ibid.
30 Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111.
other demographic characteristics used for the 1972 election results, there appears to be an inverse relationship between counties with high percentages of Methodists and a strong pro-Clark vote. The two least Methodist categories of counties (see Map 20) had the highest pro-Clark average percentages, and the two most Methodist categories of counties had the lowest pro-Clark average percentages, as can be seen in the following table.

Table 5.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Methodist</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-14 (n=20)</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-26 (n=47)</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-38 (n=23)</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-56 (n=9)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the average percentages in the most Methodist counties corresponds highly with the figures that Clark received from the least Catholic counties. Often, the more Catholic a county is, the less Methodist it is as well which also accounts for this inverse relationship between high percentages of Methodists and low Clark percentages.

The widespread nature of Clark's surprise victory in 1972 (refer again to Map 2) over an incumbent senator made his subsequent defeat in 1978 to former Lt. Gov. Roger Jepsen difficult to understand. This was especially true considering the high approval ratings that Clark had received, as evidenced in the following bar graph.31

30 Ibid.

31 The percentages contained in the two graphs are taken from the year-end publications of Iowa Polls by the Des Moines Register. Rather than listing all the sources used to make this graph and the graph of Culver's approval ratings, found later in the paper, the reader should simply refer to the section in the Bibliography containing the entries for the Iowa Polls used in this study.
The graph shows that, with the exception of the first two Iowa Polls taken in 1973, 60% or more of the Iowans polled supported Clark from late 1973 through the end of 1976. Clark peaked near 70% in January of 1977. Apparently, the heat of the campaign caused some slippage in Clark's numbers in 1978 as he temporarily dipped down to 52% approval while his disapproval rating shot up to 20%. Clark reversed the short-term downward slide by September 1978 when the Iowa Poll reported that he stood at 60% approval.\(^\text{32}\) The fact that Clark's negatives remained as high as they had been in March of 1978 is significant, even though he recovered from the hemorrhaging that he apparently suffered in his approval ratings in the early and middle part of 1978. This is significant because it shows that Jepsen, his opponent, was

\(^{32}\text{Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1977-1978 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1978), 902.}\)
having some success keeping Clark's negatives higher than they had normally been throughout his term in office. What kind of effort was Jepsen making to show Clark in an unfavorable light?

Jepsen based his entire strategy on high turnout by a coalition of narrow-focus groups, each of whose sole purpose in the 1978 Senate election was to defeat Dick Clark. He was expected to raise at least $600,000 from groups that were pro-life, anti-gun control, anti-Panama Canal Treaty, pro-business, and anti-labor. One of Jepsen's television ads even featured the main conservative politician in the United States: then former Governor Ronald Reagan of California. Clark, for his part, sought to strike much broader themes to try to deflect the negative criticism that he had received on such issues as U.S. involvement in Angola, his yes vote on the Panama Canal Treaties, his pro-choice position, and his opposition to tuition tax credits for parents who chose to send their children to private or parochial schools. He himself was expected to raise over $800,000 from various liberal special interest PAC's.

The Register reported that the 1978 race for the Senate appeared to center more on ideological differences between the two candidates and the effectiveness of single-issue voter groups than previous elections had. In one article written after the election, both candidates were accused by the Register of hurling the dirty words "liberal" and "conservative" too much without taking enough time to debate the issues that affected the majority of

---

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Iowans. The candidates, according to the Register had made the focus of the campaign too broad. In another article, the Register claimed that voters were focusing too much on these single issues without taking enough time to look at the broad picture of each candidate's record and beliefs and the effect that such beliefs might have on broad areas of policy. In other words, while the candidates' campaigns had become too broad, the voters had become too narrow-minded.

Even with all the talk of single-issue voters and the liberal and conservative labels, Clark appeared to have held the lead throughout the campaign. As can be seen in the following graph, a slight narrowing had taken place between the incumbent and the challenger as election day neared, albeit a smaller narrowing than had occurred in the 1972 Clark-Miller contest. The Iowa Poll, after factoring in undecided voters, predicted that Clark would hold on and win by a margin of 54-45%.

When the final votes were counted, Jepsen had upset Clark by getting 51.6% compared to Clark's 48.4%. Immediately following the election, the Register credited Jepsen's victory to the fact that the GOP had done a better job of getting its partisans to vote. Turnout appeared to be higher than normal in the rural counties and lower than normal in the big-city counties, another factor the Register gave for the Jepsen win. One factor that the Register

---


38 Farney.


40 The Register based this claim on the fact that the turnout in the seven most urban counties (Black Hawk, Dubuque, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Scott, and Woodbury) was 20,000 votes less in 1978 than in 1974, the preceding off-year election. According to my calculations, the decrease in the seven most urban counties was a little over 16,000 votes, which turned out to be a 5.5% decrease in the turnout in these counties. In addition, the Register stated that the rural turnout was heavier in 1978 than in 1974. According to my calculations, however, the turnout in the twenty-three most rural counties actually decreased 11.4% from 1974 to 1978, a larger decrease than was found in the
denied having a pivotal outcome on the race was the abortion issue, reporting that their study indicated that abortion "added no more than 25,000 votes to Jepsen's total." If this is the case, though, abortion had a significant impact on the race as Jepsen only beat Clark by about 26,000 votes. Logically, if even half of the 25,000 voters who voted for Jepsen because of abortion would have otherwise voted for Clark, Clark may well have won the election.

