1986

Plato's Crito: A speech act and structuralist analysis for performance

Gary Gerard Gute

University of Northern Iowa

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Plato's Crito:
A Speech Act and Structuralist Analysis for Performance

An Abstract of a Thesis
Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

Gary Gerard Gute
University of Northern Iowa
May 1986
ABSTRACT

Although scholars recognize many of Plato's early dialogues as works of significant dramatic merit, few attempts have been made to either systematically analyze them for performance or to dramatize them in their entirety. A traditional Aristotelian analysis does not facilitate bringing the dialogues to fruition in theatrical performance because of their lack of physical, external action. This study, recognizing the dramatic potential of Plato's Crito, undertakes an analysis of the dialogue for the purpose of performance. Two methodologies are applied: Speech Act and Structuralist Analyses. The study culminates in a dramatic production of the Crito.

According to speech act theory, there is action (a series of speech acts) inherent in all discourse or dialogue. In this analysis, all illocutionary speech acts in the Crito are identified, classified, and labeled by their appropriate speech act verbs. These findings are explicated in Chapter 3. The speech act methodology provides a device for identifying action in the Crito, and illuminates character motivation, subtext and objectives, and the overall dialogic action of the work. It permits the unique logic of the Crito--its action in the language of the deep structure rather than action in enactment on the surface--to be explored.

The Structuralist Methodology, presented by Richard Hornby in his text Script into Performance: A Structuralist View of Play Production, examines the script specifically for the purpose of performance. First, recurring literal and figurative images and rhetorical devices are
identified and clustered into five groups of significant elements: time, life and death, authority, questioning, and Crito's responses to Socrates. Next, these significant elements are analyzed spatially. That is, distilled from the text and removed from their context, their hidden patterns are identified in an attempt to discover how they contribute to the dialogue as a whole. The Crito is then analyzed temporally. Synthesizing the findings of the spatial analysis, the temporal analysis examines the Crito as a space-time complex for production. The significant elements are examined using Hornby's five analytical terms: choice, sequence, progression, duration, and tempo. Finally, a unifying principle for production of the Crito is provided.

The final chapter of the study discusses the production of Plato's Crito, examining acting and characterization, the treatment of the text in performance, technical aspects of the production, and the influence of the speech act and structuralist analyses upon the production of the Crito.
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This Study by: Gary Gerard Gute

Entitled: Plato's Crito:

A Speech Act and Structuralist Analysis for Performance

has been approved as meeting the thesis requirement for the
Degree of Master of Arts in Communication and Theatre Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Dean Thomas Thompson, chairman of the thesis committee, whose uncompromising standards of scholarship, academic open-mindedness, and enduring patience and support have facilitated successful completion of this study. Committee members Jay Edelnant and George Glenn provided invaluable evaluation and suggestions. One-time committee member Jack Gilbertson introduced me to the structuralist methodology and demonstrated a zest for dramatic theory and criticism that I have found infectious. I would also like to acknowledge Marcel Pop-Cornis of the university's English department faculty, who illuminated speech act theory and other useful methods of literary criticism.

Actors Bill O'Brien and Jan Robbins most generously dedicated their time and talent to performing the roles of Socrates and Crito for the production of Plato's Crito.

Most of all, I would like to thank my wife, Deanne, whose patience, support, and assistance has been invaluable.
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Scholars of philosophy have suggested that Plato deserves recognition as a dramatist:

Plato . . . is a poet and a dramatist. And this does not mean besides being a philosopher . . . . Plato is a philosopher because he is a poet. True philosophy is poetry--poetic insight and vision, the imaginative enhancement of life. At least, we are so convinced while we are reading Plato.¹

We have record of thirty-six Platonic dialogues, including a handful of dubious and spurious works. It has been noted that in many of his dialogues, especially the earlier ones, Plato skillfully employs dramatic devices, including character, theme, dialogue, setting, stage descriptions, and stage directions. Although scholars recognize Plato's skill as a dramatist, few efforts have been made to examine the dialogues as dramatic works. A comprehensive computer search of Dissertation Abstracts International from 1861 to 1983 has revealed only five doctoral dissertations which have examined Platonic dialogues--the Lysis, the Theaetetus, the Republic, and the Gorgias--as works of dramatic merit.² None of these dissertations investigate or even suggest the dialogues' potential as portable or stageable pieces of drama.³
There are, I suspect, two reasons why Plato's dialogues have been neither systematically analyzed for performance nor dramatized in their entirety. First, they have been labeled "dialogues," which implies that they are not plays. It is important to consider, however, that the playwright of Plato's day, wishing to dramatize real situations and persons, had only two options—he could write either tragedy or comedy. Both genres restricted the playwright to definite external structures and metrical schemes, and both were severely limited in subject matter. Finding neither medium suitable for depicting Socrates, his beloved teacher, Plato did not conform to these conventions; this resulted in a literary form known as the Socratic dialogue. Second, not resembling traditional dramatic works, the dialogues may not have been analyzed for performance because critics have lacked a felicitous methodology for doing so. An Aristotelian critic, independently examining plot, character, and thought in a dialogue, would indeed discover dramatic elements. However, the critic would be hard pressed to identify a sequence of external events or actions, a rudimentary procedure in the traditional Aristotelian analysis; in the dialogues there are no battles, no marriages, no fiery arguments. Aristotle's methodology does not facilitate bringing the dialogues to fruition in theatrical performance. Traditionalists may have thus deemed Plato's works non-performable, albeit dramatic, literary texts.

This study, recognizing the dramatic potential of Plato's Crito, undertakes an analysis of this early dialogue for the purpose of performance. The study is conducted in three phases and applies two
methodologies. First, a speech act analysis, which identifies the action in the language of the dialogue, is conducted. Then, Richard Hornby's methodology presented in *Script into Performance: A Structuralist View of Play Production* is applied to the dialogue. Finally, the findings of the speech act and structuralist analyses are applied in a dramatic realization of Plato's *Crito*.

**The Selection of the "Crito"**

The *Crito* has been selected as the dialogue for this analysis for two reasons. First, unlike later dialogues, the *Crito* is rich in dramatic elements. Weingartner, in *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, comments:

> They [the later dialogues] are much less dramatic in that Plato uses fewer and fewer stage directions, makes less and less effort to characterize the participants in a dialogue and, above all, adopts the practice of writing a significant role for only a single character.

Cooper, in her study of the presence and development of dramatic elements in 36 Platonic works, concluded that 24 of the dialogues (including the *Crito*) can be considered dramatic in nature, while 12 are clearly non-dramatic. Later works such as the *Laws* and the *Republic*, in which dialogue has evolved into monologue, provide less dramatic interest than do earlier dialogues in which Socrates subjects his interlocutors to his merciless dialectic. The second reason the *Crito* has been selected is that, unlike works such as the *Lbero* and the
Thæætæthûs, it is concerned with humanistic rather than metaphysical issues, a key concern when selecting a work to dramatize for contemporary audiences. Cooper explains: "As Plato's interest in speculative and philosophical questions becomes greater, his interest in the dramatic seems to decrease." 8

The Context of the "Crito"

The Crito is the third dialogue of Plato's first tetralogy, a series of four early dialogues (the Euthyphro, the Apology, the Crito, and the Phædo) which center around the trial, imprisonment, and death of Socrates. In the Euthyphro, set outside the court of Athens, Socrates reveals that he will soon be prosecuted for religious heresy. Socrates and Euthyphro discuss religious piety and man's duty to God. In the Apology, a companion dialogue to the Crito, Socrates eloquently and systematically addresses his accusers, who have charged him with impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens. Unmoved by Socrates' defense, the jury sentences him to death. The Crito is set in Socrates' prison cell, at dawn, one month after the trial. Crito, Socrates' close friend, assumes that Socrates will be executed in one day and has come to persuade him to escape while he has the opportunity. The Phædo, the fourth dialogue, captures Socrates' final conversation in which he discusses his imminent death and the immortality of the soul. 9
Methodologies

Speech Act Methodology

A speech act analysis is the first methodology applied to the Crito. Speech act theory, a branch of philosophy of language founded by John Austin, posits that when people speak, they are not only communicating content, but they are also doing things such as asking, commanding, and convincing. That is, in every utterance, every sentence and phrase, a speaker performs a speech act. Thus, according to this theory, there is action (a series of speech acts) inherent in all discourse or dialogue. As applied in this study, the speech act analysis identifies the speech act performed in every utterance in the Crito.

For several reasons, the speech act methodology is particularly appropriate for this study. First, it provides a device for identifying action in the Crito, a work elusive to Aristotelian analysis because of its lack of physical, external action. Second, this close, detailed analysis illuminates character motivation, subtext, and objectives, all of which are essential for an effective performance of the work. Finally, viewing the individual speech acts collectively, as an ensemble, permits identification of patterns in the overall dialogic action of the Crito.
Structuralist Methodology

The primary methodology in this study is structuralism outlined by Richard Hornby in *Script into Performance: A Structuralist View of Play Production*. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle establishes six elements of tragedy, which have defined drama in western culture: plot, character, thought, diction, song, and spectacle. All are devices the dramatist uses to achieve meaning; the first three apply to textual aspects of the drama, and the last three to performance aspects. Hornby, unlike traditional Aristotelian critics, recognizes the three performance elements as essential to an understanding of a dramatic work: "By stressing the possibility of reading and also by placing 'spectacle' as the last and least of his six elements of tragedy, Aristotle made possible the split between dramatic criticism and theatrical performance that still exists today". A broad interpretation of Aristotle's method, Hornby's structuralism systematically approaches the text and the performance, hence giving significance to all six elements.

For Hornby, structuralism is more an attitude than a rigid doctrine:

The Structuralist approach sees a work of art—a play, a poem, a painting, a film—as an interrelated process rather than a thing or collection of disconnected things. . . . Structuralism finds the essence of a work in the relation between parts rather than in the parts themselves; these relations form patterns or structures that define what the work truly is.
Hornby outlines his structuralist approach as one that:

1. Reveals something hidden. Rather than examining elements on the exterior of a work, the structuralist attempts to locate 'hidden' patterns or motifs.

2. Is intrinsic. The critic's concern is restricted to the work itself and does not consider author, history, other analyses and criticisms of the work.

3. Incorporates complexity and ambiguity. The method does not attempt to simplify the meaning of a playscript as would a more traditional approach.

4. Suspends judgment. When analyzing a work, the critic assumes there is a reason for the presence of everything in the text.

5. Is wholistic. It must attempt to construct a vision of a literary work that informs of all its details.16

The following procedure is followed in this study's structuralist analysis. First, recurring literal and figurative images (particularly character references to time, life and death, and authority) and rhetorical devices are extracted from the text, and clustered into significant elements or motifs.17 These significant elements are then analyzed spatially. That is, distilled from the text and removed from their context, their hidden patterns are now identified. Since this spatial analysis of the Crito is strictly intrinsic, no consideration is made of author, biography, history, genre, or other analyses. Judgment is suspended until the completion of the next phase in the analysis.
when the significant elements are examined temporally. Synthesizing the results of the spatial analysis, the temporal analysis examines the *Crito* for performance in space and time, using Hornby's five analytical terms: choice, sequence, duration, progression, and tempo. Finally, based on the spatial and temporal analyses, the unifying principle for production is formulated. Hornby defines this principle as "a statement (possibly in the form of a diagram, formula, or phrase) that enables a person to grasp the significance of a playscript as a whole."\(^{18}\) Satisfying Hornby's final principle of structuralism, the study presents a unifying principle, the wholistic, "vision of a literary work that informs of all its details."\(^{19}\)

**Organization**

After the discussion of this study's background, methodologies, and organization, the format of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, the bibliographical essay and working methodology, provides a discussion of how each key secondary source has contributed to this study. Applied to the texts on speech act theory and structuralism, the working methodology defines key terms used in the two analyses, explains how the analyses are conducted, and supplies examples of how the two methodologies are applied. Chapter 3, the speech act analysis, traces the *Crito*'s dialogic action. In addition to identifying significant features in the characters' use of language, this explication illuminates the changing character motives throughout the dialogue. In Chapter 4, the structuralist analysis for performance is presented.
First, the dialogue's significant elements are examined spatially. Then
these motifs are analyzed temporally, for the Crito's performance in
space and time. Finally, the unifying principle for production is
provided. Then, to explore the value and limitations of applying speech
act and structuralist methodologies to Plato's Crito, the dialogue is
performed. Chapter 5 concludes the study with a discussion of the
entire project. This is followed by a bibliography of sources consulted
in the study, and significant related works.

The thesis' text is supplemented by nine appendices. Appendices A
and B correspond to Chapter 3. Appendix A is a reproduction of the
Tredennick translation of the Crito, accompanied by an identification of
all speech acts in the dialogue; the corresponding speech act verbs are
defined in Appendix B. Appendix C follows, cataloging images,
clustering them, and identifying the significant elements they form.
Appendix D presents schematic diagrams explaining sequence, progression,
duration, and tempo in the Crito. Appendix E contains the letters of
permission from Penguin Press needed to reproduce and perform the text
of the dialogue. F, G, H, and I are appendices to the performance of
the Crito. Respectively, they provide a reproduction of the flyer
announcing the production, a program, photographs, and a videotape of
the performance.
NOTES


3 Scenes from Platonic dialogues have been dramatized and recorded on 16 millimeter educational films about the life of Socrates. The dramatizations, however, are supplements to these films, secondary to the films' biographical and documentary intent. None of the dialogues are dramatized in their entirety. The two films which come closest to dramatizing complete dialogues are The Death of Socrates and The Drinking Party, produced by BBC-TV and distributed by Time-Life Films, Inc. See the bibliography for citations of these films.

4 A. E. Taylor, Socrates: The Man and His Thought (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1933) 32. According to Taylor, "Plato, to all appearance, was the inventor of the Socratic dialogue as a literary form" (32). The Socratic dialogues of Xenophon and Aeschines were written after Plato's.


7 Colma B. Cooper, "Dramatic and Mimetic Elements in the Gorgias of Plato," Diss. Washington Univ. 1932. Specifically, Cooper examines dialogue, character, setting, and narrative in the dialogues.

8 Cooper 16.

9 Hugh Tredennick's translation of the *Crito*, published by Penguin Press, 1954, is used in this study's analysis and performance. The following translations were also examined: John Burnett (1924), Henry Cary (1878), F. J. Church (1880), Lane Cooper (1941), Benjamin Jowett (1892), F. W. Stawell (1904), Hugh Tredennick (1954), A. D. Woozley (1979). (See the bibliography for full citations of these texts.) Of the eight translations reviewed, Tredennick's is the richest in literal and figurative images and the most contemporary in its syntax.

Penguin Press, holder of the Tredennick copyright, has granted permission to reproduce this translation of the *Crito* in Appendix A of this thesis and to stage the dialogue. See Appendix D for letters of approval from Penguin Press.

10 J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University*, ed. J. O. Urmson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1962). Austin's text was the first published work in speech act theory, which has since been expanded and revised by several theorists including John Searle, Richard Ohmann, and Kier Elam. The
speech act analysis applied in this study is based on the work of these theorists. Chapter 2, the bibliographical essay and working methodology, explains how the speech act analysis functions in this study.

A standard interpretation of Aristotle, echoed by Sam Smiley, is that "action" exists primarily on the surface of a play and is conveyed through plot: "In any given drama, the plot is the unique structure of its action." Sam Smiley, *Playwriting: The Structure of Action* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971) 44.

In this study, however, Francis Ferguson's broader, more useful interpretation of Aristotle's concept is applied: "By 'action' he means, not physical activity, but a movement-of-spirit . . ." Francis Ferguson, *Aristotle's Poetics: Introduction* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961) 4.

Smiley 11-12.

Hornby 73.

In his review of *Script into Performance*, John Harrop comments, "Hornby follows such recent critics as John Styan, *The Elements of Drama*, Bernard Beckerman, *The Dynamics of Drama*, and Theodore Shank, *The Art of Dramatic Art*, in moving away from a textual and specifically Aristotelian-based criticism and reaching for a methodology which views the script, not as a literary artifact, but as having meaning only in its fully-realized theatrical form." Comparing Hornby's methodology to those of Beckerman and Shank, Harrop calls it "a more directly applicable method as a result of its structuralist basis." John Harrop,

15 Hornby 10.

16 Hornby 25-30. Although Hornby's structuralism shares principles with the methodologies of traditional linguistic and anthropological structuralists, he does not align himself with traditional structuralists such as Roman Jakobson, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Roland Barthes. About his structuralist approach, Hornby comments, "The principles are of course my own formulations for my own purposes, rather than an abstract description of the nature of Structuralism; many will disagree with my particular emphases" (25).

Three texts which provide thorough discussions of traditional structuralism include Richard and Fernande DeGeorge's The Structuralists from Marx to Levi-Strauss (1972), Terrance Hawkes' Structuralism and Semiotics (1977), and Terry Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction (1983).

17 Adopting his terminology from the New Critics, Hornby defines "imagery" broadly: "... imagery arises wherever there is a description or a comparison of any kind, which makes its analysis possible even with expository prose" (132).

18 Hornby 129.

19 Hornby 37.

20 A videotape of the 30 March 1986 performance of the Crito is available from the University of Northern Iowa Library.
This chapter provides an annotated bibliography of seminal works about Plato, speech act theory, and structuralism, including those which make major contributions to this study. The working methodology, included in the discussions of works on speech act theory and structuralism, explains how the two analytical methods are applied.