Clark, for his part, blamed his loss on the fact that 1978 was a more negative year than most, both in terms of the mood of the electorate and in terms of media coverage. He also credited the GOP with having better turnout than the Democrats. Perhaps most importantly, Clark blamed the persistence of single-issue interest groups, especially anti-abortion groups, in painting seven most urban counties. The Register may have confused the larger Republican margin of victory in many of these rural counties for an increased turnout. For example, in Adair County, Stanley beat Culver by about 200 votes in 1974, but Jepsen beat Clark by about 300 votes in 1978. This occurred even as the turnout in Adair County from 1974 to 1978 decreased 6.8%.
him as out-of-touch with the views of most Iowans.\textsuperscript{41}

In the rest of the state, Democrats fared about as poorly as Clark. Iowa's House delegation, on which Democrats had outnumbered Republican four to two, now stood at three Democrats and three Republicans. This was due to Tom Tauke's defeat of Michael Blouin in the Second Congressional District. Republicans also gained control of both houses of the Iowa General Assembly, compiling post-election margins of 28-22 in the Senate and 56-44 in the House. About the only thing that Iowa Democrats could be happy about was the election of a Democrat to the Executive Council as Tom Miller ousted Richard Turner for the post of Attorney General.\textsuperscript{42}

On the national scene, Republicans gained ground on the Democrats in both houses of Congress as well as winning more gubernatorial races than they had expected. Overall, the GOP gained three seats in the Senate, and more importantly for them, added more conservatives to their ranks than they had had before with the addition of Roger Jepsen (IA), William Armstrong (CO), and Gordon Humphrey (NH). The Republicans made modest gains in the U.S. House and gubernatorial races, picking up twelve and six seats, respectively.\textsuperscript{43}

What kinds of geographical distributions in the Iowa vote did this study find for 1978? By looking at Map 5, one can see that Clark only won twenty-three of the counties compared to the seventy-three that he won six years earlier.\textsuperscript{44} He only had one area in which he did consistently well: the central


\textsuperscript{44}The State of Iowa, \textit{Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978}. 
portion of the state centering around Polk and Dallas counties. Clark also did exceptionally well in Johnson County. Jepsen did best in the northwest and southwest sections, two historically Republican areas, as well as parts of northeast Iowa. By looking at the two maps, one notices that many of the counties that had given Clark between 50.1% and 59.9% in 1974 only gave him between 40% and 49.9% in 1978.

Map 6 shows the relative change in the Democratic share of the vote from 1972 to 1978. Notice that Clark actually had a percentage increase in five of the counties on the map; however, he still lost four of those five, winning only Audubon County. Notice also that Clark had relatively large percentage decreases in much of east central, northeast, and west central Iowa, and his largest percentage decreases came in Allamakee, Floyd, Grundy, and Woodbury counties, two of which he won in 1972. If one compares Map 6 with Map 3, one can see that Clark had heavy losses in 1978 in places where he had had sizable increases in 1972 over Smith's 1966 totals. These areas included parts of west central, east central, and northeast Iowa. In ways, then, the 1978 election may have been a return to normalcy, at least in terms of the way that the Democratic candidate preformed in 1966. Map 7 also shows that Clark lost much of his support in the eastern one-quarter of the state as well as in a section of west central Iowa.

Finally, Map 8, containing the geographical distribution of the vote in the 1978 Auditor's election, has been inserted to compare Clark's showing with another statewide race. Remember, in 1972 Clark ran about twelve points

---

45Ahern, 162-163. Also The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978.

46Ibid.

47The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978.
ahead of the Democratic ticket as a whole and about fifteen points ahead of the Democratic candidate for Auditor. In 1978, the Democratic ticket as a whole received 44.4% of the vote; thus, Clark still ran ahead of the ticket as a whole but only by about four points. He also ran closer to the Democratic candidate for Auditor (only a six point difference between the two) than he did in the previous election. Interestingly, when comparing both maps for Auditor (4 and 8), one can conclude that the vote in the Auditor's race was much more stable from one election to the next than the vote in the senate contest.

The demographic characteristics examined for the 1972 election have also been examined for the 1978 election. For example, the urban/rural demographic characteristic shows the same pattern in 1978 as it did in 1972, i.e., Clark did better in the most urban counties and did poorest in the least urban counties in Map 16. Starting with the least urban counties and continuing to the most urban counties, Clark received 43.2%, 44.9%, 44.7% and 51.1%.

Table 6.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
<th>% Dem. 1978</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-23 (n=23)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-45.9 (n=44)</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-68.9 (n=19)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-92.1 (n=13)</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although each of these numbers is significantly lower than those Clark received in each category of counties in 1972, one can only tell how much lower by examining the percentage decrease according to the degree of urbanism in each of the four categories of counties listed in the legend in Map
16. As the table above shows, the urban/rural cleavage cannot really be considered a factor in Clark's defeat as his percentage of the vote declined about the same amount in each of the four categories of counties.

The information on the most and least German counties tells a much different story than did the information on urban/rural differences within the state. In 1972, for example, the most German counties backed Clark's candidacy stronger than any of the other three categories of counties on Map 17, giving him about 56% of the vote. In a dramatic turnaround, the least German counties became Clark's biggest supporters in 1978. Unlike 1972, Clark's share of the vote differed little between the most and the least German counties. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the most German counties accounted for the largest percentage decreases of the four categories found on Map 17, as shown in the table below.

Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% German</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
<th>% Dem. 1978</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 (n=47)</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 (n=31)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 (n=14)</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-or more (n=7)</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some have speculated that religion's impact on the 1978 vote was closely linked to the issue of abortion.\textsuperscript{48} The Register said that, at the very most, the abortion factor accounted for 25,000 votes for Jepsen but that that amount was not enough to change the course of the election. Peter Hart, a Democratic

\textsuperscript{48}Hershey, 190.
pollster, found in a post-election survey that roughly 4% (about 26,000 voters) of those voting changed their preference because of the abortion question.\(^4^9\) Theoretically, a strong anti-Clark vote from large numbers of pro-life voters could have made the difference, or at least contributed in a significant way to a loose coalition of anti-Clark special interest groups. Interestingly, in an Iowa Poll printed on November 5, 1978, the Register reported that 4% of the electorate said that abortion was the most important issue regarding how they would vote in the Clark-Jepsen race.\(^5^0\)

Because abortion is so often linked with religion, if abortion really had an impact on the outcome of the race, one should be able to see significant losses for Clark in those counties in which the dominant religion opposed abortion. The Roman Catholic Church, strong in parts of Iowa as well as Iowa's largest denomination, has always taken a strong pro-life view. If the views of Catholics at large are consistent with the views of the church hierarchy, then one should see a slide in Clark's support in the most Catholic counties. However, finding evidence that the views of the laity and the church hierarchy coincide is difficult, as most Gallup polls taken on the subject show little difference between Catholics' and Protestants' views on abortion.\(^5^1\)

Any evidence that suggests that Catholic church members were more opposed to abortion than Protestant church members and thus in accord with the church hierarchy would help to establish that religion influenced the pro-life/anti-Clark vote. The Register, in 1978, produced two such pieces of evidence. First, an Iowa Poll printed on October 22 reported that the state's

\(^{4^9}\)Ibid.

\(^{5^0}\)Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1977-1978, 911.

Catholics, by a 2-1 margin, favored either banning abortions altogether on permitting them only to save the life of the mother whereas Protestants, by a 3-2 margin, favored allowing abortion under broader circumstances. Thus, the Catholic/Protestant cleavage on the issue of abortion that the Gallup Poll failed to find working at the national level apparently had the potential to work at the Iowa level. In addition, 12% of the state's voting Catholics, compared with only 4% of all Iowans, ranked abortion as the most important issue in the 1978 senate race.

If there really was a link between abortion, religion, and the Clark loss, the numbers should show significant losses for Clark in the heavily Catholic areas of the state as well as smaller losses in the more Protestant areas of the state. Remember, in 1972, the most Catholic counties had been Clark's biggest supporters, giving him almost 58% of the vote. In 1978, the most Catholic counties supported Clark at about the same level as the other three categories of counties found in Map 18. Going from the least Catholic counties to the most Catholic counties, Clark received 41.5%, 46.9%, 46.9%, and 46.8% of the vote. More important, perhaps, is the percentage drop for each of the four categories as shown in the table below.

Table 8.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Catholic</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
<th>% Dem. 1978</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-14 (n=30)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=24)</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-81 (n=8)</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 Ibid., 911.
As the table shows, Clark suffered his heaviest losses in the most Catholic counties. Apparently, the abortion issue moved enough Catholics to vote against Clark to contribute to the Jepsen victory.

Linking the Lutheran vote to the abortion issue is much more difficult to do since no Iowa poll breaks down the Protestant denominations into separate categories such as Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and so on. The official statements of the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in America, by far the two largest Lutheran bodies in the United States at the time, each published somewhat middle-of-the-road statements on abortion, affirming the right of women to make the choice to terminate an unwanted pregnancy yet, at the same time urging all those who are considering such a profound move to consider the impact of the decision. Because the Lutheran bodies took such middle-of-the-road positions, it would be hard to link the decrease, if any, in the Clark vote in the most Lutheran counties, the next most Lutheran counties, and so on with the subject of abortion. In addition, the second largest Lutheran body in Iowa at the time was the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, a far more conservative church on social issues. Because the author grouped all Lutherans together rather than separating the conservative Lutherans from the moderate Lutherans, any clear link between the vote in heavily Lutheran counties and the pro or anti-Clark vote would be hard to establish.

As Table 9 indicates, going from least Lutheran counties to the most Lutheran counties, Clark received averages in 1978 of 48.1%, 42.7%, 45.9%, and

44%. In addition, no clear correlation existed between either the most or least Lutheran counties and the percentage drop from 1972 to 1978.

Table 9.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Lutheran</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
<th>% Dem. 1978</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 (n=33)</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=20)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-71 (n=9)</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linking the Methodist counties to the abortion issue is easier in the sense that the Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church issued very liberal stands on the subject of abortion.55 In addition, the Annual Conference that met in 1979 commended Dick Clark, himself a United Methodist, for the work that he had done in the Senate to promote world peace.56 Because the Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church is composed of church hierarchy, local pastors, and local laity, it should not be surprising that, although Clark was supported the least in the most Methodist counties in 1972, those same counties supported him in 1978 at about the same rate as the other three categories of counties found in Map 20. In fact, the most Methodist counties in 1978 provided Clark with the smallest percentage drop of any of the categories of counties in any of the other demographic characteristics used in this study.

Table 10.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Methodist</th>
<th>% Dem. 1972</th>
<th>% Dem. 1978</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-14 (n=20)</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-26 (n=47)</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-38 (n=23)</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-56 (n=9)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the methods that have been used in this study cannot prove the reasons for either Clark's surprise victory over Miller in 1972 or his surprise defeat by Jepsen in 1978, they can at least point to some groups of Iowans who appear to have given Clark the support that contributed to his 1972 victory (urban Iowans, Iowans of German ancestry, and Catholics) as well as groups that helped contribute to his 1978 defeat (rural Iowans, Iowans of German ancestry, and Catholics). Even though the results of the study are not conclusive, they have been arrived at through more scientific means than the mere speculation given by the candidates themselves or by the major media. The Culver election of 1974 and his subsequent defeat in 1980 will be dealt with in the same manner. In addition, some comparisons between the elections and defeats of both men will be made.

**John Culver and the Elections of 1974 and 1980**

On the surface, the Culver election of 1974 and defeat of 1980 would appear to be similar to the Clark races in 1972 and 1978. After all, both Culver and Clark grew up in Eastern Iowa's Second Congressional District and relied on that district's urban triangle--Cedar Rapids, Clinton, and Dubuque--for much of their traditional Democratic base. Both also were considered
liberal and won their elections to the Senate in the early 1970s. Most of all, both failed to win second terms and were beaten by conservative Republicans. After exploring these similarities, however, one must stretch to find many examples of parallels between the two men and their candidacies. Indeed, their backgrounds and the circumstances surrounding their elections and defeats were quite different.

Whereas Clark had grown up poor in rural towns during the Great Depression, Culver came from a Cedar Rapids family that was prominent and relatively well off, if not wealthy by Iowa standards. Clark could only afford to attend a small liberal arts college close to home, Upper Iowa; Culver chose to continue a family tradition by attending Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as both his father and grandfather had done. While at Harvard Culver participated in varsity football, playing well enough to be drafted by the Chicago Cardinals. Even the sport of choice of the two men differed as Clark was a hometown baseball great!

Politically, Culver shared the Republican outlook of his parents throughout most of his college career. It was not until his graduate studies in Cambridge, England, his service in the U.S. Marine Corps, and his subsequent studies at Harvard Law School that he evolved into a liberal Democrat. Much of the reason for this evolution can be attributed to the fact that his law school years allowed Culver to become involved heavily in the 1962 senatorial campaign of Ted Kennedy, Culver's close friend and former roommate at Harvard. After serving a brief stint as Kennedy's legislative assistant,

The 1972 campaign is considered by many today to be a missed opportunity on Culver's part. Most Iowa Democrats had hoped that Culver would challenge Jack Miller for the senate seat, but Culver decided that Miller was too popular to beat. Because of Dick Clark's surprising upset of Miller, Culver had to bank his chances of winning a senate seat on the 1974 retirement of Harold Hughes. From the outset, even the victories of Clark and Culver were different as Clark had to overcome an incumbent whereas Culver competed for an open seat that his party had controlled previously. Culver also had the advantage of being a Democrat in what had the potential to be a big Democratic year, for the 1974 election came shortly after Watergate and President Nixon's humiliating downfall. Clark, two years earlier, had to run as a Democrat in the Nixon landslide.

Culver used Watergate as well as issues relating to the economy, defense, taxes, health care, and his ten-year cumulative voting record in the House against his opponent David Stanley, a veteran of the Iowa General Assembly and the unsuccessful GOP senatorial candidate against Hughes in 1968. According to Iowa Polls taken throughout the spring and summer, the candidates were locked in a relatively close race, as can be seen in the graph on the following page.

---

60 Ibid., 140-141.
Even after Culver had taken the lead in the September poll, Stanley narrowed the race in October but not enough to overcome Culver's early fall surge. When all the votes were cast, Culver beat Stanley with 52.4% of the statewide two-party vote, essentially by the same margin that the Register had predicted.62

Nationally, the 1974 election lived up to its billing as a heavily Democratic year. In the Senate, the Democrats picked up three seats, extending their majority over the Republicans to 61-39. Many senators elected in 1974 are still serving in that office today, including Dale Bumpers (AR), Wendell Ford (KY), John Glenn (OH), and Patrick Leahy (VT). In the House, the Democrats gained a whopping forty-three seats for a 291-144 majority.63 The Class of '74, which was among the youngest since the end of World War II, also had the

---

62Peglow, 160-161.
largest number of freshmen congressmen since the Congress elected in 1948.\textsuperscript{64} Overall, this gain of Democrats in the House and Senate, combined with the reelection victories of liberal Senate Republicans such as Bob Packwood (OR) and Jacob Javits (NY), contributed to a leftward shift in both houses. Democrats also won a net total of five gubernatorial races in 1974, extending their majority in this category to 36-14, the largest differential between the two parties since 1937.\textsuperscript{65}

In looking at the geographical distribution of the 1974 vote (see Map 9), one can see both similarities and differences between this election and the Clark triumph of 1972.\textsuperscript{66} Note first that Culver only won forty-seven counties statewide compared with the seventy-three counties that Clark won in 1972.

Luckily for Culver, three of the five counties that he won by very large margins (those counties giving him over 60\% of the vote) were the highly urban counties of Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque. These were also counties in, or bordering on, Culver's own Second District. In fact, the northeast and east central part of the state, i.e., the Second District, is one of the few sections that Culver did well in as a whole. Culver's best showing overall came in the central section of the state in counties such as Polk, Dallas, Warren, Story, Boone, Jasper, Marion, and Madison. Culver also did well in a string of counties bordering the Missouri River, a few counties in the southern two tiers, and five counties in the north central part of the state. Other than in those five places, however, Culver won only a scattered county here or there.

Map 10 shows the relative percentage change for the senate seat that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64}Ibid., 7.
\item \textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 13.
\item \textsuperscript{66}Peglow, 160-161. Also Ahern, 162-163.
\end{itemize}
Culver won in 1974 compared to how Hughes did in his race for the same seat in 1968.\textsuperscript{67} The fact that Culver scored a percentage increase in seventy counties over the Hughes percentages in 1968 shows that, even though Culver ran in a very close election, the Hughes victory was much closer. Indeed, Hughes beat Stanley by only a 50.4-49.6% margin.

When compared to the other Democrats running for statewide office, Culver's 1974 victory was not as impressive as Clark's in 1972. Clark won almost 56% of the vote compared to 44% for all the other candidates running in statewide races. Culver only ran about six percentage points ahead of the statewide Democratic ticket in 1974, a better than usual Democratic year in the nation as a whole. When comparing Culver's 1974 geographic distribution of the vote against the geographic distribution of the vote for the 1974 Democratic candidate for Auditor (see Map 11), one can see that in only five counties did both Culver and the Auditor candidate score between 50 and 59.9%, Monroe, Dallas, Monona, Wapello, and Des Moines.\textsuperscript{68} In no counties did the candidate for Auditor garner 60% or more of the Democratic vote. In fact, Culver ran about seven points ahead of the Auditor candidate, about the same percentage ahead he ran against the Democratic ticket as a whole.