Works about Plato

Taylor, A. E. *Plato: The Man and His Work*. 4th ed. N.p.: Methuen, 1937. Taylor's text, a key work in modern Platonic scholarship, has been of enormous assistance, providing a valuable historical perspective on the ancient Greece of Socrates and Plato. Taylor presents a careful and thorough explication of each dialogue (tracing in detail Socrates' conversations with his interlocutors), and provides the reader with much appreciated interpretations of obscure passages. When necessary, Taylor addresses issues of controversy in Platonic scholarship, particularly issues of historical accuracy and Plato's intentions as an author. His attempts to resolve these controversies are consistently based on textual evidence; seldom does he rely on secondary sources or conjecture.
Cooper, Colma B. "Dramatic and Mimetic Elements in the Gorgias of Plato." Diss. Washington U, 1932. Cooper, in addition to investigating the dramatic and mimetic elements of the Gorgias, exhaustively surveys setting and narrative in thirty-five other Platonic dialogues. Her dissertation, demonstrating the dramatic richness of earlier dialogues such as the Crito, has facilitated the selection of a dialogue for this study. On the Crito's setting, for instance, she comments, "[the Crito portrays] the nature of the two men, Socrates as cheerfully and bravely facing death on the morrow, Crito gentle, sympathetic, and eager to help his friend [sic]."

Works about Speech Act Theory

Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Ed. J. O. Urmson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1962. This collection of posthumously published lectures is the seminal work in speech act theory. Austin, strongly influenced by Wittgenstein, here establishes his theory of language as social action. According to Austin's theory, when people communicate they are not only conveying content, but they are also doing such things as asking, commanding, attempting to influence or convince their interlocutors. In this work, Austin defines the three basic types of speech acts, each of which may be present in a single utterance. These include (1) locutionary acts—the most basic speech act, performed by producing a statement that conforms to standard phonology, syntax, and morphology. A speaker's intentions have no
impact on the locutionary act. (2) illocutionary acts—locutionary acts that convey a speaker's intention (such as asking, warning, complimenting). (3) perlocutionary acts—illocutionary acts that have successfully affected the feelings or behavior of the listener; this is sometimes known as the perlocutionary effect. Thus, according to Austin, a critic identifies illocutionary and perlocutionary acts by discovering performative verbs such as to "ask," to "promise," and to "reward," which are used in the speech act.

In 47e of the Crito is one of many speech acts in the dialogue:

Socrates: Well, is life worth living with a body which is worn out and ruined in health?

Crito: Certainly not. (47e, 4-6)

In this excerpt, Socrates performs a speech act which is locutionary (he makes an utterance that conforms to the standard rules of language); illocutionary (he conveys the intention of asking a question of Crito); perlocutionary (Crito understands and answers Socrates' question in the affirmative). Not all acts, of course, are perlocutionary. If Socrates' question had baffled Crito, Socrates would have performed only locutionary and illocutionary acts.

Austin's methodology for analyzing speech acts limits the literary critic in two ways. First, although he discusses defective speech acts (acts that are not completed successfully), he presents no criteria for identifying them. Second, his method for identifying speech acts (locating performative verbs) does not account for the fact that many speech acts occur independent of performative verbs. That is, in the
utterance, "I promise to repay you," the speaker need not use the performative verb "to promise" in order to commit an illocutionary speech act. For instance, the utterance, "I will repay you," although lacking the verb "to promise" is also an illocutionary act. John Searle has attempted to correct these two limitations.


1. Representatives: statements in which the speaker commits himself to the truth of a proposition. Representative speech act verbs include "affirms," "concludes," and "avows." For instance, at 47d, 1-6, Socrates asks Crito if he disagrees with the proposition that one should respect and obey authorities; Crito's response is an affirmation: "No, I think it is true, Socrates" (47d, 7). Representatives are the most frequent illocution in the Crito.

2. Directives: illocutions that attempt to get the listener to do something. Included are commands, requests, pleadings, prayers, entreaties, invitations, and questions; for example, Crito's entreaty, "I agree with what you say, Socrates; but I wish you would consider what we ought to do" (48d, 10-11).
3. Commissives: utterances that commit the speaker to a future act. These include promises, vows, pledges, and commitments. For instance, at 49a, 1-4, Socrates instructs Crito: "... try to answer my questions to the best of your judgment." Crito's response is a commissive illocution, a commitment: "Well, I will try" (49a, 5).

4. Expressives: acts that communicate some aspect of the speaker's psychological state. They include thanking, wishing, congratulating, apologizing, condoning, and welcoming. Crito, for example, commits an expressive illocution, that is, a wish: "I only wish I were not so sleepless and depressed myself" (43b, 3-4).

5. Declaratives: acts which, if performed successfully, bring about a change in the course of events in the drama. Included are appointing, marrying, firing, and resigning. There are no declarative illocutions in the Crito.

Searle, John R. **Speech Acts: An Essay in The Philosophy of Language.** Cambridge: UP, 1969. It is the hypothesis of this essay, the second major work published in speech act theory, that "speaking a language is engaging in a highly complex rule-governed form of behavior." Addressing a shortcoming of Austin's method, Searle presents a system for determining if a speech act is defective. He presents three conditions (felicity conditions) that must be satisfied in a non-defective speech act:

1. Preparatory conditions: the speaker must be authorized to perform the act. That is, Socrates must be an authority when granting
Crito advice. He must have evidence for the statements he makes; furthermore, he must be ignorant of the answer when asking a question.

2. Sincerity conditions: the speaker must sincerely want the requested information and be appreciative of it.

3. Essential conditions: the speaker is making a social commitment to the listener; thus, the act must indeed be what it appears to be.

Elam points out "... much of drama is structured precisely on the abuse of these conditions, and thus on the production of speech acts known to be defective to the audience but accepted as 'happy' by the dramatic interlocutor." In the Crito, Socrates frequently abuses the felicity conditions for speech acts: for many of the questions he poses to Crito, he clearly possesses the answers (violating the preparatory condition); often, when Crito replies, Socrates responds flippantly (violating the sincerity condition).


Of the three types of speech acts, says Ohmann, illocutionary acts are the most elusive and offer the richest expressive possibilities. To demonstrate this, he examines the illocutionary acts in Watt,
applying Austin's felicity criteria (rules for non-defective acts) and
determines that Beckett's Watt is constructed upon a series of
infelicitous (defective) speech acts.

Ohmann hints at this method's particular appropriateness in an
analysis of drama: "The point [the method's success] is most obvious as
it applies to dramatic works, which consist almost solely of alternating
speech acts by the several characters, or in prose fiction that relies
mainly on dialogue." Ohmann points out, "... styles of
illocutionary action help to determine the most fundamental literary
types." Farce, for example, employs "a repetitive or mechanical
series of speech acts," and tragedies are rich in variety of
illocutionary acts.

Ohmann, Richard. "Literature as Act." Approaches to Poetics. Ed.
"Literature as Act" is an insightful and useful essay for the dramatic
critic, who, Ohmann argues, should view playscripts as dynamic works,
not as "structures, objects, and artifacts." Applying Austin's theory
of speech acts (identifying illocutions and examining them for
felicity), Ohmann extensively studies Major Barbara and excerpts from The
Importance of Being Earnest, King Lear, The Crucible, and Endgame.

Elam, Keir. The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London: Methuen,
1980. Elam's work has proven to be this study's most informative and
useful source on speech act theory. It clearly explains the evolution
of the theory and outlines the ways it can be used in dramatic criticism. Elam discusses Austin's three types of speech acts, Searle's five classes of illocutions and his three conditions for a non-defective speech act. A 295-item bibliography on the semiotics of theatre and drama is provided.

**Working Speech Act Methodology**

The speech act analysis is presented in two parts, the first in Appendix A and the second in Chapter 3. Part One, an identification of all illocutionary speech acts in the *Crito*, is conducted in three steps:

Step One: One speech act is separated from another within one character's speech by a slash.

Step Two: Each speech act is classified as a representative (R), expressive (E), declarative (D), or commissive (C).

Step Three: Each illocutionary act is labeled with its appropriate speech act verb.

The following excerpt from the dialogue illustrates Part One of the analysis presented in Appendix A.

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explains  

R CRITO: He is used to me now, Socrates, because I come here so often;/ besides, he is under some small obligation to me. (43a, 1-7)

Part One's findings are presented discursively in Part Two of the speech act analysis, Chapter 3 of the thesis.

Works about Structuralism

Hawkes, Terence. *Structuralism and Semiotics*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1977. Hawkes' thorough and readable text has contributed to this study's perspective on the origin and evolution of structuralism as an analytical method. Structuralism was central to the study of linguistics and anthropology long before Hornby applied it to the analysis of drama. Hawkes makes it clear that although structuralism has been applied to various disciplines, all structuralists (including Hornby) have been guided by the principle that "reality inheres not in things themselves, but in the relationships we discern between things; not in items, but in structures." 17

Smithson, Isaiah. "Structuralism as a Method of Literary Criticism." *College English* 37 (1975): 145-59. It is Smithson's thesis that "although 'structuralism' is generally taken to refer to a single methodology, the diversity of approaches actually included under this term is immense." 18 In this essay, Smithson attempts to define the assumptions that underly all structuralist approaches and illustrate the method's relevance to literary criticism.
Smithson identifies three principles of structuralism, all principles of the Hornby method. The first is emphasis on relations; as Smithson explains, "as a structure is a system, particular relations are going to exist among its elements." This is Hornby's justification for analyzing a playscript spatially (identifying the significant elements, or motifs, that make up the work) and temporally (synthesizing those elements to reach a better understanding of the work for performance). Smithson claims that this process of analyzing and synthesizing "[forces] information to emerge that is different from that which would result from a concentration on the elements themselves . . . ." The second principle of structuralism is emphasis on the synchronic (relations across a moment in time) rather than the diachronic (relations through time) in the analysis of a literary work. In a structuralist analysis, the critic must "disregard the order of precedence among the elements," paying no regard to cause and effect relationships that exist in a work. The final tenet of structuralism is that it seeks to identify structures that exist below the surface. Smithson continues, "the structure of the work will be something other than that which is immediately evident on the surface." Citing structuralist critic Roland Barthes, Smithson explains that the work is first submitted to "dissection whereby the fragments" are revealed; then, applying the principles similar to those employed in Hornby's temporal approach, he continues, "through a process of
articulation, the rules of association of the elements are established.\textsuperscript{22}


Although several books address either textual criticism or play production, Hornby's is the only work which investigates the relationship between script and performance, providing the critic and director with a practical methodology. He considers it a "third alternative" to the current bifurcation between textual criticism and performance theory, about which Oliver comments:

\dots he does most vehemently recommend a thorough analysis of the text prior to writing a critique or directing the play. He explains how to go about such an analysis and then he has the courage to demonstrate his recommendations with three good examples of his own work---the finest being his interpretation of Pinter's \textit{The Homecoming}. Few theorists are this brave; even fewer are this able.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Working Structuralist Methodology}

This study's Structuralist analysis of the \textit{Crito} is presented in four parts.
Part One: Recurring images and rhetorical devices are identified and catalogued into five clusters of motifs, or significant elements: time, life and death, authority, questioning, and Crito's responses to Socrates. In Appendix C, the location of each image is noted by its Stephanus number and letter and line number(s). The following is an example of the cluster of life and death references extracted from the Crito:

Life and Death References

| 43b, 10  | 45d, 12  | 52c, 9  |
| 43c, 2   | 46e, 5   | 53c, 7  |
| 43c, 4   | 48a, 14  | 53e, 2  |
| 43c, 5   | 48b, 7   | 53e, 6  |
| 43d, 2   | 48b, 9   | 54a, 2  |
| 43d, 9   | 48d, 5   | 54a, 7  |
| 43d, 11  | 50d, 3   | 54b, 6  |
| 44b, 3   | 51a, 5   | 54b, 13 |
| 44b, 9   | 51b, 10  | 54c, 8  |
| 45c, 7   | 52c, 8   |         |

Such a statistical exercise, according to Hornby, forces the critic to "look at the script in solid, factual, terms." Part Two: The Crito is analyzed spatially. As Hornby points out, "a simple list or catalogue is of no use at all until one considers the significance of the sets of images." Thus, in the spatial analysis, each significant element is individually examined in an attempt to discover how it functions and contributes to the dialogue as a whole.
This analysis is not concerned with where the images occur in the dialogue; instead, the emphasis is on how they contribute to the atmosphere or environment of the *Crito*. In support of spatial criticism, G. Wilson Knight comments, "One must be prepared to see the whole play in space as well as in time. . . . there are throughout the play a set of correspondences which relate to each other independently of the time-sequence which is the story."\(^{28}\)

Part Three: The *Crito* is analyzed temporally. Synthesizing the findings of the spatial analysis, the temporal analysis examines the *Crito* as a space-time complex for production. The significant elements are examined using Hornby's five analytical terms: choice, sequence, progression, duration, and tempo.

Choice: The playwright, according to Hornby, must make several choices when authoring a drama. "The most obvious case is when the playscript is based on an existing myth. . . ."\(^{29}\) Examine are Plato's fundamental choices and their implications for performance of the *Crito*. These include Plato's source for the dialogue, his manner of depicting Socrates, and his choice of the dialogue genre.

Sequence: Generally defined, sequence is "... the order in which incidents are shown."\(^{30}\) In this study, sequence is first examined as it exists in the overall structure of the dialogue. The number and order of the *Crito*'s incidents—the "Introductory Conversation," "Crito's Exhortation to Escape," "Socrates' Reply to Crito," "the Two Premises," and the "Speech of the Laws of Athens"—are investigated to determine how they contribute to the shape and meaning of the dialogue. Then, the
images, references, and identified rhetorical devices, which comprise the significant elements, are investigated in order to discover the sequences they form in the text of the dialogue.

Progression: A consequence of the recurring significant elements, progression is the action that drives a dramatic text and performance onward. The essence of a performance's movement in time, the action or progression is what makes a performance dynamic. About this, Francis Fergusson, in a contemporary elaboration on Aristotle's theory of action, writes, "action does not mean deeds, events, or physical activity: it means rather, the motivation from which deeds spring. . . . Action is the whole working out of a motive to its end in success or failure." That is, the action of an entire play, driven by the progression of its significant elements, is moving toward some objective. This analysis of progression builds upon the study of sequence, examining how the Crito's incidents and significant elements interact to form the action that drives the work in performance.

Duration: The sequence and progression analyses identify the presence, order, and interaction of the incidents in the dialogue. It is also necessary, when examining the Crito as a work to be performed in space and time before an audience, to consider each incident's length and importance. This is the concern of duration. According to Hornby, this is done by examining "the length of an incident in the sense of both real chronological time (the clock time that passes in performance) and psychological weighting" (the projected impact on the audience). This study of duration examines the five incidents in the Crito,
determining the correspondence between chronological time and psychological weighting within each of the incidents.

Tempo: Tempo is "a function of the number of incidents occurring per unit of time." "It should not be confused in performance," Hornby stresses, "with mere speed of playing time." This study of tempo addresses each division of the *Crito*, examining the relationship between the chronological length of the division and the amount of activity that occurs within it. From this functional relationship, the appropriate tempo of the *Crito* in performance is determined.

Other Works Consulted

Taylor, A. E. *Socrates: The Man and His Thought*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1953. Most biographers present Socrates as a historical character from Periclean Greece, far removed from the contemporary reader. Unlike other biographies, Taylor's work brings the personality of Socrates to life, illuminating his rationality, playful humor, political and ethical motives, and acute self-awareness. Taylor's insights into character have contributed the understanding of personality needed as a basis for a dramatic portrayal of Socrates.

of the Laws of Athens"—are used in this study to label the sections of the dialogue.
1 By design, few secondary sources about Plato have been consulted, since the foundation of structuralism is intrinsic analysis of a text. Hornby argues: "Criticism that will be of use to the director, designer, or performer must be intrinsic . . . for, whatever value there may be in treating a play script as a historical document or as an example of a particular genre, movement, or 'trend,' in performance the most use such information can be is as a set of program notes. The critic must therefore get in the habit of always asking himself, 'Am I really and truly talking about the play script itself, or about something else?" (115). Attempting to avoid bias or distortion in the interpretation, sources about Plato were consulted only for the purposes of selecting a dialogue and providing basic historical background.

2 In passage 44a-44b Socrates tells Crito about a recent dream in which he was approached by a beautiful woman in white robes. This dream, Socrates assures Crito, is a sign that the ship which will end his reprieve will be late, thus deferring his execution. Taylor explains, "In his [Socrates'] interpretation he evidently takes the 'fair and comely woman' of 44a, 11 for the 'fetch' of the approaching vessel, and her 'white garments' for its gay white sails" (Taylor 169).

3 Cooper 12.

4 A speech act is defined by Littlejohn as "the basic unit of language for expressing meaning. It is an utterance that expresses intention. Normally the speech act is a sentence, but it can be a word or phrase, so long as it follows the rules necessary to accomplish the
intention." He continues, "When one speaks, one performs an act. The act may involve stating, questioning, commanding, promising, or any of a number of other acts. Speech therefore is conceived of as a form of action or intentional behavior." Stephen W. Littlejohn, Theories of Human Communication (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1983) 104.