The three demographic characteristics used in analyzing the Clark/Miller and Clark/Jepsen races (urban/rural, German ancestry, and religion) will also be used to analyze the Culver elections in 1974 and 1980. For example, when the data in Map 16 is combined with the average percentage of the Democratic vote in the 1974 election, one can compare how well Culver did according to


\textsuperscript{68}Peglow, 166-167.
the degree of urbanism in Iowa's counties, as indicated in the table below.

Table 11.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-23 (n=23)</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-45.9 (n=44)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-68.9 (n=19)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-92.1 (n=13)</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As happened with Clark in 1972, the more urban the county (with one exception), the higher the average percentage Democratic. Not surprisingly, the most urban counties, those which were 69-92.1% urban, gave Clark his highest average percentages, coming in at 55.8%. The category of counties which was classified as most urban was the only category of counties which gave Culver a higher average percentage of the vote than he received statewide.

No clear relationship between how German a county was (refer again to Map 17) and the size of its Culver vote existed. The range of the average percentages for Culver between the least German counties and the most German counties was only four percentage points compared with the ten point range found in Table 11. Nevertheless, Culver did appear to do better in the most German counties.

Table 12.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 (n=47)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 (n=31)</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 (n=14)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-or more (n=7)</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The range was neither as large as Clark's 1972 range of average percentages of the vote nor was the relationship between German ancestry and the Democratic vote as clear. Numbers such as these make it difficult to say that the more German a county was the more likely it was to support Culver heavily or vice versa.

Of the three religious denominations used in this study, the percentage of a county's population classified as either Catholic or Methodist appear to show the greatest correlation between a pro or anti-Culver vote in 1974. According to the table below, the range of the Culver percentage between the group of least Catholic counties and the most Catholic counties (see Map 18) was about thirteen points, far larger than the range for either urbanism characteristic or German ancestry. This was also a larger range than Clark had for the same counties in 1972. In short, the more Catholic a county was, the more Democratic it voted in the 1974 U.S. Senate contest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Catholic</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-14 (n=30)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=24)</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-81 (n=8)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The more Methodist a county was (see Map 20), the less likely its residents would support Culver in 1974. This is the same type of inverse relationship seen with this characteristic that was displayed in the 1972 Clark victory. The range from the most to least Methodist counties was about seven percentage points, larger than the range for the German/non-German
characteristic but smaller than for the urban/rural or the Catholic demographic characteristics.

Table 14.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Methodist</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-14 (n=20)</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-26 (n=47)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-38 (n=23)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-56 (n=9)</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, like the 1972 Clark election, the average percentages for the least to the most Lutheran counties and their relationship to the Culver vote is less clear, as seen in Table 15 below. Whereas Clark received average majorities in each of the four categories of counties in Map 19, Culver only received a majority in one, that category of counties with 30-44% of their respective populations classified as Lutheran.

Table 15.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Lutheran</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 (n=33)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=20)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-71 (n=9)</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Culver's narrow victory in 1974 meant that he might be vulnerable in his 1980 reelection bid. Indeed, national parties often target senators for defeat who won their initial elections to the Senate by a very slim margin. There have, however, been senators who have won narrowly in their initial contests and then won by increasing margins in following elections. If this had been all that Culver had to worry about, there would not have been the anxiety that
existed in his campaign in 1980. Some of the other factors that worried Culver were the loss of Dick Clark (Culver's ideological twin) to a conservative Republican two years earlier, the apparent success of the anti-abortion/pro-family coalition in 1978 and their pledge to target Culver in 1980, the growing unpopularity of the national Democratic party as a result of the poor economy and the weak leadership of President Jimmy Carter, and the prospect of running against popular Third District Congressman Charles Grassley, who had run unopposed in 1978 and thus had a sizable war chest of funds at his disposal. The most ominous forewarning of defeat for Culver was the unfavorable trend in his approval ratings as measured by Iowa Polls taken since he had assumed office.

---

69 Hershey, 222-223.
70 Ibid. Also James Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Surge to Join Reagan, Big Rural-Area Vote Helps Grassley Victory," Des Moines Register, 4 (A).
Note in the graph on the previous page that, only once during his six-year term (January of 1977), did Culver receive above 50% approval. In every other Iowa Poll in which Iowans were asked if they approved, disapproved, or had no opinion of the job that John Culver was doing as U.S. Senator, Iowans always responded with less than 50% approval. Probably more important are Culver's final three approval ratings. In March and July of 1978 and in January of 1979, Culver only managed to win the approval of 39%, 36%, and 38%, respectively.\footnote{Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1977-1978, 878 and 902. Also Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1979 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1979), 926.} In addition, instead of having high disapproval ratings, Culver had very large percentages of Iowans who had no opinion, either good or bad, of him. The fact that between 40 and 50% of the state's population had no opinion of him for his entire six-year term was a sign that Culver's reelection chances were in doubt. Because such large percentages had no opinion of Culver, Grassley could manufacture unfavorable opinions of Culver more easily during the campaign by molding public opinion in his favor.

Grassley, from the beginning, sought to paint Culver as out-of-touch with the concerns and feelings of normal, everyday Iowans.\footnote{Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A).} Grassley pointed out that Culver had actually lived in the state for only a very short period of time between his high school days and 1980. He noted that Culver spent little time in the state, especially when compared to Grassley's work as a farmer, teacher, and factory worker in the state.\footnote{David Yepsen, "Grassley Roots Sunk Deep in Frugal Soil," Des Moines Register, 5 (A).} In fact, Grassley's rural image was one of his major selling points. Grassley also accused Culver of being too liberal and too much a part of the Democratically-controlled Congress, which Grassley blamed for the nation's high inflation rate. For his part, Grassley campaigned...
on the Reagan platform, calling for increased defense spending and lower taxes. These issues apparently worked in Grassley's favor, as he jumped out to a substantial lead in the Iowa Polls taken in the summer of 1980.