5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, originator of ordinary language philosophy, argues that language, as used in ordinary life, constitutes a "language game." In order to accomplish verbal acts, people follow rules. Examples of language uses that follow rules include giving and obeying orders, asking and answering questions, and describing events. (Littlejohn 104).


7 According to Littlejohn, perlocutions are a relatively undeveloped subject in speech act literature. Most speech act analyses of drama examine illocutionary acts.

8 Searle 12.

9 Austin labels successful and defective acts "happy" and "unhappy" respectively (136). He also calls defective acts infelicitous, to which Searle responds with his felicity conditions.

10 Elam 163.

11 Ohmann refers to the standard analyses as "the discovery of lexical, syntactic, and semantic regularities; the weighing of their expressive import, and their mimetic character; and the analysis of rhetorical effect" (243). Ohmann’s essay was published prior to
Searle's taxonomy for illocutionary acts; thus, he uses Austin's approach rather than Searle's.

12 Ohmann 246.
14 Ohmann 252-3.
15 Ohmann points out that the first several pages of *The Importance of Being Earnest* is almost exclusively an exchange of questions and assertions, while *Hamlet* begins with a question, a refusal, two commands, a loyalty oath, a question, a statement, a compliment, a statement, an order, thanks, and a compliment (253).

16 Elam draws heavily from Searle and Ohmann, discussing Austin's theories as they have been interpreted by Ohmann. Stanley Fish, in "How to do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech-Act Theory and Literary Criticism" (983-1025), chastizes Ohmann for his "misapplication" of Austin's theory of speech acts. Unlike Ohmann, Fish insists that speech act theory can be used successfully in the criticism of very few literary works. No doubt Fish would find Elam's interpretation of the theory objectionable.


23 The Library of Congress uses the descriptors "theatre" and "drama—explication" to classify works pertaining to the analysis of playscripts for performance. These two descriptors were combined in the search of the United States Library of Congress holdings.


25 The Stephanus numbers and letters, the standard pagination of Plato's works, were assigned by Henri Estienne in his 1578 translation of the dialogues from Greek to French.

26 Hornby 134.

27 Hornby 134.


29 Hornby 80.

30 Hornby 29.


32 Hornby 85.

33 Hornby 85.

34 Hornby 88.
CHAPTER THREE

SPEECH ACT ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO

Introduction

Drama, writes Sam Smiley, is structured action. Reiterating a thesis of Aristotle's Poetics, that action is the soul of drama, he comments: "Whenever . . . human activities are given unity in drama, the resultant action assumes a structure. Thus, structure in drama amounts to the logical, or causal relationships of characters, circumstances, and events."¹ There are, he continues, no rules for structuring action, only principles. The logic of an individual play, not prescriptive rules, determines its structure.

The critic's customary approach to studying the structured action of a play has been to examine the playscript's surface structure, which, according to Hornby, is traditionally defined in terms of rising action, climax, beats, acts, scenes, French scenes, reversal, recognition, and denouement. These elements of surface structure, he argues, "... have never been much use to performers, and they do not particularly point out things that a reader or audience member might otherwise have missed."² The critic who studies the surface structure of Hamlet, for instance, might identify and explain the significance of key events (actions) that comprise the plot of the play: Hamlet's encounter with his father's ghost, Hamlet's killing of Polonius, the burial of Ophelia, the battle between Hamlet and Laertes, and Hamlet's death. When examining dramas with little surface action, such as Plato's Crito,
Hornby argues, the critic should investigate the script's deep structure. For instance, about Pinter's *The Homecoming*, he comments, "On the surface there are very few events to cover the two hours or so of playing time. . . . Below the surface, in the deep structure, a great deal is going on."³

Speech act theory applied to dramatic criticism provides a methodology for investigating a playscript's deep structure. While traditional critical approaches view action as nonverbal, external acts such as marriages, murders, and battles, speech act criticism views action as a general category that includes both verbal and nonverbal acts.⁴ Based upon an identification of all speech acts in the *Crito* (see Appendix A), this chapter provides an explication of the dialogue's speech action. Examining the action in the deep structure of the *Crito*'s five incidents, this speech act explication illuminates character motives and objectives, and the overall structure and logic of the dialogue.

**Divisions of the Dialogue**

**Introductory Conversation (43a-44b)**

A study of the speech acts in the "Introductory Conversation" reveals that Socrates and Crito are dynamic and contrasting dramatic characters. Socrates, consistently in control of the conversation, is playful and relaxed. Crito is indefatigably anxious, eager, and impetuous. A scrutiny of the speech action also indicates that the
movement or progression of the "Introductory Conversation" is structured upon four turns in speech action.\(^5\)

Upon waking and noting Crito's presence, Socrates begins the dialogue: "Here already, Crito? Surely it is still early?" (43a, 1). These initial questions allow Socrates to assume and never relinquish control of the conversation, and, to initiate an inquiry-response pattern in the dialogue by asking Crito a series of simple questions and queries. While Socrates is relaxed and casual, Crito is apprehensive. Each of Crito's responses is very brief, as if he is apprehensive, withholding what he actually desires to express: "Indeed it is" (43a, 2). "Just before dawn" (43a, 4). "Fairly long" (43a, 9).

Crito turns the direction of the established inquiry-response speech action when he explains why he did not wake Socrates. Unable to withhold his emotions any longer, he does not simply respond to Socrates' inquiry but delivers an impetuous, emotional outpouring:

I wouldn't dream of such a thing, Socrates. I only wish I were not so sleepless and depressed myself. I have been wondering at you, because I saw how comfortably you were sleeping; and I deliberately didn't want to wake you because I wanted you to go on being as comfortable as you could. I have often felt before in the course of my life how fortunate you are in your disposition, but I feel it more than ever now in your present misfortune when I see how easily and placidly you put up with it. (43b, 3-43b, 11)
Rather than presenting a thoughtful and focused explanation, Crito delivers a scrambled confession. In this four-sentence speech, Crito, obviously disturbed by the immediacy of Socrates' execution, performs a variety of speech acts: he asserts, wishes, explains (twice), and expresses admiration.

Socrates calmly and playfully responds to Crito's outpouring: "Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die" (43c, 1-2). Crito raises the objection that others of Socrates' age resent dying. Socrates, retaining control of the conversation, acknowledges the truth of Crito's objection and turns the speech action by quickly changing the subject, redirecting Crito's attention: "Quite true. But tell me, why have you come so early?" (43c, 6). Although his attention has been refocused, Crito is still unable to deliver a succinct explanation for why he has come. Finally he tells Socrates that the boat from Delos will arrive on this day, and thus, in one day, he shall have to end his life. Even when confronted with the prospect of his own death, Socrates retains his casual manner: "Well, Crito, I hope that it may be for the best; if the gods will it so, so be it. All the same I don't think it will arrive to-day" (44a, 2).

After Crito has asked Socrates for an explanation, Socrates again changes the direction of the speech action. He performs the first commissive speech act, an act which expresses intention, in the dialogue: "I will try to explain" (44a, 2). It is at this juncture that Socrates strengthens his control of the discussion, leading Crito to
believe that he is seriously committing himself to the issue of his impending death, a subject he has heretofore been treating lightly. Socrates explains that his hunch that the ship would not arrive on this day is based on a dream. Socrates commits the speech act of describing, transmitting a mental image or impression. Moreover, Socrates does not merely report what the woman prophet has revealed, but he assumes her character to deliver her line:

"... Socrates, to the pleasant land of Phthia on the third day thou shalt come" (44b, 2-3).

Crito tells Socrates that his dream "makes no sense" (44b, 4).

Asserting his control of the conversation and continuing his manipulation of Crito, Socrates responds smugly: "To my mind, Crito, it is perfectly clear" (44b, 5). He offers no further explanation.

**Crito's Exhortation to Escape (44b-46a)**

Throughout the "Introductory Conversation" Crito grows more assertive and engaged in the conversation, apparently frustrated by Socrates' unrelenting trifling. In this next division of the dialogue, his impatience crescendos, culminating in his speech exhorting Socrates to escape. Although now more assertive, Crito has not matured intellectually; his thinking is still muddled and his expression is seldom concise. Socrates, less prominent in this section of the dialogue, continues teasing and baiting Crito, who is growing frustrated by his friend's apparent lack of sincerity. Crito's growing impatience and aggression propels this incident.
Growing combative, Crito opens his first speech with sarcasm, commenting that Socrates' understanding of his own dream is "too clear, apparently" (44b, 6). He continues this speech, committing a variety of speech acts. He reminds Socrates that he can still escape; he expresses regret that he will be losing a friend; he forecasts that people will suspect him of letting Socrates down; he challenges Socrates to consider "what would be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your friends" (44c, 5-6); he conjectures that people will never believe that Socrates refused to leave prison. In response to Crito's exuberant pleading, Socrates poses only a mild challenge statement: "But my dear Crito, why should we pay so much attention to what 'most people' think?" (44c, 9-10). This avuncular approach characterizes Socrates' attitude throughout this section of the dialogue. Never does he seriously challenge Crito intellectually.

Demonstrating his commitment, Crito asseverates and avows in his response. He snaps: "You can see for yourself, Socrates, that one has to think of popular opinion as well" (44d, 1-2). He insists that ordinary people do indeed have great potential for causing damage to one's reputation. In reaction to Crito's insistence, Socrates merely expresses a wish: "I only wish that people had an unlimited capacity for doing harm . . ." (44d, 6-7). He casually infers that, were this the case, they might have an unlimited power for doing good.

Sensing the futility of pursuing a tangential issue (the potential for ordinary people to cause harm), Crito acquiesces in despair: "Have it that way if you like" (44e, 1). Apparently frustrated by Socrates'
unwillingness to discuss his escape, Crito redirects Socrates' attention toward this serious issue via a directive speech act: "... but tell me this, Socrates" (44e, 1). In his final minor speech, Crito demonstrates his strongest aggression thus far. He strongly admonishes and advises Socrates: "If any idea like that is troubling you, you can dismiss it altogether... Take my advice and be reasonable" (44e, 7-45a, 3). In response to this frenetic plea, Socrates concedes casually: "All that you say is very much in my mind, Crito, and a great deal more besides" (45a, 4-5).

Crito's growing assertiveness culminates in the fourth and final speech, his longest in the dialogue. Characteristically, Crito's final exhortation is a random, scattered plea. His reasons for Socrates to escape can be extracted from his speech. According to Crito, by not escaping, Socrates will be (1) robbing Crito of a friend he could not possibly replace; (2) making certain that Crito will acquire a dishonorable reputation among those who feel that he failed Socrates; (3) throwing away his life when he could be saved; (4) letting his sons down when he has an obligation to make certain that their education is completed. Crito's reasons for Socrates to escape are not presented in an organized scheme but are scattered throughout his monologue.

The movement of Crito's final exhortation is structured upon the progression of his directive speech acts. As he grows bolder and more engrossed in his plea, his treatment of Socrates grows from mildly reproving to strongly rebuking. In the first of this series of directive speech acts, Crito reproves Socrates: "You are doing your best
to treat yourself in exactly the same way as your enemies would, or rather did, when they wanted to ruin you" (45c, 8-10). A little later, Crito admonishes Socrates for neglecting his sons' education: "Either one ought not to have children at all, or one ought to see their upbringing and education through to the end" (45d, 7-9). In his next allegation, Crito reprehends Socrates: "It strikes me that you are taking the line of least resistance, whereas you ought to make the choice of a good man and a brave one, considering that you profess to have made goodness your object all through life" (45e, 1-2). Growing more hostile, Crito next reproaches Socrates: "Really, I am ashamed, both on your account and on ours your friends..." (45e, 1-2). Concluding his exhortation, Crito commands and rebukes his friend: "Come, make up your mind. Really it's too late for that now; you ought to have made it up already" (46a, 3-4). Crito, more emotionally distraught than anywhere else in the dialogue, completes his plea by beseeching with anxiety: "I appeal to you, Socrates, on every ground; take my advice and please don't be unreasonable!" (46a, 7-8)

Socrates' Reply to Crito (46b-49a)

"Socrates' Reply to Crito" exhibits many significant changes in the two characters. Crito's role is much less prominent; he speaks only upon direction from Socrates. Socrates finally puts aside his teasing and apparent lack of sincerity in a 42-line monologue, followed by a lengthy dialogue between himself and Crito.
Apparently moved (but not likely persuaded) by the fervor of Crito's plea, Socrates begins his speech with sincerity and seriousness. He thanks, stipulates, warns, and charges with a task:

My dear Crito, I appreciate your warm feelings very much—that is, assuming that they have some justification; if not, the stronger they are, the harder they will be to deal with. Very well, then; we must consider whether we ought to follow your advice or not. (46b, 1-5)

Socrates' alacrity revealed in these speech acts contrasts markedly with the flippancy evident in his earlier speech action. Socrates charges himself with a task, thus committing he and Crito to exploring the issue of his escape, for the first time in the dialogue.

By way of his opening monologue, Socrates establishes a foundation for the dialectical exchange which will follow. First, he cautions Crito that he will explore this issue prudently, that only reason must determine which action is right. Then, in careful, direct prose, Socrates demonstrates his earnestness; he avows: "I cannot abandon the principles which I used to hold in the past simply because this accident has happened to me" (46c, 1-3); he assesses: "they seem to me to be much as they were" (46c, 3); he avows: "and I respect and regard the same principles now as before" (46c, 3-4); he vows: "So unless we can find better principles on this occasion, you can be quite sure that I will not agree with you" (46c, 5-6). Next, Socrates explains that he would like to explore this issue by examining Crito's view about the significance of peoples' opinions. Moral authority, Socrates hopes to
demonstrate, rests not with the "many" (as Crito believes) but with Truth. Thus, the use of reason is the only suitable approach for arriving at a decision.

To conclude his monologue, Socrates cites authorities. Establishing the first premise of his polemic, he says: "Serious thinkers, I believe, have always held some such view as the one which I mentioned just now: that some of the opinions which people entertain should be respected, and others should not" (46d, 11-46e, 3). Crito affirms that this is a fair statement. Socrates controls the ensuing dialogue, an extremely careful and exhaustive exploration of the value of popular opinion. Throughout this portion of the dialogue, Socrates poses 19 inquiries (14 questions and five queries). Having established the premise that some opinions should be respected and others should not, Socrates and Crito deduce that one should regard the good opinions and not the bad. Moreover, they agree that the opinions of the wise are good and those of the foolish bad. The athlete, for example, should trust only the opinion of his trainer, the expert. So too, one should trust only the opinion of the expert, not the general public, when making decisions about what is just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. They form three additional deductions: first, that life will not be worth living if we spoil a part of the body by taking the non-expert's advice; second, that the non-physical part of us, "in which right and wrong operate," can also be harmed by wrong actions and benefitted by right ones; third, that this non-physical side (the soul) is much "more precious" than the physical side. Socrates thus concludes
that Crito's proposition that popular opinion must be considered in matters of good and bad, right and wrong, is incorrect, and, for the second time in the dialogue, he charges himself with a task: "In that case, my dear fellow, what we ought to consider is not so much what people in general will say about us but how we stand with the expert in right and wrong, the one authority, who represents the actual truth" (48a, 6-9).

The dialogue continues, Socrates maintaining control. They agree that "the really important thing is not to live, but to live well" (48a, 7-8), and that "to live well is to live honorably or rightly" (48b, 10-11). Based upon this agreement, Socrates charges himself with a task, for the third time in the dialogue: "Then in light of this agreement we must consider whether or not it is right for me to try to get away without an official discharge" (48b, 13-48c, 2).

Concluding this portion of the dialogue, Socrates judges irrelevant Crito's earlier arguments about damaging his reputation and neglecting the upbringing of his children; these arguments "represent the reflections of the ordinary public . . ." (48c, 6-7). Next, Socrates again charges himself with a task:

Our real duty . . . since the argument leads that way, is to consider one question only . . . : Shall we be acting rightly in paying money and showing gratitude to these people who are going to rescue me, and in escaping or arranging the escape ourselves, or shall we be acting wrongly in doing all this? (48c, 9-48d, 4)
Socrates' argument is clearly becoming less focused. On four occasions he has charged himself with a task. The first, to consider whether or not he should follow Crito's advice (44b, 4-5), is discussed, but closure is not reached. The second, to consider how they stand with the expert who represents truth (48a, 6-9), is not addressed. The third, to consider whether or not it is right to get away without an official discharge (47b, 13-48c,2), is not addressed. The fourth, to consider if they would be right in paying money to the rescuers or in managing the escape themselves (48c, 9-48d, 1), is not addressed. Tired of Socrates continually postponing the tasks he charges himself with, Crito requests practical, tangible results: "I agree with what you say, Socrates; but I wish you would consider what we ought to do" (48d, 10-11). As at the end of the last section, Crito's request propels Socrates into the next section of the dialogue.