Culver met the Grassley attack head-on by forcefully defending his liberal principles. Apparently, Culver believed that Clark two years earlier had failed to appear passionately dedicated to liberalism and had wavered too much under the weight of Jepsen’s attacks. Culver vowed not to make the same mistakes that Clark had made. He began by attacking Grassley for being too conservative as well as an ineffective member of the Iowa Congressional delegation. In offering proof that Grassley was ineffective, Culver pointed out that Grassley voted in opposition to the rest of the state’s Congressional delegation, Republicans included, on 612 House roll call votes in his six years in that body. Culver’s forceful defense of himself and his ideology, coupled with his attacks on Grassley, helped him regain the lead in the Iowa Polls taken in the early fall.

By election day, the Register predicted that the race would be close, and, after factoring in the undecided likely voters, the Register concluded that Grassley would prevail by the narrow margin of 51.6% to 48.4%. After all the votes were counted, Grassley prevailed by a larger margin than expected, winning 54% of the two-party vote. In the rest of the state, Republicans

---

75 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1980 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1980), 990.
76 Hershey, 223.
78 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 1006.
81 Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1981-1982 (Des Moines, Iowa: The
also did well, winning control of Iowa's Congressional delegation for the first time since 1972. The Republican candidate for President, Ronald Reagan, won Iowa with almost 58% of the two-party vote. The GOP also retained control of both houses of the Iowa General Assembly.  

Nationally, the Grassley win contributed to a Republican landslide. Reagan won the Presidency with a forty-four state romp, rolling up a 489-49 margin in the electoral college. In addition, the GOP captured control of the Senate for the first time since since the 1947-48 session. More important than the increase in numbers that the Republicans had in the new senate was the decidedly more conservative ideologies of many of the GOP's new senators.

---

State of Iowa, 1981, 146-147.

82 Ibid., 144-145 and 148-150. Also Charles Bullard and Bonnie Wittenburg, "GOP Mulls Leader Posts After Legislative Takeover," Des Moines Register, 1 (A).

In addition to Grassley's Iowa victory, conservative candidates won in Washington, Idaho, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and New Hampshire. The new faces in the Senate from those states included Slade Gorton, Steve Symms, James Abdnor, Bob Kasten, Dan Quayle, Jeremiah Denton, Mack Mattingly, Paula Hawkins, John East, and Warren Rudman. Some of the defeated liberal senators in addition to Culver included Frank Church (ID), Birch Bayh (IN), Warren Magnuson (WA), and George McGovern (SD). The GOP also gained seats in the U.S. House as well as picking up four governorships.

In addition to the points that have been analyzed in the discussions of the 1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, i.e., the geographical distribution of the vote, the senate race compared to the statewide Democratic ticket, and the taking into account of the three demographic characteristics (urban/rural, German ethnicity, and religion), one other point needs to be emphasized when analyzing the Culver loss of 1980. This other point is how well Culver fared in Grassley's Third District and how well Grassley did in Culver's former Second District.

Map 12, the geographical distribution of the vote in the Culver/Grassley race, shows that Culver lost heavily in most areas of the state. The only area in which Culver consistently won was in the central Iowa counties of Polk, Boone, Story, Webster, Dallas, and Warren. Culver also did fairly well in Monroe, Wapello, Des Moines, Lee, Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque counties. Overall, Culver won only thirteen of the state's ninety-nine counties. Interestingly,

---

84 Ibid.
86 Gautier, 146-147.
when Map 12 is compared to Map 5 (the geographical distribution of the vote in Clark's 1978 loss), one notices that the Culver loss was much more widespread than the Clark loss, as evidenced by the fact that, in 1980, Culver had forty-eight counties that supported him with 20.7-39.9% of the vote while Clark had only seventeen counties in that category. On the whole, both Clark and Culver retained the counties in central Iowa the best.

Map 13 shows the relative percentage change in the Democratic Senate vote from 1974 to 1980. Notice that Culver's percentages suffered the most in the western one-fourth of the state as well as in east central, northeast, and north central Iowa. Note also that east central, northeast, and north central Iowa is the area that contains the Second and Third Congressional Districts. Map 14, showing the absolute percentage gain or loss for Culver from 1974 to 1978, shows much the same phenomenon as Map 13, i.e., Culver lost much support in the areas contained in his and Grassley's Congressional Districts as well as in the western one-quarter of the state. In fact, the average percentage that Culver received in both can be seen in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statewide</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table above suggests, Culver lost substantially in the Second and

---

87 Ibid. Also Peglow, 160-161.
88 Gautchier, 146-147.
the Third Congressional Districts, two areas that he probably needed to do well in if he were to have any chance of winning reelection. Interestingly, Culver lost a larger percentage, both absolute and relative, in the Second District than he lost in the state as a whole. Similarly, Culver's 13.1% absolute point loss and his 27.1% relative point loss in the Third District is directly related to Grassley's success as a Congressman there and his popularity in the area.

It is hard to compare the 1980 Culver/Grassley race with the statewide Democratic ticket because in 1980 there was only one other statewide election: the 1980 Presidential contest between President Carter and Ronald Reagan. This was the only other statewide contest because, after 1974, the members of Iowa's Executive Council were elected every four years rather than every two years thus making non-Presidential election years those in which large numbers of candidates ran on a statewide basis.