The Two Premises (48d-50a)

Socrates immediately responds to Crito's plea that he consider what they "ought to do." Assuming a more pedantic role, Socrates opens this section of the dialogue by directing, inviting, and instructing: "Let us look at it together, my dear fellow; and if you can challenge any of my arguments, do so and I will listen to you; but if you can't, be a good fellow and stop telling me over and over again that I ought to leave this place without official permission" (48d, 12-48e, 3). Although Socrates is now seriously challenging Crito intellectually, he makes it clear that his wish is not to mislead or deceive Crito. He defers to
Crito: "I don't want to act against your convictions" (48e, 5). He cautions: "Now be careful, Crito . . ." (49d, 1-3). He requests: "I want even you to consider very carefully whether you share my view and agree with me . . ." (49d, 8-14).

Answering several questions posed by Socrates, Crito agrees to two premises: first, that despite the opinion of the "many" it is always wrong to return injury for injury or injustice for injustice; and second, that one must fulfill all one's agreements, assuming that they are just. Socrates then applies these two premises in a question to Crito:

Socrates: If we leave this place without first persuading the State to let us go, are we or are we not doing an injury, and doing it in a quarter where it is least justifiable? Are we or are we not abiding by just agreements?

Crito: I can't answer your question, Socrates; I am not clear in my mind. (49e, 8-50a, 6)

Crito is unable to answer Socrates' two questions and incapable of understanding Socrates' opinion of what they "ought to do," which he earlier requested that his teacher explain. Again, Crito's confusion precipitates the next section of the dialogue.
The Speech of the Laws of Athens (50a-54d)

At the conclusion of "Two Premises," Socrates proclaims that by escaping he would be violating just agreements and doing an injury where it is least justifiable. To illustrate, he personifies the Laws of Athens in this, the most dynamic section of the dialogue. The "Speech of the Laws," according to Taylor, "does not carry the argument further, but brings it home powerfully to the imagination." As the persona of the Laws, Socrates delivers four speeches, addressing each of Crito's arguments for escape.

In the Laws' first speech (the shortest of the Laws' speeches at 19 lines) Socrates challenges Crito with a series of inquiries (four questions and two queries). The speech is built solely upon directive speech acts, which gradually build in intensity. The Laws wish to know what Socrates proposes to do by running away; if he intends to destroy them and the state by escaping; if a city can exist when its legal judgments are nullified and destroyed. At the end of the speech, Socrates puts aside his role as the Laws and asks: "Shall we say 'Yes, I do intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgement at my trial'? Is that to be our answer, or what?" (50c, 1-4). Eager to please Socrates and the Laws, Crito answers quickly: "What you have just said, by all means, Socrates" (50c, 5). Crito is unaware that Socrates will soon prove this statement fallacious.
The second speech, over twice the length of the first, is also built upon a series of challenges. Throughout the speech, the Laws fire questions:

Come now, what charge do you bring against us and the State, that you are trying to destroy us? Did we not give you life in the first place? was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? . . . can you deny that you were our child and servant. . . . Do you not realize that you are even more bound to respect and placate the anger of your country than your father's anger? (50d, 1-51b, 6)

In addition to challenging Crito through inquiries, the Laws also issue challenging statements. In his portrayal of the Laws, Socrates instructs and asserts: "Never mind our language, Socrates; but answer our questions; after all, you are accustomed to the method of question and answer" (50c, 10-50d, 1). The Laws also challenge by pointing out: "You did not have equality of rights with your father . . . to enable you to retaliate; you were not allowed to answer back when you were beaten . . ." (50e, 8-51a, 3). The Laws conclude this speech with the forceful speech acts of enjoining and asseverating: "Both in war and in the law-courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country commands, or else persuade it in accordance with universal justice; but violence is a sin even against your parents, and it is a far greater sin against your country" (51b, 12-51c, 5). Socrates, ending this second speech, again steps out of his role as the Laws to question Crito: "What shall we say to this, Critc?—that what the Laws
say is true, or not?" (51c, 5-6) Again, Crito readily embraces the Laws' proposition, answering, "Yes, I think so" (51c, 7).

The third speech, the Laws' longest thus far, is, like the two previous speeches, built upon a series of speech acts which challenge Crito. In this speech, all acts are representative ones; inquiries as challenges play almost no role. Asking fewer questions, the Laws grow less conversational, more formal, and more dogmatic. Socrates, as the Laws, begins the third speech with a mild challenge: "Consider, then, Socrates . . . whether it is also true for us to say that what you are now trying to do to us is not right" (51c, 8-51d, 1). Rapidly growing more authoritative, the Laws declare an Athenian principle: "... any Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the political organization of the State and us its Laws, is permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever he likes" (51d, 6-10). Next, the Laws propound two additional points of Athenian citizenship: first, if a citizen is not satisfied with the state, he has the option of leaving the state, and, second, by accepting the way the state administers laws, a citizen commits himself to the laws of that state. The Laws enumerate three separate counts on which Socrates is guilty: "first, because we [the state] are his parents, and secondly because we are his guardians; and thirdly because, after promising obedience, he is neither obeying us nor persuading us to change our decision if we are at fault in any way" (51e, 10-52a, 2).

Growing more accusatory, the Laws substantiate for eight consecutive speech acts, presenting evidence that Socrates has indeed
been satisfied with the state. He has observed the duties of a citizen; begotten children in the city; preferred death to banishment at the time of death; and has never left the city, except on a military expedition. Using the harshest language in the speech thus far, the Laws criticize Socrates: "... you are behaving like the lowest type of menial, trying to run away in spite of the contracts and undertakings by which you agreed to live as a member of our State" (52d, 2-5). Concluding their third speech, the Laws ask their first question: "Are we or are we not speaking the truth when we say that you have undertaken, in deed if not in word, to live your life as a citizen in obedience to us?" (52d, 6-8). Characteristically, Socrates ends the speech by putting aside his role and asking Crito: "What are we to say to that, Crito? Are we not bound to admit it?" (52d, 8-10). Predictably, Crito affirms Socrates' question: "We cannot help it, Socrates" (52d, 10).

The Laws' fourth and final speech is their longest at 102 lines. It is built upon a series of representative speech acts, particularly forecasting, which is consistently used to threaten and frighten Crito; another tactic the Laws often employ to alarm Crito is threatening that Socrates' friends will be adversely affected by his escape.

Recognizing Crito's fear of the future, the Laws begin their final appeal, inviting him to consider the personal consequences were he to be an accessory to Socrates' escape: "We invite you to consider what good you will do to yourself or your friends if you commit this breach of faith and strain your conscience" (53a, 9-53b, 1). They continue, postulating Crito's fate: "It is fairly obvious that the risk of being
banished and either losing their citizenship or having their property confiscated will extend to your friends as well" (53b, 1-4). Next, addressing Crito's plan that Socrates escape to a foreign land, they forecast that Socrates will enter the foreign country as an enemy of its constitution, be eyed with suspicion as a criminal, and confirm the jurors' opinion that their verdict was correct. Ten lines later (53d, 3-6) the Laws actually implicate Crito, referring to Thessaly, the land of his friends, as the "home of indiscipline and laxity." The Laws forecast that the natives of Thessaly will be amused by the story of Socrates' escape and that once there he will hear "a good many humiliating comments" (53e, 5-6). The Laws close their speech by forecasting, asserting, and forecasting again, issuing their strongest plea in the dialogue:

It seems clear that if you do this thing [escape], neither you nor any of your friends will be the better for it. . . . As it is, you will leave this place, when you do, as the victim of a wrong done not by us, the Laws, but by your fellowmen. But if you leave in that dishonorable way . . . then you will have to face our anger in your lifetime, and in that place beyond when the laws of the other world know that you have tried, so far as you could, to destroy even us their brothers, they will not receive you with a kindly welcome. Do not take Crito's advice, but follow ours. (54b, 10-54d, 2)
As in the past, Socrates ends this, his final speech, by stepping out of his role. He reports, attests, warns, and invites: "That, my dear friend Crito, I do assure you, is what I seem to hear them saying . . . . I warn you that, as my opinion stands at present, it will be useless to urge a different view. However, if you think that you will do any good by it, say what you like" (54d, 3-10). Overwhelmed, Crito is forced to concede defeat, answering, "No, Socrates, I have nothing to say" (54d, 11).

Conclusion

This chapter's explication of the Crito's speech action—and the consequent revelation of the dialogue's deep structure—reveals that the Crito is a dynamic work, rich in action. Identifying the speech act verbs which name the illocutionary acts provides a useful method for illuminating character objectives and motives—what a character is attempting to accomplish in an utterance.

Socrates, for example, performs illocutions in which he avows, substantiates, and charges himself with a task. Each of these three speech act verbs reveal specific objectives that he is attempting to accomplish at three precise moments in the conversation. While a cursory reading of the "Introductory Conversation" would indicate that Socrates is calm, playful, and perhaps apathetic, a scrutiny of his speech action reveals contrary information otherwise unavailable. In the "Introductory Conversation," for instance, he seizes and maintains control of the dialogue by performing predominantly directive speech acts—eight questions and queries. In addition, he commits several
representative acts—committing himself to the truth of a proposition—as he casually, sometimes flippantly, opines in response to a pleading Crito: "Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die" (43c, 1-2). "Well, Crito, I hope that it may be for the best; if the gods will it, so be it" (43d, 8-9).

Socrates' complete avoidance of expressive acts—those by which the speaker communicates some aspect of his psychological state—reveals his uncompromising desire to avoid an emotional discussion of his impending death. Thus, a thorough and meaningful articulation of Socrates' character objectives based on his speech action in the "Introductory Conversation" would read: "I want to: bait and tease Crito, remain emotionally uninvolved, and control the conversation absolutely, keeping it superficial."

A final significance of the speech act analysis is that it, unlike any other methodology, successfully explains the Crito's overall structure and logic. This can be seen most clearly when the analysis is considered in the context of Smiley's premises about the structure of drama. The analysis reveals that the Crito is the record of one continuous conversation in which Socrates and Crito continually perform illocutionary acts; a study of these illocutions indicates that both characters change significantly in the course of the dialogue, Socrates evolving from docile to aggressive, and Crito changing from apprehensive to submissive. Indeed, the Crito is the evolution of a dynamic exchange, whose structured action is dictated by the two characters' illocutions, by their attempting to influence one another. The
principle of the Crito's unique structure is explained by Ohmann's contention: "In a play the action rides on a train of illocutions. . . . movement of characters and changes in their relations to one another within the social world of the play appear most clearly in their illocutionary acts." 12
NOTES

1 Smiley 43.
2 Hornby 25.
3 Hornby 187.

Fergusson's broad interpretation of "action" permits the examination of the dramatic action in the dialogue's speech action, in the deep structure: "One must be clear, first of all, that "action" (praxis) does not mean deeds, events, or physical activity: it means, rather, the motivation from which deeds spring" (8). He continues, "When Aristotle says 'action' (praxis) in the Poetics, he usually means the whole working out of a motive to its end in success or failure" (9). About Fergusson's application of his action concept in an analysis of Hamlet, Hornby comments: "In other words, Fergusson is not just dealing with a few surface events in the text . . ." (121).

5 A turn in speech action, as defined and applied in this study, occurs when a speaker initiates or introduces a new pattern or direction in the dialogue.

6 Following the standard procedure in speech act criticism, the speech act verbs, which identify speech acts, are underlined in the text of this analysis. Appendix B provides definitions of all speech act verbs used in this study.
A directive speech act attempts to get the listener to take action. The following are definitions of the speech act verbs used by Crito in his plea: Reprove—to gently criticize for a fault or misdeed. Admonish—to reprove mildly or kindly, but seriously. Reprehend—to sharply disapprove of the attributes or actions of a person. Reproach—to criticize sharply out of a sense of regret or disappointment. Command—to direct with authority. Rebuke—to criticize or reprove sharply. Beseech—to deliver an earnest or urgent request.

As applied in this study, a question is an inquiry that seeks a "yes" or "no" response and implies continuous and careful asking during a given period. A query does not seek a "yes" or "no" response, but seeks further explanation in order to resolve a doubt.

Taylor 171. The artistic function of this speech, says Taylor, is "to evoke a mood of ideal feeling adequate to the elevation of the ethical demands of Socraticism on the conscience, to arouse unconditional 'reverence' for the dignity of the moral law as that which demands and justifies the philosophers' [Socrates'] martyrdom" (171-2).

"Character objectives" is used consistent with Stanislavski's definition of the term, as the specific desires or wishes that a character wants to accomplish in a play. According to the Stanislavski method, the actor must identify the specific objectives which motivate his character by formulating the statement "I want to . . .," followed by an active verb. The actor, writes Hornby, "programs his role as a series of these desires: 'I want to prove Claudius's guilt,' 'I want to
stage a play,' 'I want to get revenge on Rosencrantz and Guildenstern,' and so on" (42-3).

Fergusson, in fact, in his application of the term, defines "action" as a character's objective or motive: "Oedipus's action in most of the play is easy to define; his motive is a clear and rational purpose. This is the kind of action Aristotle usually has in mind in discussing tragedy, and his word praxis connotes rational purpose. The common motive 'to find the slayer' accounts for the main movement of Oedipus Rex; and most drama, which must be instantly intelligible to an audience, depends on such clearly defined motivation" (9). According to Hornby, Fergusson's concept of "action" is especially valuable for an analysis for performance: "Fergusson, for example . . . comes to drama with the terminology of an actor--Stanislavski's concept of the 'objective,' which Fergusson relates to Aristotle's concept of 'action'" (20).

As stated earlier, Smiley posits that drama is structured action; that there are no rules for structuring action, only principles; that the logic of an individual play, not prescriptive rules, determines its structure (43).

Ohmann 61-107.
CHAPTER FOUR

STRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO

Spatial Analysis

Time

The Crito is set in the eleventh hour of Socrates' life. He is 70 years old, and, convicted of corrupting the youth of Athens and worshiping false gods, he is scheduled to be executed in two days. Sixty-five references to the passing of time, the time of day, the past, the present, and the future are made in the conversation. Time references permeate the dialogue, highlighting the contrasts between the personalities of Socrates and Crito.

At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates is concerned primarily with the time of day; Crito is most concerned about the immediacy of Socrates' execution. Socrates expresses his concern with time in the first line of the dialogue: "Here already, Crito? Surely it is still early?" (43a, 1). Crito responds that it is indeed early, establishing the setting of the dialogue as "just before dawn" (43a, 4). As the dialogue proceeds, Socrates maintains his concern with time: "Have you just come, or have you been here for long?" (43a, 8) "... why have you come so early?" (43a, 6). "Then I don't think it [the boat] will arrive on this day that is just beginning, but on the day after" (44a, 6-7). Crito's primary concern is Socrates' impending doom, and, thus, the need for a quick escape: "But look here, Socrates, it is still not too late to escape" (44b, 6-7). "... the whole thing must be
carried through during this coming night. If we lose any time it can't be done, it will be too late" (46a, 4-7).

Another aspect of the time motif is the characters' preoccupation with the future, especially what the future will hold if Socrates does not escape. Crito frequently expresses this concern by attempting to threaten and frighten Socrates, forecasting how dismal Socrates' future will be if he does not heed Crito's advice. In addition to guaranteeing that Crito will lose a friend, Socrates is ensuring that his sons will be treated like orphans. Furthermore, Crito warns Socrates, "... it will look as though we had played something of like a coward's part all through this affair of yours" (45e, 2-3). "... besides the suffering there will be all this disgrace for you and us to bear" (46a, 1-3).

Ironically, later in the dialogue, Socrates as the Laws uses the same tactic to threaten and frighten Crito.

In his reply to Crito, Socrates introduces a new facet of the time motif: the importance of understanding the relationship between the past and the present. In fact, Socrates' decision not to escape is based on the principle that one's current actions and beliefs must be consistent with those of one's past. Unlike fickle, impressionable Crito, Socrates is not influenced by the danger of the situation he now faces: "I cannot abandon the principles which I used to hold in the past simply because this accident has happened to me; they seem to me to be much as they were, and I respect and regard them now as before" (46c, 1-4).

Socrates, in fact, makes 26 references to the relationship between the past and the present. For example:
. . . I respect and regard the same principles now as before
(46c, 3-4). . . . what do you think of the sort of
illustration I used to employ? (47c, 3-4) Is it true, as we
have often agreed before . . . ? (49a, 7-8) Or have we
jettisoned all our former convictions in the last few days?
(49a, 9-10) Surely the truth is just what we have always said
(49b, 4-5). I have held it for a long time and still hold it
. . . (49d, 15).

Like Socrates' earlier speeches, much of the Laws' speech is structured
upon illustrating the relationship between the past and the present.
They use this strategy to provide concrete examples for Crito,
contrasting Socrates' behavior at his trial with his current behavior.
This demonstrates for Crito that, by escaping, Socrates would be acting
inconsistently with the principles upon which he has lived his life.
According to the Laws, Socrates is trying to leave the country against
the Laws of the state, when he could have left under the state's
sanction. The Laws tell him, " . . . at the time of your trial you could
have proposed the penalty of banishment, if you had chosen to do so
. . . " (52c, 4-5). However, they say, " . . . you made a noble show of
indifference if you had to die, and in fact preferred death, as you
said, to banishment . . . " (52c, 8-10). So, the Laws point out,
Socrates is showing no respect for his earlier professions and no regard
for the Laws, whom he is trying to destroy. Again, the Laws tell
Socrates: "You did not choose Sparta or Crete--your favorite models of
good government--or any other Greek or foreign state. . . . It is quite
obvious that you stand by yourself above all other Athenians in your affection for this city and for us its Laws . . . " (52e, 7-53a, 3).

"And now," the Laws ask Socrates, "after all this, are you not going to stand by your agreement?" (53a, 4-5).

Life and Death

The issue of Socrates' death is introduced immediately and referred to throughout the dialogue. Of 29 references to life and death made in the Crito, seven death references are made in the "Introductory Conversation." (No life references are made in this section of the dialogue.) There is an unequivocal contrast in the two characters' views of Socrates' death. Socrates speaks of his death bluntly. He accepts his fate: "Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die" (43c, 1-2). "I think I am right in saying that I have to die on the day after the boat arrives?" (44a, 3-4) Crito, however, is unable to speak comfortably about Socrates' death. It is difficult for him to confront the issue, for him to even say "death." He says instead, "I have often felt before in the course of my life how fortunate you are in your disposition, but I feel it more than ever now in your present misfortune [facing execution] when I see how easily and placidly you put up with it" (43b, 7-11). He continues, "Other people just as old as you are get involved in these misfortunes [facing the death penalty], Socrates, but their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they find themselves in your position" (43c, 3-5).
From 50d, 1 to 51c, 6, the Laws introduce a new perspective in the
life and death motif, presenting the state's viewpoint on the
relationship between life and death. It is the Laws' argument that the
state gave life to Socrates, making it possible for his father to marry
his mother and for his children to have a cultural and physical
education. Because he is the state's "child and servant," he owes it
the responsibility of dying if the state requires: "And if it leads you
out to war, to be wounded or killed, you must comply . . . "
(51b, 9-10).

The last section of the dialogue is concerned with death. From
53c, 1 onward, the Laws explore the issue of Socrates' death by
coloring his future earthly and non-earthly lives. As the
dialogue closes, Socrates' potential life is made to appear more bleak
than his death. The Laws wish to know if Socrates will consider life
worth living when he is humiliated as a runaway in Thessaly and his
children become foreigners. Furthermore, the Laws predict, if he is
unwilling to die as his country commands, his life in the "next world"
will not be pleasant: ". . . when the laws of the other world know that
you have tried, so far as you could, to destroy even us their brothers,
they will not receive you with a kindly welcome" (54c, 9-54d,1).

Authority

The issue of authority is another significant element that is woven
throughout the fabric of the dialogue. Socrates and Crito make 68
references to authorities and to people perceived as authorities. Like
other significant elements, the references to authority indicate the characters' contrasting values and motives. Crito argues that the common man should be respected and feared as an authority; that the common man serves as a trustworthy source for information; that the services of authorities can be purchased and controlled. Socrates believes that only experts should be respected as authorities; that the influence of the common man is unimportant; that the state is the supreme authority; that there exists a spiritual authority beyond the physical earth. Furthermore, Socrates (who is pedantic, self-confident, and uninfluenced by the opinions of others) views himself as an authority, while Crito, the analysis indicates, views everyone except himself as an authority.

The opinion of the masses, Crito believes, yields a great deal of influence over individuals. Thus, the lifestyle of the common man should serve as model behavior for the individual. He expresses this in a line, which, as earlier noted, also reveals his aversion of death: "Other people just as old as you are get involved in these misfortunes, Socrates, but their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they find themselves in your position" (43a, 3-5). In addition, he feels that the opinion of the common man can cause the individual a great deal of harm. A consequence of Socrates' not escaping, Crito insists, is that: "... a great many people who don't know you and me very well will be sure to think that I let you down, because I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend the money; and what could be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your
friends?" (44c, 2-6). Unrelenting, Crito offers a justification for his paranoia by pointing out his argument's relevance to Socrates' current situation:

You can see for yourself, Socrates, that one has to think of popular opinion as well. Your present position is quite enough to show that the capacity of ordinary people for causing trouble is not confined to petty annoyances, but has hardly any limits if you once get a bad name with them.

(44d, 1-5)

In addition to believing that the common man is an authority with a great deal of influence, Crito is also convinced that the "hoi polloi" can serve as a trustworthy source for information. Thus, Crito constantly relies on the word of others. At 44d he warns Socrates, ". . . I expect that it [the boat] will be here to-day, judging from the report of some people who have just arrived from Sunium and left it there" (43d, 3-5). He persists, commenting, "It's quite clear from their account that it will be here to-day . . ." (43d, 5-8). Based upon the report of these "authorities," Crito reaches the extreme conclusion that Socrates must therefore end his life on the next day. When asked if it is true that Socrates must die on the day after the boat's arrival, Crito immediately responds: "That's what the authorities say, at any rate" (44a, 5).

Crito's comments about authorities make him at times seem a man of questionable ethics. He has no qualms about buying the services of authorities. In the "Introductory Conversation," Crito makes an
allusion to a transaction or "arrangement" that he has made with the warder, the authority who guards Socrates' cell. Crito explains the reason the warder allowed him to enter at an exceptionally early hour: "He is used to me now, Socrates, because I come here so often; besides, he is under some small obligation to me" (43a, 6-7). Perhaps using "small obligation" ironically, Crito is indicating that the warder is someone with whom he has made arrangements for Socrates' escape. A little later, when reminding Socrates that he can still easily escape, Crito says that witnesses (potential informers) can easily be bribed: "And then surely you realize how cheap these informers are to buy off; we shan't need much money to settle them . . . ." (54b, 5-7). Moreover, Crito claims to know people who are willing to use their own money to pay off these informers: "One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has actually brought the money with him for this very purpose; and Cebes and a number of others are quite ready to do the same" (45b, 5-7). Not only is Crito willing to bribe informers, but he is most willing to involve others in his scheme.

Concerning authority, Socrates' views are the antitheses of Crito's. Crito's assumption that the common man is an authority, he feels, is blatantly erroneous. Socrates is adamant in his opinion that only experts (not the common man) should be treated as authorities. After "Crito's Exhortation," he immediately addresses and corrects his friend's view: "Suppose that we begin by reverting to this opinion you hold about people's opinions" (46c, 12-46d, 1). He presents a series of premises, each of which Crito agrees with: first, that it was always
right that only some opinions should be taken seriously; second, that one should only regard the opinions that some people hold; third, that the opinions of the wise are good and the foolish bad; fourth, that one should listen only to the opinion of qualified persons, not the general public. Finally, Crito agrees with Socrates' conclusion: "... that we ought to respect and fear this person more than all the rest put together; and that if we do not follow his guidance we shall spoil and mutilate that part of us which, as we used to say, is improved by right conduct and destroyed by wrong?" (47d, 1-6).  

Socrates continues the authority motif, reasoning that the common man, whose opinion is unimportant, deserves no respect. First he refutes Crito's argument by challenging him: "My dear Crito, why should we pay so much attention to what 'most people' think? The really reasonable people, who have more claim to be considered, will believe that the facts are exactly as they are" (44c, 9-12). About common people, Socrates says, "They cannot make a man wise or stupid; they simply act at random" (44d, 9-10). Next, he demonstrates that he does indeed apply what he teaches: "... it has always been my nature never to accept advice from any of my friends unless reflexion shows that it is the best course that reason offers" (46b, 6-46c, 1). Socrates culminates his polemic in the "Two Premises": "Whatever the popular view is ... the fact remains that to do wrong is in every sense bad and dishonorable for the person who does it" (49b, 4-8).

The polarities between Socrates and Crito are highlighted further by Socrates' belief that the supreme authority is the state. Each of
the 21 references he makes to the authority of the state, save one, are made in the "Speech of the Laws of Athens." Exploring the relationship between the individual and authorities, the Laws explain and justify the state's supreme authority. First, they remind Socrates of the relationship between a child and his parents: "You did not have equality of rights with your father... to enable you to retaliate; you were not allowed to answer back when you were scolded or to hit back when you were beaten..." (50e, 8-51a, 3). Next, they define the relationship between the citizen and the state: the state is the citizen's parent and guardian. Third, the Laws question Crito on the implications of this relationship: "Do you not realize that you are even more bound to respect and placate the anger of your country than your father's anger?" (51b, 4-6). The Laws make it clear to Crito that he must "submit to any punishment that it [the state] imposes" (51b,8), and that "in war and in the law-courts" he must do whatever his city and country commands (52d, 2-5). The Laws chastize Socrates, claiming that by escaping he will be violating the hierarchy of authority in the state: "... you are behaving like the lowest type of menial, trying to run away in spite of the contracts and undertakings by which you agreed to live as a member of our State" (52d, 2-5).

Socrates makes five references to the existence of spiritual, non-earthly authorities, communicating his respect for their powers to intervene in human affairs. Crito, however, makes no such references. In the "Introductory Conversation" Socrates tells Crito that he is convinced he will not have to die for three more days because a
prophetess appeared to him in a dream and told him so: "I thought I saw a gloriously beautiful woman dressed in white robes, who came up to me and addressed me in these words: 'Socrates, to the pleasant land of Phthia on the third day thou shalt come'" (44b, 2-3). At the conclusion of the Laws' speech Socrates acknowledges his respect for the mystic's inspiration: "That, my dear friend Crito, I do assure you, is what I seem to hear them saying, just as a mystic seems to hear the strains of music ..." (54d, 3-5). Moreover, three times throughout the dialogue, Socrates mentions the gods who preside in a world beyond the earth. Each of his comments indicates that he respects the gods and acquiesces to their authority. At 43d, 9, about his own death, Socrates says, "... if the gods will it so, so be it." At 54b, 7-10, Socrates, as the Laws, forecasts where he will go after escaping and dying: "... so that when you enter the next world you may have all this to plead in your defence before the authorities there." Socrates' final acquiescence to the gods is in the last line of the dialogue: "Then give it up, Crito, and let us follow this course, since God points out the way" (54e, 1-2).

Questioning

There is a profusion of questioning in the Crito. Between Socrates and Crito there are drastic differences in the numbers and types of questions asked. Socrates asks 89 questions and Crito asks five. In the dialogue, four basic types of questions are asked. Many are simple, direct, and non-challenging, while others are serious and challenging.
A third type is those to which the speaker does not permit his interlocuter opportunity for response. Finally, there are several hidden or covert inquiries—those which are not presented as obvious questions.

Socrates initiates the conversation (43a, 1-44a, 5) with simple, direct, non-challenging questions. Through his questioning he attempts to control the exchange, establishing a conversational, relaxed atmosphere. In addition to asking Crito the time of day, how long he has been waiting, and why he has come so early, Socrates asks, "Here already, Crito? Surely it is still early?" (43a, 1). "Then why didn't you wake me at once, instead of sitting by my bed so quietly?" (43b, 1-2). Impatient Crito, disturbed by Socrates' imminent execution, demands that they discuss more substantial issues. Socrates complies with Crito's demand, and no more questions of this sort are asked after 44b, 5.

From 44c, 1 to the end of the dialogue, Socrates relentlessly fires serious and challenging questions at Crito. During this interrogation, Socrates attempts to resolve several key issues, such as the significance of the opinion of the "many"; how his and Crito's opinions compare with those of the experts in right and wrong; if, by escaping, Socrates is destroying the state and returning an injury for an injury. Crito's serious questions are much less frequent and much less challenging than Socrates'. In his exhortation to escape, his longest speech in the dialogue, Crito asks only three questions: "... and what could be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money
than of your friends?" (44c, 4-6). "I hope that you aren't worrying about the possible effects on me and the rest of your friends, and thinking that if you escape we shall have to . . . pay an enormous fine, or even incur some further punishment?" (44e, 2-6). Finally, about the fate of Socrates' sons, Crito asks, "And what sort of chance are they likely to get?" (45d, 5-6).

Within his monologues, Socrates asks 57 questions for which he does not provide Crito opportunity to answer. Each of these inquiries is serious and challenging, and the majority of them (44 of the 57) can be answered with "yes" or "no" responses. Sample questions of this sort include the following:

Come now, what charge do you bring against us and the State, that you are trying to destroy us? (50d, 1-3) Did we not give you life in the first place? (50d, 3-4) was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? (50d, 4-5) Tell us, have you any complaint against those of us Laws that deal with marriage? (50d, 5-7)

Not all inquiries made in the dialogue are presented as obvious questions (interrogative sentences followed by question marks). For instance, at 43a, 5 Socrates queries, but does not question, "I wonder that the warder paid any attention to you." Crito poses hidden questions by expressing his confusion: "I have been wondering at you, because I saw how comfortably you were sleeping . . ." (43b, 4-6);

"Other people just as old as you are get involved in these misfortunes, Socrates, but their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they
find themselves in your position" (43c, 3-5); "Your dream makes no sense" (44b, 4). Socrates responds to each of these statements of confusion as he would if Crito were asking a question seeking clarification. Seven times throughout the dialogue Socrates disguises his questions by stating assumptions which serve as cues for Crito to indicate whether or not he is following Socrates' reasoning. Socrates' disguised inquiries include the following: "Then we should be afraid of the criticism and welcome the praise of the one qualified person, but not those of the general public" (47b, 7); "... I should like you to consider whether we are still satisfied on this point: that the really important thing is not to live, but to live well" (48b, 6-8). "Then in no circumstance must one do wrong" (49b, 10).

Crito's Responses to Socrates

It is in "Socrates' Reply to Crito" that Socrates begins firing questions at Crito. From this point to the end of the dialogue, Crito responds to Socrates 31 times. Each of his responses, save two, are statements of agreement with Socrates. Consistently, he eagerly embraces Socrates' explanations, never questioning his teacher's motives. Typical responses include "Yes, it is," "Naturally," "Certainly," "Surely not," "No never," "Exactly."

Although Crito's responses are consistently affirmative, it is doubtful that each of his replies represent a genuine and complete understanding of Socrates' reasoning. First, at 49a, 5, after much discussion and agreement, Socrates instructs Crito, "Now, give your
attention to the starting point of this inquiry . . . and try to answer my questions to the best of your judgement" (49a, 1-4). Crito's response, "Well, I will try," reveals his lack of certitude. Later, and more significantly, at the end of the "Two Premises," Socrates asks Crito a question that merely combines several of the premises that Crito has heretofore accepted as true:

Then consider the logical consequence. If we leave this place without first persuading the State to let us go, are we or are we not doing an injury, and doing it in a quarter where it is least justifiable? Are we or are we not abiding by our just agreements? (49e, 8-50a, 4)

Crito, having agreed to each element of this question, should have no difficulty answering Socrates. However, he responds: "I can't answer your question, Socrates; I am not clear in my mind" (50a, 5-6). Although it has been easy for Crito to answer "yes" to several simple questions, he is baffled when confronted by a question which requires him to synthesize previous ones. Crito's positive responses, it seems, indicate his intimidation rather than understanding.

**Temporal Analysis**

**Choice**

A fundamental choice for many dramatists is the historical source upon which to base a drama. About source, Hornby points out: "the most obvious case is when the play script is based on an existing myth, legend, novel, historical record, or another play script."^2^ Plato,
however, chose to base his drama on biography. The characters in his
dialogues were real, not fabricated, personalities with whom Plato met
and spoke daily. As Socrates' disciple since age twenty, Plato observed
his beloved teacher for nearly a decade. Plato wrote the Crito shortly
after Socrates' death in 399 B.C. in an attempt "to preserve his memory
by depicting his personality and conversation."³

Although Plato did not witness every dialogue he dramatized, his
depictions of Socrates are considered more consistent, complete, and
accurate than those of Xenophon and Aristophanes, the other authors of
extant dramatic works about Socrates.⁴ In the Apology, Plato has
Socrates himself strongly objecting to Aristophanes' distorted
characterization: "You have seen it for yourselves in the play by
Aristophanes, where Socrates goes whirling around, proclaiming that he
is walking on air, and uttering a great deal of other things of which I
know nothing whatsoever" (Apology 19C). It was Plato's deliberate
choice not to caricature or fictionalize Socrates. A close examination
of the Crito indicates that Socrates is a complex, dynamic, and
believable character. While his reasoning is usually insightful and
salient, it is at times sophistic and fallacious. Frequently
aggressive, locquacious, and eloquent in style, he is also docile,
reticent, and laconic. Although his treatment of Crito is usually
gentle and sensitive, he is also sarcastic and flippant.

Plato's choice of a source for the Crito dictated several other
choices, including his decision to write the Crito in dialogue form.
Censuring tragedy and comedy because of their reliance on spectacle for
effect, Plato selected a literary form uniquely appropriate to his subject. The dialogue is a special genre which permitted him to accurately capture Socrates in action, honestly present a portrait of his teacher, and effectively implement dramatic elements which do not require the spectacle of tragedy or comedy for their effect.

Another of Plato's significant choices was his decision concerning the function of the "Speech of the Laws of Athens." In this, the longest and final speech in the dialogue, Plato elected that Socrates assume the persona of the Laws and Constitution of Athens and conduct a mock interrogation of himself. This speech, the most dramatic and powerful in the dialogue, is responsible for Crito's surrender to Socrates. In this speech, Socrates does not merely report what he hears the Laws saying. He changes drastically, assuming an intimidating, dynamic personality, bringing the Laws to life as if they are another character in the drama.