Map 15 shows the percentage Democratic in the 1980 Presidential election in Iowa. Note that Carter and Culver had the same areas of strength centered in the east central and central sections of the state. Note as well that Carter won a majority in only four counties: Wapello, Des Moines, Johnson, and Dubuque. Statewide, Culver ran about three points ahead of Carter, and judging by the great similarity in Maps 12 and 15, he ran about that far ahead in most counties as well.

How did Culver's 1980 defeat compare to his 1974 victory in terms of the three demographic characteristics being studied? Did Culver suffer the most at the hands of the same groups that contributed to Clark's 1978 loss? The relationship between the least urban to most urban counties and the 1980 Culver vote is outlined in the following table. Note that, in the most urban

---

89 Ibid., 144-145.
counties, Culver still garnered an average of 50% of the vote. Even though this constituted an absolute point loss of about six percentage points for Culver compared to his 1974 average percentage, the voters in the most urban counties tended to desert Culver in far smaller proportions than did those in the less urban counties.

Table 17.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-23 (n=23)</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-45.9 (n=44)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-68.9 (n=19)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-92.1 (n=13)</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Culver loss can definitely be linked to the urban/rural phenomenon. The more rural a county was, the greater the possibility that Culver's would lose heavily in that county. This direct relationship between ruralism and Culver's loss was much more apparent than in the case of Clark's 1978 loss (refer to Map 1).

The information on German ancestry and the Culver vote in 1980 is similar to the same information found in the 1978 loss of Clark to Jepsen, i.e., the most German counties showed a drop off in support of Culver from 1974 to 1980 that was twice as large as the drop off of the least German counties. Instead of the most German counties being the most supportive of Culver as they were in 1974, the least German counties became the strongest supporters of Culver in 1980, even though they supported Culver with an average of only 42.6% (see the table below and refer also to Table 2).
Table 18.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% German</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 (n=47)</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 (n=31)</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 (n=14)</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-or more (n=7)</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the Culver numbers on this subject to the Clark numbers, one can see that the only difference between the two is that the relative percentage change from 1974 to 1980 for the group of counties with 5-9% of their respective 1885 populations classified as German was larger than for the group of counties with 10-14% of their populations German. This put a break in the size of the percentage drops for the Culver numbers whereas the Clark numbers showed increasing relative percentage decreases of 9%, 16%, 20%, and 21% from the least German to the most German counties.

In 1974 Catholic counties were Culver's strongest supporters, Methodist counties were his weakest supporters, and Lutheran counties were somewhere in between. Remember also that, in considering Clark's 1978 loss, the voters in Catholic counties deserted Clark in far larger numbers than did the voters in Methodist counties, a phenomenon that may have been linked to abortion. The notion that the Culver defeat was similar to the Clark defeat on the issue of religion is only partially true. For example, the more Catholic a county tended to be, the greater likelihood that Culver's average percentage would drop by a large amount. This happened in the Clark defeat as well. One big difference between the two elections needs to be mentioned, however. In the case of Culver, the least Catholic counties (4-14% Catholic) abandoned him at a very
high rate (-18%) and, in fact, deserted Culver at a higher rate than the counties that were 15-29% and 30-44% Catholic. This makes the relationship between highly Catholic counties and large anti-Culver voting in 1980 less clear than the same information for the anti-Clark vote in 1978.

Table 19.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Catholic</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-14 (n=30)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=24)</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-81 (n=8)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the Clark defeat of 1978, Culver lost much less support among heavily Methodist counties than he did in counties where Methodists were a small part of the church membership. It should be noted, though, that the most Methodist counties gave Culver such a low average percentage of the vote in 1974 that the relatively small percentage decrease in 1980 was because the starting point was so low. At any rate, the more Methodist a county was the more loyal it remained to Culver in 1980.

Table 20.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Methodist</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-14 (n=20)</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-26 (n=47)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-38 (n=23)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-56 (n=9)</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As to the question of whether or not the abortion issue played a role similar to that in the 1978 election is unclear because the Register took no poll in either 1979 or 1980 that dealt specifically with religion and the abortion issue. Aside from that, however, the Register reported that, in a poll taken as voters left the polling places, 10% of the Grassley voters voted for him because of his tough, pro-life position. If these voters would have voted for Culver otherwise, then the poll might be relevant, but there is no proof that this group would have modified its voting behavior in this manner. What is clear from this study, however, is that single issue voters can make a difference in close elections, but those voters are hard to identify and quantify.

As with the 1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, there is no evidence of a clear relationship between Lutheran church membership and 1980 voting behavior in the Culver-Grassley contest.

Table 21.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Lutherans</th>
<th>% Dem. 1974</th>
<th>% Dem. 1980</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
<th>Relative Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 (n=33)</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 (n=37)</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44 (n=20)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-71 (n=9)</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting point to consider in the Culver/Grassley election is the fact that the most Lutheran counties deserted Culver in larger numbers than did counties with relatively small Lutheran populations as can be seen in the table below. Note as well that the -24% relative loss almost reached the levels of

---

the relative loss in the most Catholic counties. A possible explanation for this huge relative percentage decrease is the large number of heavily Lutheran counties located in Grassley's Third District, an area where he dominated Culver.

**Conclusion**

The political and emotional setback suffered by the Iowa Democratic Party hierarchy and its activists as a result of the defeats of Clark and Culver in the 1978 and 1980 elections, coupled with the loss of majority control in both houses of the Iowa General Assembly, left many party loyalists wondering whether or not the success of the party and its candidates in the 1960s and 1970s was simply a temporary phenomenon. Later events would indicate that that line of thinking was not correct. The Democratic Party in Iowa, by the end of the 1970, had achieved too much through superior organization (voter identification and get-out-the-vote programs) to return to the days of being the GOP's perennial punching bag. Indeed, the 1980s would show that the Iowa Democratic Party would rebound and be victorious in many county, state, and national races.

At the same time, the defeats of Clark and Culver produced attempts within the party at the time to better understand the reasons for the two candidates' lack of success in winning second terms. Inevitably, this led to talk of similarities between the types of persons Clark and Culver were ideologically when compared to their two conservative opponents, Jepsen and Grassley. One major weakness in simply looking at the two races as two liberals being replaced by two conservatives in a period of apparently increasing conservatism in the country is that this approach failed to take into
account the striking differences in the situational contexts surrounding the two men and their political careers. This study has suggested that the two sets of races were similar in limited respects but strikingly different in others.

This study has also attempted to determine the relationships, if any, between voting behavior and various demographic characteristics. Through this type of empirical analysis, the author found that a plausible explanation for the victories of Jepsen and Grassley are that they did a good job of prying away some of Clark's and Culver's natural bases of power, such as Catholics, Germans, and those Living in the state's urban areas. The abortion issue, at least in 1978, also played a role. Although this type of study cannot conclusively show the reasons for the election or defeat of either candidate, it can point to possible, or even probable, reasons.

Clark's victory in 1972 over Jack Miller was definitely a surprise because Clark was virtually unknown in many parts of the state, he had to compete in the Nixon landslide year, and he was running against a two-term senator who had won by a relatively wide margin in 1966. Likewise, Clark's defeat in 1978 was also a surprise because he had been held in such high esteem by his fellow Iowans, according to a variety of Iowa Polls taken throughout his term. In addition, Clark ran against an opponent, Roger Jepsen, who had only lukewarm support from members of his own party, especially from those within the moderate wing of the state's GOP led by Governor Robert Ray. Indeed, it was widely believed at the time of his announcement that Jepsen's time in the Iowa political spotlight had come and gone. In spite of his apparent advantages, Clark lost to Jepsen in a race that may have hinged on Jepsen's ability to attract enough single-issue voters to band together in an anti-Clark coalition.
The two elections involving Culver were held in very different circumstances. In 1974, Culver, already an immensely popular member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Second Congressional District, ran for an open seat held by Harold Hughes, a member of his own party. In addition, the Watergate scandal and the downfall of the Republican President made Culver's electoral chances much better. Finally, Culver's opponent, David Stanley, was only fairly well-known throughout the state (certainly not as well-known as Clark's first opponent, Miller) and had already been unsuccessful in a previous try to win a seat in the U.S. Senate. Despite all of these advantages, Culver only beat Stanley by the barest of margins, not even coming close to equaling the impressive showing of Clark two years earlier.

Unlike Clark, Culver failed to increase his own popularity during his six years in the Senate. This failure of Culver to solidify his position in public opinion polls made him easy prey for Charles Grassley, himself an immensely successful member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Third Congressional District. The stories of both Clark and Culver, aside from being interesting portraits of two of the state's (and the Iowa Democratic Party's) most important political leaders in the second half of the Twentieth Century, help us to better understand the nature of Iowa politics during the 1970s, a volatile and exiting time in the state's history.
Map 1.
Iowa's 99 Counties

Key:
Map 2.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for Clark-Miller 1972 Election

Map 3.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1966-1972

Map 4.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for State Auditor's Race, 1972

Map 5.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for Clark-Jepsen 1978 Election

Map 6.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

Map 7.
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

Map 8.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for State Auditor's Race, 1978

Map 9.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for Culver-Stanley 1974 Election

Map 10.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1968-1974

Map 11.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for State Auditor’s Race, 1974

Map 12.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties for Culver-Grassley 1980 Election

Map 13.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

Map 14.
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980

Map 15.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties in Presidential Race, 1980

Map 16.
Percentage of Population Classified as "Urban" for Iowa Counties, 1980

Map 17.
German-Born Population of Iowa Counties, 1885

Source: The State of Iowa, Census of Iowa for the Year 1885 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1885), 164-166.
Map 18.
Catholics as a Percentage of Total Church Members in Iowa Counties, 1980

Source: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980: An Enumeration by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported by 111 Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111.
Map 19.
Lutherans as a Percentage of Total Church Members in Iowa Counties, 1980

Source: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980: An Enumeration by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported by 111 Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111.
Map 20.
Methodists as a Percentage of Total Church Members in Iowa Counties, 1980

Source: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980: An Enumeration by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported by 111 Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111.
Bibliography


Bullard, Charles, and Bonnie Wittenburg. "GOP Mulls Leader Posts After Legislative Takeover." *Des Moines Register*, 9 November 1980, 1 (A) and 3 (A).


Flansburg, James. "GOP Success Traced to Grass Roots: No Compelling Issues in Results, Studies Show." *Des Moines Register*, 9 November 1978, 1 (A) and 18 (A).


[Author not listed]. "Iowa Voters Join Surge to Reagan, Big Rural-Area Vote Helps Grassley Victory." *Des Moines Register*, 5 November 1980, 1 (A) and 4 (A).

[Author not listed]. "New 'Dirty Names' From Iowa's '78 U.S. Senate Race." (Editorial) *Des Moines Register*, 9 November 1978, 17 (A).

[Author not listed]. "Ray Is Easy Winner for Reelection, Close Race for Neu, Gannon." *Des Moines Register*, 8 November 1972, 1 (A) and 7 (A).

[Author not listed]. "The Story of Dick Clark's Success." *Des Moines Register*, 12 November 1972, 1 (B) and 3 (B).


National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. *Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980: An Enumeration by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported by 111 Church Bodies*. Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Center, 1982.


Simbro, William. "Clark Credits Success to His 1,300-Mile Hike." *Des Moines Register*, 8 November 1972, 7 (A).


______. *Census of Iowa for the Year 1885.* Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1885.