Sequence

The Crito, like Beckett's Endgame and Ionesco's The Bald Soprano, is not separated by acts or scenes. It consists of continuous dialogue. Nonetheless, it has a sequence of incidents, identified in this study as the "Introductory Conversation," "Crito's Exhortation to Escape," "Socrates' Reply to Crito," the "Two Premises," and the "Speech of the Laws of Athens," which contribute to the shape and meaning of the dialogue. Examining the Crito's incidents provides a useful categorization for purposes of criticism, analysis, and rehearsal, and
reveals that although the conversation is continuous, the dialogue is not dramatically unchanging. Dividing the *Crito* in this manner demonstrates how the parts in the sequence contribute to the formation of the whole.

The spatial analysis of the *Crito* revealed the presence of four types of references in the dialogue's time motif. A temporal study of these references indicates that they are not scattered throughout the dialogue; rather, they appear in a sequence of four reference or image clusters. In fact, all references to the time of day and Socrates' execution appear in the "Introductory Conversation." No other time images appear in this section of the dialogue, nor do references to the time of day and execution occur after the "Introductory Conversation." All references to the future are clustered in the next section of the dialogue, "Crito’s Exhortation to Escape." All succeeding time references or images concern the relationship between the past and the present and appear throughout the dialogue's remaining three incidents.

References to life and death, another significant element in the *Crito*, occur in three image clusters, in this order: death, the relationship between life and death, and life. Throughout the "Introductory Conversation" and "Crito's Exhortation," Socrates and Crito refer only to death, never to life. For instance, Socrates says, "... it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die" (43c, 1-2). Crito reminds Socrates, "Your death means a double calamity for me" (44c, 7-8). As "Crito's Exhortation to Escape" concludes, death images are superseded by images of both life and death,
particularly what Socrates considers the proper outlook on the relationship between life and death. Beginning at 53c, 7, references to life, especially life in the future, pervade the dialogue. For instance, the Laws ask Socrates: "... and if you do, will life be worth living?" (53c, 7). "So you will live as the toady and slave . . ." (53e, 6-54a, 1).

The spatial analysis of the third significant element in the Crito, questioning, revealed the presence of four basic types of questions. Two of these—simple, direct, non-challenging questions and the serious, challenging questions—appear in two clusters in the dialogue.7 Simple, direct, non-challenging questions, such as, "Here already, Crito? Surely it is still early?" (43a, 1) "About what time?" (43a, 3) are posed first. They are the only type present in the "Introductory Conversation." Beginning with "Crito's Exhortation to Escape," there is a shift to serious and challenging questions. This pattern continues throughout the remainder of the dialogue.

Like the significant element questioning, Crito's responses are clustered in two types or classes within the dialogue. His responses throughout the "Introductory Conversation" and his "Exhortation to Escape" indicate an independence from Socrates. As the speech act analysis indicates, in this early part of the dialogue, Crito performs a variety of speech acts including answering, explaining, asserting, wishing, differing, and querying. As the dialogue progresses, however, Crito's independence diminishes. From "Socrates' Reply to Crito" to the
end of the dialogue, all but two of Crito's responses are affirmations of Socrates' statements.

Authority is the only significant element identified in this study that does not appear in clustered images within the text. The eight types of authority references permeate the entire fabric of the dialogue, often appearing simultaneously within one division of the Crito. For instance, in the "Introductory Conversation," the shortest section of the dialogue, five of the eight authority references appear: Crito expresses his belief that the common man should be respected and feared; that the word of the common man can be trusted; that authorities can be bought and controlled; that he himself is not an authority; and Socrates alludes to the existence of a supernatural authority. References to authority do not appear in independent clusters that form a sequence or progression throughout the dialogue. Figure 1, Appendix D, presents a schema of the sequence of significant elements in the Crito.

**Progression**

As the schema of progression, Figure 2, Appendix D, indicates, the dialogue follows a course, each significant element except authority undergoing a progression of image cluster changes. A close study of how these clusters progress, how they interact, and where they change, indicates that they do not change randomly: there is, rather, a metamorphosis from the beginning of "Crito's Exhortation to Escape" to the end of "Socrates' Reply to Crito." (This section of the Crito will
hear after be referred to as the "Metamorphosis.") Each significant element emerges from this portion of the dialogue drastically changed. Moreover, Socrates is responsible for each of these key changes. The cumulative effect is an overall progression or advancement in the dialogue. What Socrates accomplishes in the Metamorphosis moves the Crito toward its objective. Figure 2 illustrates the progression of motifs and the Metamorphosis' influence on the movement of the dialogue.

The two primary topics of conversation illustrated in Figure 2, time, and life and death, make progressions throughout the dialogue. The concern with and references to time progress from the simple to the complex and abstract. Initially, each character has a single, concrete time concern (Crito with the execution, Socrates with the time of day). Then, in the Metamorphosis, Socrates, demanding that time be given more substantial consideration, redirects the concern with time. He instigates references to the relationship between the past and the present, upon which he builds the principle responsible for his ultimate decision not to escape. References to life and death advance from death, to life and death, to life. At the beginning of the dialogue, the characters present their simple, unsophisticated views of death. Crito is fearful and Socrates is accepting. Then, in the Metamorphosis, Socrates calls for and provides a serious examination of the relationship between life and death. The consequence is an emphasis on life for the remainder of the dialogue. Ironically, as the dialogue
evolves and Socrates' execution draws nearer, the references progress from death to life.

In addition to progressions in the topics Socrates and Crito discuss, there are also changes in the manner of their conversation. First, Socrates modifies his questioning. Consistent with his earlier behavior, Socrates, in the Metamorphosis, shifts from asking simple, non-challenging questions to inquiries which are serious and challenging. Crito's responses progress from those which reveal his independence from Socrates to those which continually affirm Socrates' statements. This progression can be most meaningfully understood by examining how it interacts with the other progressions in the dialogue. Crito demonstrates his independence early in the dialogue, through his responses in the "Introductory Conversation" and his "Exhortation to Escape." During these early incidents, the time concerns are still with the time of day, the execution, and the future; the life and death references are only to death; Socrates' questions are still simple, direct, and non-challenging. Then, as the Metamorphosis begins at the inception of "Crito's Exhortation to Escape," Socrates redirects each of the motifs. At 46c, 2, the time motif shifts from the future to the relationship between the past and the present; at 45c, 7, the life and death references shift from death to the relationship between life and death; at 44c, 9, Socrates begins firing serious and challenging questions. Crito, bombarded by Socrates' challenges, ceases to use responses which indicate his independence, and at 47a, 5 he consistently acquiesces to and affirms with Socrates.
In the *Crito*, changes in the characters' motives result in the progression of motifs, the consequence of which is the overall action or evolution of the dialogue. Throughout the conversation, Crito has one primary motive: to convince Socrates to escape. Socrates is initially playful; his motive is to tease and bait Crito. Then, in the Metamorphosis, he changes his approach: "Very well, then: we must consider whether we ought to follow your advice or not" (46b, 4). Whether sincere or not, Socrates' change of motive drastically affects the dialogue. He redirects each significant element except authority, driving the dialogue toward its resolution.

**Duration**

An incident's chronological duration, its length in performance, is dictated by such factors as the number of lines in the incident, the length of the characters' speeches, and the seriousness of the conversation. An incident's psychological weighting exists in the deep structure of the text and is comprised of such factors as character motives, the progression of significant elements, and the evolution of the dialogue as a whole. According to Hornby, an incident's psychological weighting determines its importance.

Considered chronologically, the "Introductory Conversation" is the shortest incident in the dialogue. The incident is only 37 lines in length; the characters' speeches range from two words to three sentences. The conversation is a rapid exchange of questions and responses, and the discussion is superficial, lacking focus and depth.
As a consequence, in clock time, the incident progresses very quickly. However, as the most psychologically weighty incident, the impact of its deep structure on the audience is vital. The audience should be bombarded with the contrasts in character personalities, motives, and topics of conversation. Socrates, more concerned with the time of day than with his execution, assumes control of the conversation, and asks simple, nonthreatening questions. Crito, preoccupied with the execution, is fearful of death. He indicates independence in his responses to Socrates. Due to the contrasts between Crito's sincerity, commitment, and enthusiasm and Socrates' apathy, more is happening in the deep structure of this short incident than in that of any other. Moreover, the psychological impact of this incident is especially important because it is from the foundation established in the "Introductory Conversation" that the characters evolve in the drama. "Crito's Exhortation to Escape" is 20 lines longer than the "Introductory Conversation." The characters' speeches average ten lines each, with Crito's final speech in this scene the dialogue's longest thus far. Questions and responses are no longer fired in rapid exchange, and the conversation, due to Crito's pleading, emotional monologues, is more serious. The cumulative result is a chronological duration slightly longer than that of the "Introductory Conversation"; however, the psychological weighting of this incident is slightly less significant. There are, nonetheless, subtle changes in character and dialogue. Socrates continues teasing and baiting Crito, who, although intellectually unchanged, is growing impatient, aggressive, and
emotional. Moreover, this incident ushers in the Metamorphosis, during which every significant element changes direction. Here the time element is redirected from a concern with the time of day and execution to a preoccupation with the future, and the questions asked shift from simple to serious and challenging. An audience's awareness of the deep structure's evolution results in a better understanding of the Crito's meaning.

Chronologically, "Socrates' Reply to Crito" is the dialogue's longest incident thus far. The scene is eighty lines long; all questions asked in it are serious and challenging; and in it Socrates presents four long, unfocused, albeit intellectually rigorous, monologues. Although this incident concludes the Metamorphosis which began in "Crito's Exhortation," everything established by the conclusion of "Socrates' Reply" remains constant, for the remainder of the dialogue. The significant element time shifts from an emphasis on the future to the importance of understanding the relationship between the past and the present; life and death references now refer to understanding the relationship between life and death; and Crito's responses to Socrates change from those which show his independence to affirmations which show his acquiescence. At the end of this incident, the characters are still opposites of each other; however, each is now opposite what he was at the dialogue's beginning. Although some changes occur in its deep structure, this incident is the least significant thus far.
The "Two Premises" continues the pattern of the incidents' progressively lengthening durations and decreasing psychological weighting. Socrates, seldom permitting Crito opportunity to speak, continues his long, often unwieldy, monologues; the questions are still serious and challenging; the significant elements are unchanging for the remainder of the dialogue.

Without question, the "Speech of the Laws" has the longest chronological duration of any incident in the dialogue. One-hundred and thirty lines long, it is comprised almost entirely of Socrates' monologues. Crito speaks only four times, uttering a total of 25 words. A scrutiny of the incident's psychological weighting indicates that the deep structure is nearly stagnant, evolving very slowly from the previous incident. Socrates' motives, for instance, are basically unchanged from those he pursued in the last incident; however, he is growing more formal and dogmatic, challenging Crito with greater frequency and intensity. In performance, the chronological duration and psychological weighting must be carefully manipulated, permitting the elements of the deep structure to be brought to the surface. The analysis of the Crito's tempo explains how these factors can be manipulated in performance. Figure 3 (Appendix D) is a schema of the chronological duration and psychological weighting of each incident in the dialogue.
Tempo

Tempo is a function of the number of incidents occurring per unit of time. Hornby stresses that tempo "should not be confused, in performance, with mere speed of playing time." The director's understanding of a play's tempo, the function between clock time and the number of incidents that occur, permits a performance to, as Bernard Shaw points out, "bring out the meaning better by contrasts in tone and speed." Viewing tempo as a function, the critic is reminded that tempo is relative to each playscript, that "pace is an inner goal, imposed by the circumstances of the playscript, rather than by the director shouting 'faster'." In the Crito there are seemingly few events occurring per unit of time. There is little external (surface) action. Hence, one might suspect that, in performance, it is necessary to deliberately accelerate the tempo in order to compensate for the lack of activity. This is not the case. Tempo in the Crito functions on the same principle as it does in Pinter's The Homecoming, as Hornby reveals in his study of the play.

Viewing the Crito's tempo as a mathematical function, a generalized formula which stresses the relationship between the elements that determine the dialogue's pace, permits a deeper examination of tempo than does strictly discursive language. The tempo of most playscripts can be represented by the formula \( S(C) \rightarrow T \), where the relationship between the surface activity, \( S \), and the chronological duration, \( C \), yields the tempo, \( T \). The Crito, however, like The Homecoming, has very little surface activity to interact with its chronological duration. If
this function alone were permitted to dictate tempo—if the tempo were not manipulated to bring the psychological weighting of the deep structure to the surface—the dialogue’s pace would grow progressively slower in performance. Consequently, the audience would not have opportunity to be affected by the richness of the deep structure. Thus, the function $D(C) \rightarrow T$, where $D$ represents the amount and type of activity in the deep structure, provides a more useful and illuminating way to view the Crito’s tempo. Applying this formula, sensitive directorial choices can be made. For instance, when there is much activity in an incident’s deep structure, the tempo can be deliberately slowed to maximize the impact of the psychological weighting on the audience. Conversely, when little is happening in the deep structure, when the interaction of $D$ and $C$ yield a slow pace, the tempo can be accelerated. (Figure 4, Appendix D, provides a schema of tempo in the Crito, as dictated by both functional relationships.)

The $D(C) \rightarrow T$ formula applied to the first two incidents indicates a strong interaction between the deep structure and the chronological duration. There is much activity in the deep structures of these chronologically brief incidents. Thus, in performance, the incidents will tend to move very quickly. Although these incidents have inherently fast tempos, directorial attempts must be made in performance to deliberately slow the tempo. The audience must be given opportunity to "ponder the nuances" of the deep structure and to be affected by the rich psychological weighting.
As the dialogue progresses, its inherent tempo—dictated by the interaction of the surface structure with the chronological duration—slows considerably. Moreover, in the last incident, the "Speech of the Laws," there is very little activity in the dialogue's deep structure. In this problematic situation, it would be ineffective, and probably detrimental, to slow down the tempo, as is necessary in the first two incidents; here, there is little deep structure action to expose or bring to the surface. The solution lies in applying Hornby's definition of tempo: "a function of the number of incidents occurring per unit of time."

Statement of the Unifying Principle

The unifying principle, Hornby points out, "... is a functional relationship between a critical approach and a particular script; it does not exist in the script itself." He continues, "It exists as a transaction between the eye of the beholder and the thing beheld... not like a hallucination but rather like the meaningful organization of a mosaic." The Crito's unifying principle is a critical and comprehensive synthesis of the spatial and temporal analyses—a device which informs one of the dialogue's details, thus facilitating comprehension of the total significance of the script. It explains the dynamics of the dialogue as an organic literary and theatrical artwork to be performed in space and time. Finally, it provides the director, actors, and technicians with a cohesive production concept.
The unifying principle for Plato's *Crito*, then, is as follows: The *Crito* is one continuous conversation whose evolution is structured upon Socrates' successful manipulation of Crito. He adroitly reverses Crito's behavior from aggressive to passive; turns his stubborn rejection of Socrates' ideas to unconditional acquiescence; and alters the subject matter from simple to complex and abstract.
Later in the dialogue Socrates applies the appeal to authority as a persuasive technique. At 46d, 12 he assures Crito, "Serious thinkers, I believe have always held some such view as the one which I mentioned just now: . . . ." At 50b, 10 he postulates, "There is much that could be said, especially by a professional advocate. . . . ."

In Socrates: The Man and His Thought, Taylor thoroughly and convincingly argues that Plato's depictions of Socrates are more credible than those of Xenophon and Aristophanes. According to Taylor, "Except on one or two points of detail, Xenophon does not formally contradict anything which Plato tells us about Socrates." However, he continues, "... the vivid individuality of Plato's portrait of Socrates is all but entirely lost in Xenophon, who ignores most of the peculiarities which make Plato's hero an 'original.'" (Taylor 22)

There is a questionable tradition supported by Diogenes Laertius that in his youth Plato wrote tragedies which he later destroyed. In A.D. 200, Diogenes wrote about Plato, "He applied himself to painting and wrote poems, first dithyrambs, afterwards lyric poems and tragedies. . . . Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus, and then consigned his poems to the flames, with the words: 'Come hither, O fire-god, Plato now has need of thee.'" Diogenes Laertius,
These types of references include concern with the time of day, the timeliness of Socrates' execution, the future, and the relationship between the past and the present.

Two of the four question types are not treated directly in this study of sequence. The 57 inquiries for which Socrates does not permit Crito opportunity to answer are also serious and challenging questions, and the hidden questions are too infrequent for their presence to form a pattern. Because he asks only five of the 94 questions in the dialogue, there is no pattern in his questioning; therefore, his questions are not examined in this study of sequence.

The spatial analysis reveals eight authority motifs in the Crito. They include Crito's argument that the common man should be respected and feared as an authority; that the common man serves as a trustworthy source of information; that the services of authorities can be purchased and controlled. Socrates contributes four motifs: the assertion that, contrary to what Crito believes, only experts should be respected as authorities; that the influence of the common man is unimportant; that the state is the supreme authority; that there exists a spiritual authority beyond the physical earth. The eighth motif is Socrates' perception of himself as an authority and Crito's view of everyone except himself as an authority.

Recall that "action" is defined by Ferguson as "the whole working out of a motive to its end in success or failure" (9).
In the statement of his motive, "to consider whether we ought to follow your advice or not," Socrates conveys the impression that his decision will be determined by a rational consideration of the issue, a process that he will presently undertake with Crito. Because the consequence of his stated motive has such a profound effect on the movement and ultimate resolution of the dialogue, it is questionable that this is Socrates' genuine motive. It is more likely that his actual motive is to control the conversation, directing Crito toward accepting his predetermined decision.

Authority serves a function different from the other significant elements. Although they neither appear in clusters nor form progressions, the authority motifs are continually manifest in some form. Due to the topic and the nature of the dialogue, authority is a constant element that underlies the entire conversation, contributing to the overall atmosphere of the Crito.

As employed in Hornby's definition, "incidents" refers to the events which comprise the divisions of the dialogue. However, in this analysis of tempo, "incidents" will continue referring to the divisions of the dialogue (i.e., the "Introductory Conversation," "Crito's Exhortation to Escape," etc.).

Hornby 88.


Hornby 89.
Hornby posits two premises about *The Homecoming*. First, "On the surface there are very few events to cover the two hours or so of playing time . . . " (187); second, " . . . important events are compressed, while trivial ones (on the surface) are extended . . . ." (190-1). In light of these premises, Hornby concludes that *The Homecoming* calls for a very slow tempo:

... the temptation to speed things up must be scrupulously avoided. This is because, below the surface in the deep structure, a great deal is going on—seductions, power struggles, acts of vengeance, territorial defenses, the passing of the older generation. To speed up the surface activity is to destroy these deeper resonances and make the play seem really slow. The audience must be given time to ponder, to notice subtleties, for the surface of the action really offers them very little by itself. That is, one can rush a play like *Macbeth*, and the audience will still remain interested because there is so much surface activity; they may not be very deeply moved, but at least they will not get bored. With a play like *The Homecoming*, however, there is no sense in rushing or "getting on with the action," since there is almost no surface action to begin with. Rushing is one of the most common flaws in directing today—which is why so many productions seem so slow. (187)

"Function" as used in this analysis and by Hornby denotes the same meaning as "ratio" used by Kenneth Burke: "A ratio is a formula
indicating a transition from one term to another. Such a relation necessarily possesses the ambiguities of the potential, in that the second term is a medium different from the first." Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969) 262.

"Function," Hornby suggests, is more accurate than "ratio," for it describes a transformation rather than a comparison.  

18 Hornby 120.
Plato's *Crito* was performed on 27 and 30 March 1986 in the Bertha Martin Theatre at the University of Northern Iowa. Appendix E provides a flyer announcing the production; F, a program; G, photographs; and H a videotape of the performance. This chapter first discusses the nature of the production, focusing on acting and characterization, the treatment of the text in performance, and technical aspects of the production. The second part of the chapter examines the influence of the speech act and structuralist analyses upon the production of the Crito.

**Discussion of the Production**

**Acting/Characterization**

Chapters 3 and 4 reveal fundamental principles about the relationship between Socrates and Crito. Most of this information, however, was deliberately withheld from the actors during early rehearsals. Dictating an interpretation of the characters and their relationships, I decided, could potentially handicap the actors by limiting their exploration of character and by providing them with direction they might find difficult to motivate. Instead, the rehearsal process was used as the actors' opportunity to explore the script, discover character relationships, and convert these discoveries into what we agreed were sensible artistic choices for performance. The
actors were guided by the Stanislavskian principle that acting is living truthfully in imaginary circumstances. One of the initial and most valuable decisions the actors made was that, in performance, Socrates and Crito must be authentic human beings, driven more by emotional needs than by cerebral concerns. The emotional bond between Socrates and Crito established the foundation upon which subsequent character motivation was built.

Crito is driven to save his best friend of fifty years from, as he sees it, killing himself. Socrates, not immune to reacting emotionally, is consumed by a passion for doing what is right, even if it means surrendering himself to death. Rather than an attempt to stage an argument, give the audience a philosophy lesson, or re-create historical personalities, the Crito became the dramatization of one man's mission to save his closest friend from committing "suicide."

Upon a cursory reading of the script, a reader would likely conclude that Crito is a flat character, a mere pawn who fails to heighten the dramatic action. To achieve a compelling characterization, it was necessary for the actor to extrapolate far beyond a surface interpretation of the role. First, the script was scrutinized for factual information about Crito: he is Socrates' contemporary and his closest friend, a pragmatic businessman of financial means and influence, and an individual driven in part by selfish motives. Next, such factual or "surface" information was combined with that which the speech act and structuralist analyses revealed about the deep structure of the dialogue, resulting in the actors' understanding of hidden or
buried emotional facets of the character and rich motivational opportunities for performance. Motivated by love, as well as fear of public ridicule, Crito fights to save Socrates; frustrated by his limited success, his love turns to fury; brow-beaten, he respectfully defers to Socrates.

Although many of Crito's arguments are fallacious, the directorial decision was made that they must, nonetheless, appear credible to the audience and tempting to Socrates. Portraying Crito as someone to be taken seriously, rather than the ponderous, simplistic foil he might seem in the written text, engages the audience and heightens dramatic potential. Rather than dismissing Crito as a pawn who will be predictably pounced upon by Socrates, by the end of his exhortation the audience should be allied with Crito, hoping for Socrates to do the right thing and follow his friend's sensible advice. Socrates can then take charge, engaging the audience and Crito by addressing Crito's arguments one by one in his powerful Speech of the Laws.

To strengthen the communication and essential bond between the characters, character believability, and audience involvement, it was decided that Socrates could not be portrayed as the infallible "logic machine" he is often viewed as. To ensure Socrates' emotional vulnerability, the actor playing the role made several essential, specific decisions (not all of which are explicitly suggested by the script, but which can be supported by it): (1) Before Crito arrived, Socrates had considered escaping; (2) He has since decided against it;
(3) Crito has partially succeeded at convincing Socrates to escape; (4) Socrates must use the remainder of the conversation to convince Crito and reconvince himself that he should not escape. Making these decisions by expanding upon what is provided in the script assists the actor in developing the concrete framework necessary for building the character.

The Crito's most formidable acting challenge is Socrates' long, seemingly-directionless monologue in which he personifies the Laws of Athens. Four major acting and directorial decisions were made concerning the performance of the Speech of the Laws. First, Socrates must undergo an unmistakable metamorphosis in voice, movement, and energy when he becomes the Laws. Socrates' transitions between himself and the Laws were crisply delineated for the audience. Second, when Socrates becomes the Laws, he must assign Crito the role of Socrates. Although this technique is not suggested by the script, it permits Crito and the audience to experience the manifestation of the Laws much more powerfully than if Socrates were merely conversing with himself. Third, the Laws' speech must be didactic rather than ruminary. At this point, Socrates has already reconvincing himself that he should not escape, but has yet to convince Crito and the audience. Thus, it was necessary that Socrates be fiery, didactic, and intimidating, rather than merely "think out loud," sorting through his convictions. Finally, it was determined that, as the Laws, Socrates should assume the role of a lawyer convincing a jury--the audience--that Socrates should do what is right and not escape. This deliberate attempt to violate the audience's
aesthetic distance by directly addressing individual members made the audience integral participants in the drama. Thus, by the end of the Laws' speech, Socrates has negated Crito's influence on the audience, turning them into Socrates' reluctant adversaries.

**Treatment of the Text in Performance**

Hornby's intrinsic method of analysis is opposed to altering or "doctoring" the written text for the purpose of performance. Text and performance, Hornby believes, have a dynamic relationship that editing destroys; the integrity of the author and the artwork must be of foremost importance:

> Again, I believe that a director, and a critic too, should develop a habit of modesty toward a playscript; instead of automatically thinking, 'I know better. Chuck this out,' one should always assume that the playwright knew what he was doing, even (or perhaps especially) where the script seems difficult or obscure. . . . a work of art that contains no element of the irrational or inexplicable is usually tepid and dull. . . .

Adjusting the *Crito* by deleting lines or rearranging parts would have defeated a major purpose of the study--demonstrating that the dialogue is in itself performable--by ignoring a major challenge presented when performing Plato. Slight alterations occurred in only two instances: first, when the actors were unable to provide a "word-perfect" recollection of the lines. Second, since this translation was intended
for the print medium, Socrates' utterances were occasionally too long and cumbersome for the actor to articulate and for an audience to be expected to comprehend. One of these speeches was judiciously edited for the performance medium. The following is the translator's version of Socrates' utterance at 48d, 4-9:

If it becomes clear that such conduct is wrong, I cannot help thinking that the question whether we are sure to die, or to suffer any other ill effect for that matter, if we stand our ground and take no action, ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the risk of doing what is wrong.

This awkward line was necessarily trimmed: "If it becomes clear that such conduct is wrong, any ill effects we may suffer ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the risk of doing what is wrong."11

Technical Aspects of the Production

It was clear from the early planning stages that it would be a serious error to rely upon theatrical spectacle for the success of the production. Rather than enhancing the performance, spectacle would have interfered with the drama inherent in the language, the conflict, and the threat of Socrates' impending doom. The Crito was produced utilizing a near-barren set and minimal lighting. Set in Socrates' prison cell in 399 B.C., the environment was suitably barren and dank, consisting of one bed, two tables, one bench, and one stool. Illumination was provided by two ellipsoidal-reflector lamps, two scoop lights, two oil-burning pottery lamps, and the house lights, controlled
by a dimmer switch. Two goboed ellipsoidals cast light and shadow to the floor, creating the appearance of shadows from two barred prison windows. Early in the script, we are told that the time is "just before dawn": as the dialogue progressed, the outside light from the windows and the overhead light gradually increased.

The actors wore period costumes, Socrates, the ascetic philosopher, barefoot and costumed in a thread-bare robe. Crito, the wealthy merchant, was appropriately appointed in sandals and a robe. The possibility of "updating" the setting and/or costumes—for example, costuming Crito in a three-piece suit and Socrates in prison greys—was categorically rejected rather than risk alienating the audience. When most audiences view a "contemporary" production of a classic, they are so often consumed with decoding the significance of (or the symbolism behind) the director's decision, that they are unable to surrender themselves to the theatrical experience. The possibility of performing the Crito as a "concept" production, which would attempt to make a relevant political message, was also vehemently opposed. Such a technique would prove reductive, severely limiting the audience's response to the potential richness of the artwork.

**Discussion of the Methodologies**

**Speech Act Methodology**

A premise of speech act theory, and this study, is that identifying the speech acts characters commit takes the critic below the surface of the text to discover what those characters are "attempting to do."
Illocutionary acts are explicated in Chapter 3 (and catalogued in Appendix A), thus illuminating the motivation and objectives of the characters in the Crito. For instance, it was determined that early in the dialogue Socrates, attempting to elicit action from Crito, performs a series of directive speech acts by pelting Crito with questions and queries. This made possible the discovery that Socrates, while relaxed and somewhat playful, has successfully initiated an inquiry-response pattern in the dialogue, securing a control over the conversation that he never relinquishes. Crito delivers a four-sentence speech early in the dialogue in which he commits a variety of representative and expressive speech acts, including asserting, wishing, explaining, and expressing admiration. The randomness of his speech action indicates that he is so emotionally distraught by Socrates' approaching doom that he can deliver only a scrambled confession.

Upon examining the identified illocutions, revealing speech act patterns emerge. Significantly, these patterns reveal character evolution and the action or progression of the dialogue. According to Ohmann, "... movement of the characters and changes in their relations to one another within the social world of the play appear most clearly in the illocutionary acts."\(^5\) Socrates, for instance, maturing from committing directive acts (primarily questioning and querying) to performing representative ones (forecasting, asserting, and postulating), thus evolving from a calm, relaxed state to a fiery, didactic one in the role of the Laws of Athens. Ohmann's hypothesis is supported: "Illocutions are the vehicle of the play's action."\(^6\)
The most significant theoretical and, as this study has found, practical value of a speech act analysis of Plato's *Crito* is that it, unlike other methodologies, goes directly to the primary source of action in the dialogue—the deep structure. Unlike most dramatic works, however, the *Crito* does not entirely support Aristotle's definition of tragedy (drama) as the imitation (re-enactment) of an action. It is generally agreed that "re-enactment" is the best translation for "imitation," for, as Butcher comments, "In the drama the characters are not described, they enact their own story and so reveal themselves." The *Crito*, quite clearly, consists of little action of this sort. It is rather what Susanne Langer calls a discursive form than a presentational form. The speech act methodology, however, permits the unique logic of the *Crito*—its action in the language of the deep structure rather than action in enactment on the surface—to be explored. For instance, the analysis determined that the action or progression of the "Introductory Conversation" is structured upon four turns in speech action: first, Socrates establishes his inquiry-response pattern; then Crito redirects this action by explaining why he didn't wake Socrates; Socrates turns the action again, redirecting Crito's attention; Socrates changes the direction yet again, performing the first commissive act, expressing his first intention.

Although speech act theory has proven an invaluable tool for the rhetorical analysis, permitting a view of the otherwise "hidden world" of the play, it poses one major limitation to the critic analyzing a script for the purpose of performance: the method is designed to examine
static, printed, literary texts, not to explore dynamic, organic works for performance. As Campbell points out, "Theatre is made up of texts-in-performance, and there are major formal differences between the work on the page and that same work on the stage. Consequently, the method partially "breaks down" in the transition from text to performance. There is not a one-to-one correspondence between those illocutions identified in the script and those performed on the stage. While the analysis may determine that, at a particular point in the script, a character is committing certain speech acts, the actor may, quite justifiably, perform entirely different speech acts. For instance, at 45a, 6-45b, 10 in "Crito's Exhortation," the analysis suggested that Crito was advising, alleging, and counseling. However, in performance, due to the actor's personal interpretation of the script and character, his relationship with the other actor, and the emphasis on exploration in rehearsals, the actor performed quite different speech acts: admonishing, rebuking, and commanding.

**Structuralist Methodology**

Unlike speech act theory, Hornby's structuralism is designed precisely for the purpose of analyzing playscripts for performance. He has taken a method of literary criticism, which has also traditionally examined static, printed texts, and adapted it for performance theory and criticism. The result, as Hornby concedes, is not pure Structuralism, but a method that effectively serves the critic from playscript analysis through the production process.
The spatial analysis, in which such recurring elements as time, life/death, and authority are identified and clustered into significant elements, is of limited significance in and of itself. However, when utilized as a precursor to the temporal analysis it is invaluable. The spatial analysis, for instance, discovered that life and death references are not only present, but that they form patterns that give the Crito its meaning. It is most significant that of the life and death references, only those to death are made at the beginning of the dialogue, and that at the end of the dialogue death is only mentioned in reference to life after death. This information, which would otherwise be difficult to perceive, informs the critic of the dialogue's hidden meaning.

It is primarily through the process of temporal analysis that Hornby has adapted traditional literary structuralism to theatrical performance. Applying the analytic terms choice, sequence, progression, duration, and tempo, this analysis has applied the results of the spatial analysis facilitating performance of the Crito in space and time. Duration, and its companion tempo, served as the most fruitful catalyst for making the directorial choices necessary to perform the Crito. It was, for instance, determined that although the "Introductory Conversation" would likely move the most quickly in performance, this incident had to be deliberately slowed to permit its significant psychological weighting to surface. The necessary tempi of incidents were identified and set in rehearsals so that, as Shaw said, the tempo would be achieved ". . . by contrasts of tone and speed."
Concluding Remarks

Whether or not a work such as the *Crito* is a performable dramatic work is an issue of contention. The question is not so much the dramatic merit of Plato's dialogues as it is, according to Campbell, whether or not the theatre can effectively present drama which is discursive rather than presentational: whether or not argument can effectively be presented through the theatrical medium. Campbell's position is that, because theatre operates by example, presenting characters in situations, a "theatre of argument" has limited dramatic potential: "The displacement of examples and enactment by assertion and argument means that the theatrical work is diminished, for argument *qua* argument is not the stuff of theatre."¹⁴ He continues:

Because theatre depends on the example and can use argument only in a secondary manner, it is not capable of treating complex ethical issues, or of analyzing intricate political situations, or of investigating the moral problems of freedom, evil, etc. Such topics require discursive treatment, and the theatre cannot spin out the long, taut arguments that would be needed to handle them.¹⁵

Nonetheless, a contrary viewpoint exists. Kauffman, in his essay "Poetic as Argument," makes the argument that argument and poetic are "interdependent forms of discourse" and that, "Even in didactic drama, whose form is mainly rhetorical, enactment is an important form of argument."¹⁶ Many frequently-performed plays, particularly some by George Bernard Shaw, are certainly no less discursive than Plato's
Crito. A primary example is Shaw's Man and Superman, particularly Don Juan's debate with the devil in Act III of the play (which is often performed as a complete play in and of itself). About this work, Campbell points out "... here the discursive argument is not incidental to the dramatic action, but for large sections of the play is the dramatic action." Other plays go beyond the Crito in their lack of enactment and example and reliance upon discursive form: Clifford Odets' Waiting for Lefty and Awake and Sing!, John Howard Lawson's Loud Speaker and Marching Song, Trevor Griffith's The Party, and The Living Theatre's Paradise Now.

It is the conclusion of this study that the Crito, as well as other such early Platonic dialogues as the Eutypbro, the Apology, the Phaedo, the Symposium, the Lysis, and possibly the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, can be successfully dramatized if four essential criteria are met: first, the director must apply a felicitous method of analysis such as the structuralist approach used in this study, which permits exploration of the dialogues specifically for the purpose of performance; second, the director must employ highly competent actors, capable of working from a script which provides few clues to interpretation; third, the dialogues demand creative direction which recognizes the unique logic and dramatic structure of Plato's works; fourth, the dramatization must be presented to an academic community, which would have the necessary appreciation of the historical, philosophical, and discursive nature of the script.
NOTES

1 That acting is "living truthfully in imaginary circumstances" is a personal formulation of a Stanislavskian acting principle, extracted from Sonia Moore's text Training An Actor. Sonia Moore, Training an Actor: The Stanislavski System in Class. (New York: Penguin, 1979).

2 The following is textual evidence supporting the actor's specific decisions about Socrates' struggle with whether or not he should escape:

   a. Before Crito arrived, Socrates had considered escaping; Crito has partially succeeded at convincing Socrates to escape: After Crito tells Socrates that he can escape with little difficulty, Socrates responds, "All that you say is very much in my mind, Crito, and a great deal more besides" (45a, 4-5).

   b. Socrates has, however, decided against it: When Crito insists he must escape immediately if he wishes to live, Socrates answers, "Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die" (43c, 1-2).

   d. Socrates must convince Crito and reconvince himself that he should not escape: "I am very anxious to obtain your approval before I adopt the course which I have in mind; I don't want to act against your convictions (48e, 3-5).

3 Hornby 141-2.

4 Early in the rehearsal process, we had considered turning several of Socrates' rhetorical questions in his "Speech of the Laws" into questions posed by Crito, thereby breaking up some of Socrates' very
long monologues and creating more interaction between the characters. It was discovered that rather than enhancing the performance, this slight tampering with the text instead disturbed the continuity of Socrates' speeches.

5 Ohmann 83.


Campbell argues that the theatre is primarily a presentational, not a discursive, medium; that is, that most theatre functions by providing examples and enactment (the imitation of an action) rather than argument: "In the theatre, it is never enough to argue or assert; characters come into existence via action or enactment. And in enactment, examples are created" (34).

9 Campbell 33.

10 The speech act analyses reviewed for this study were conducted by literary, not performance, critics. Although Ohmann (1973) examines the speech action of *Major Barbara, The Importance of Being Earnest, King Lear, The Crucible,* and *Endgame,* he treats them strictly as static, literary artifacts.
About his temporal analysis, Hornby comments:

With all these terms . . . I have tried to avoid a suggestion of a rigid analytical system. They are neither abstract 'categories' nor a how-to-do-it procedure for staging plays. Their order is unimportant, their meanings often overlap, and in many cases other terms could be substituted for them. Their purpose is to channel the intellect and imagination of the critic or director in confronting a playscript, to make them see spatial and temporal considerations as an integral part of it rather than a 'spectacle' to be added on afterward.

(90)

Shaw on Theatre, ed. E. J. West (New York: Hill and Wang, 1958)

12

Campbell 40.

13

Campbell 42.

14


15

In his 12 September 1903 Saturday Review essay, "Mr. Shaw's New Dialogues," British drama critic Max Beerbohm compared the discursive natures of Shaw and Plato:
... to drama Mr. Shaw and Plato stand in almost exactly the same relation. Plato, through anxiety that his work should be read, and his message accepted, so far mortified his strongly puritan instincts as to give a setting of bright human colour to his abstract thought. He invented men of flesh and blood, to talk for him, and put them against realistic backgrounds.


17 Actor Frank F. Fowle III tours American colleges and universities performing Book I of Plato's Republic, one of the Platonic dialogues which seems least likely to be performable. One reviewer commented: "He makes it come alive. . . . he held a college audience spellbound with Plato's Republic for an hour. . . .!" A Gripping One Man Performance (St. Louis: Bard Publications, 1986) 6.
Bibliography


The Death of Socrates. Prod. BBC-TV, 1966. 45 min.


The Drinking Party. Prod. BBC-TV, 1965. 40 min.


Introductory Conversation

CRITO

greets, questions
E,D

SOCRATES: Here already, Crito?/ Surely it is still early?

affirms
R

CRITO: Indeed it is.

queries
D

SOCRATES: About what time?

answers
R

CRITO: Just before dawn.

queries
D

SOCRATES: I wonder that the warder paid any attention to you?

explains
R

CRITO: He is used to me now, Socrates, because I come here so often; /

explains
besides, he is under some small obligation to me.

questions
D

SOCRATES: Have you just come, or have you been here for long?

answers
R

CRITO: Fairly long.

queries
D

SOCRATES: Then why didn't you wake me at once, instead of sitting

by my bed so quietly.

asserts, wishes
R,E

CRITO: I wouldn't dream of such a thing, Socrates./ I only wish

avows
R

I were not so sleepless and depressed myself./ I have

been wondering at you, because I saw how comfortably you

explains
were sleeping;/ and I deliberately didn't wake you because
expresses admiration

I wanted you to be as comfortable as you could. I have often felt before in the course of my life how fortunate you are in your disposition, but I feel it more than ever now in your present misfortune when I see how easily and placidly you put up with it.

opines

R Socrates: Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die.

differs

R Crito: Other people just as old as you are get involved in these misfortunes, Socrates, but their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they find themselves in your position.

explains

D Socrates: Quite true. But tell me, why have you come so early?

admits, queries

R, D Socrates: Because I bring bad news, Socrates; not so bad from your point of view, I suppose, but it will be very hard to bear for me and your other friends, and I think that I shall find it hardest of all.

answers, clarifies

D Socrates: Why, what is this news? Has the boat come in from Delos --the boat which ends my reprieve when it arrives?

queries, questions

R Crito: It hasn't actually come in yet, but I expect that it will
corroborates
concludes
acquiesces, opines
queries
expresses intention
questions
affirms
asserts
explains
expresses approval
queries
describes

be here to-day, judging from the report of some people who have just arrived from Sunium and left it there. It's quite clear from their account that it will be here to-day; and so by tomorrow, Socrates, you will have to--to end your life.

R SOCRATES: Well, Crito, I hope that it may be for the best; if the gods will it so, so be it. All the same, I don't think it will arrive to-day.

D CRITO: What makes you think that?

C SOCRATES: I will try to explain.

D I think I am right in saying that I have to die on the day after the boat arrives?

R CRITO: That's what the authorities say, at any rate.

R SOCRATES: Then I don't think it will arrive on this day that is just beginning, but on the day after. I am going by a dream that I had in the night, only a little while ago.

E It looks as though you were right not to wake me up.

D CRITO: Why, what was the dream about?

R SOCRATES: I thought I saw a gloriously beautiful woman dressed in
white robes, who came up to me and addressed me in these words: 'Socrates, to the pleasant land of Phthia on the third day thou shalt come.'

expresses confusion R CRITO: Your dream makes no sense, Socrates.

attests R SOCRATES: To my mind Crito, it is perfectly clear.

R CRITO: Too clear, apparently. But look here, Socrates, it is still not too late to take my advice and escape. Your death means a double calamity for me. I shall not only lose a friend whom I can never possibly replace, but besides a great many people who don't know you and me very well will be sure to think that I let you down, because I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend the money; and what could be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your friends? Most people will never believe that it was you who refused to leave this place although we tried our hardest to persuade you.

admits, reminds E still not too late to take my advice and escape. Your death means a double calamity for me. I shall not only

expresses regret R lose a friend whom I can never possibly replace, but besides a great many people who don't know you and me very well will be sure to think that I let you down, because I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend the money; and what could be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your friends? Most people will never believe that it was you who refused to leave this place although we tried our hardest to persuade you.

forecasts R

challenges D saved you if I had been willing to spend the money; and

conjectures R
| challenges | D SOCRATES: But my dear Crito, why should we pay so much attention to what 'most people' think?/ The really reasonable people, who have more claim to be considered, will believe that the facts are exactly as they are. |
| attests    | R |
| asseverates | R CRITO: You can see for yourself, Socrates, that one has to think of popular opinion as well./ Your present position is quite enough to show the capacity of ordinary people for causing trouble is not confined to petty annoyances, but has hardly any limits if you once get a bad name with them. |
| avows      | E SOCRATES: I only wish that ordinary people had an unlimited capacity for doing harm;/ then they might have an unlimited power for doing good;/ which would be a splendid thing, if it were so./ Actually they have neither. They cannot make a man wise or stupid; they simply act at random. |
| hypothesizes | R |
| avows      | R |
| declares    | R |
| acquiesces, directs | R,D CRITO: Have it that way if you like;/ but tell me this, Socrates./ I hope you aren't worrying about the possible effects on me and the rest of your friends, and thinking that if you escape we shall have trouble with informers for having |
| queries    | e |
admonishes  D  If any idea like that is troubling you, you can dismiss
maintains  R  it altogether./ We are quite entitled to run that risk in
advises  R  saving you, and even worse, if necessary./ Take my advice,
concedes  R  and be reasonable.

CRITON: Very well, then, don't let it distress you./ I know some
people who are willing to rescue you from here and get you
out of the country for quite a moderate sum./ And then
surely you realize you cheap these informers are to buy off;/
we shan't need much money to settle them;/ and I think you've
got enough of my money for yourself already./ And then even
supposing that in your anxiety for my safety you feel that you
oughtn't to spend my money, there are these foreign gentlemen
staying in Athens who are quite willing to spend theirs./

One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has actually brought the money
with him for this very purpose; and Cebes and a number of others are quite ready to do the same./ So as I say, you mustn't let any fears on these grounds make you slacken your efforts to escape;/ and you mustn't feel any misgivings about what you said at your trial, that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself if you left this country./ Wherever you go, there are plenty of places where you will find a welcome; and if you choose to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and give you complete protection, so that no one in Thessaly can interfere with you./ Besides, Socrates, I don't even feel that it is right for you to try to do what you are doing, throwing away your life when you might save it./ You are doing your best to treat yourself in exactly the same way as your enemies would, or rather did, when they wanted to ruin you./ What is more, it seems to me that you are letting your sons down too. You have it in your power to finish their bringing up and education, and instead of that you are proposing to go off and desert.
challenges D attests R admonishes D reprehends R

d them, and so far as you are concerned they will have to take
their chance. And what sort of chance are they likely to get? The sort of thing that usually happens to orphans when they lose their parents. Either one ought not to have children at all, or one ought to see their upbringing and education through to the end. It strikes me that you are taking the line of least resistance, whereas you ought to make the choice of a good man and a brave one, considering that you profess to have made goodness your object all through life. Really, I am ashamed, both on your account and on ours your friends'; it will look as though we had played something like a coward's part all through this affair of yours. First there was the way you came into court when it was quite unnecessary—that was the first act; then there was the conduct of the defence—that was the second; and finally, to complete the farce, we get this situation, which makes it appear that we have let you slip out of our hands through some lack of courage and enterprise on our part, because we didn't save you,
and you didn't save yourself, when it would have been quite possible and practicable, if we had been any use at all. / There, Socrates; if you aren't careful, besides the suffering there will be all this disgrace for you and us to bear. / Come, make up your mind. / Really it's too late for that now; you ought to have made it up already. / There is no alternative; the whole thing must be carried through during this coming night. If we lose any more time, it can't be done, it will be too late. / I appeal to you, Socrates, on every ground; / take my advice and please don't be unreasonable!

Socrates' Reply to Crito

SOCRATES: My dear Crito, I appreciate your warm feelings very much; -- that is, assuming that they have some justification; / if not, the stronger they are, the harder they will be to deal with. / Very well, then; we must consider whether we ought to follow your advice or not. / You know that this is not a new idea of mine; / it has always been my nature
never to accept advice from any of my friends unless
reflexion shows that it is the best course that reason
offers./ I cannot abandon the principles which I used to
hold in the past simply because this accident has happened
to me;/ they seem to me to be much as they were;/ and I
respect and regard the same principles now as before./

So unless we can find better principles on this occasion,
you can be quite sure that I shall not agree with you;
not even if the power of the people conjures up fresh hordes
of bogies to terrify our childish minds, by subjecting
us to claims and executions and confiscations of our
property./

Well, then, how can we consider the question most
reasonably?/ Suppose that we begin by reverting to this
view which you hold about people's opinions./ Was it
everly right to argue that some opinions should be taken
seriously but not others? Or was it always wrong?/

Perhaps it was right before the question of my death arose,
but now we can see clearly that it was a mistaken persistence in a point of view which was really irresponsible nonsense. I should like very much to inquire into this problem, Crito, with your help, and to see whether the argument will appear in any different light to me now that I am in this position, or whether we shall dismiss it or accept it.

Serious thinkers, I believe, have always held some such view as the one which I mentioned just now: that some of the opinions which people entertain should be respected, and others should not. Now I ask you, Crito, don't you think that this is a sound principle? You are safe from the prospect of dying to-morrow, in all human probability; and you are not likely to have your judgement upset by this impending calamity. Consider, then; don't you think that this is a sound enough principle, that one should not regard all the opinions that people hold, but only some and not others? What do you say? Isn't that a fair statement?
affirms  R CRITO: Yes, it is.
questions  D SOCRATES: In other words, one should regard the good ones and not the bad?
affirms  R CRITO: Yes.
questions  D SOCRATES: The opinions of the wise being good, and the opinions of the foolish bad?
affirms  R CRITO: Naturally.
directs, queries  D SOCRATES: To pass on, then: what do you think of the sort of illustration that I used to employ?/ When a man is in training, and taking it seriously, does he pay attention to all praise and criticism and opinion indiscriminately, or only when it comes from the one qualified person, the actual doctor or trainer?
answers  R CRITO: Only when it comes from the one qualified person.
questions  D SOCRATES: Then he should be afraid of the criticism and welcome the praise of the one qualified person, but not those of the general public.
affirms  R CRITO: Obviously.
D SOCRATES: So he ought to regulate his actions and exercises and eating and drinking by the judgement of his instructor, who has expert knowledge, rather than by the opinions of the rest of the public.

R CRITO: Yes, that is so.

R, D SOCRATES: Very well./ Now if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and commendations, and pays attention to the advice of the many who have no expert knowledge, surely he will suffer some bad effect?

R CRITO: Certainly.

D SOCRATES: And what is this bad effect?/ Where is it produced?/ I mean, in what part of the disobedient person?

R CRITO: His body, obviously; that is what suffers.

R, D SOCRATES: Very good./ Well now, tell me, Crito--we don't want to go through all the examples one by one--does this apply as a general rule, and above all to the sort of actions which we are trying to decide about: just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and bad?/
Ought we to be guided and intimidated by the opinion of the many or by that of the one—assuming that there is someone with expert knowledge?/ Is it true that we ought to respect and fear this person more than all the rest put together; and that if we do not follow his guidance we shall spoil and mutilate that part of us which, as we used to say, is improved by right conduct and destroyed by wrong?/ Or is this all nonsense?

CRITO: No, I think it is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then consider the next step./ There is a part of us which is improved by healthy actions and ruined by unhealthy ones./ If we spoil it by taking the advice of nonexperts, will life be worth living when this part is once ruined?/ The part I mean is the body;/ do you accept this?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, is life worth living with a body which is worn out and ruined in health?

CRITO: Certainly not.
D SOCRATES: What about the part of us that is mutilated by wrong actions and benefited by right ones? Is life worth living with this part ruined? Or do we believe that this part of us, whatever it may be, in which right and wrong operate, is of less importance than the body?

R CRITO: Certainly not.

D SOCRATES: It is really more precious?

R CRITO: Much more.

C SOCRATES: In that case, my dear fellow, what we ought to consider is not so much what people in general will say about us but how we stand with the expert in right and wrong, the one authority, who represents the actual truth. /

R So in the first place your proposition is not correct when you say that we should consider popular opinion in questions of what is right and honourable and good, or the opposite. Of course one might object 'All the same, the people have the power to put us to death.'

R CRITO: No doubt about that! Quite true, Socrates; it is a possible
objection.

attests R  SOCRATES: But so far as I can see, my dear fellow, the argument which we have just been through is quite unaffected by it./

requests D  At the same time I should like you to consider whether we

avows C  are still satisfied on this point:/ that the really

important thing is not to live, but to live well.

affirms R  CRITO: Why, yes.

questions D  SOCRATES: And that to live well means the same thing as to live

honourably or rightly?

affirms R  CRITO: Yes.

charges with a task C  SOCRATES: Then in the light of this agreement we must consider

whether or not it is right for me to try to get away

without an official discharge./ If it turns out to be

right, we must make the attempt;/ if not, we must let it

drop./ As for the considerations you raise about expense

and reputation and bringing up children, I am afraid,

Crito, that they represent the reflections of the ordinary

public, who put people to death, and would bring them
back to life if they could, with equal indifference to reason. / Our real duty, I fancy, since the argument leads that way, is to consider one question only, the one which we raised just now: / Shall we be acting rightly in paying money and showing gratitude to these people who are going to rescue me, and in escaping or arranging the escape ourselves, or shall we really be acting wrongly in doing all this? / If it becomes clear that such conduct is wrong, I cannot help thinking that the question whether we are sure to die, or to suffer any other ill effect for that matter, if we stand our ground and take no action, ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the risk of doing what is wrong.

CRITO: I agree with what you say, Socrates; / but I wish you would consider what we ought to do.

The Two Premises

SOCRATES: Let us look at it together, my dear fellow; / and if you
can challenge any of my arguments, do so and I will listen to you;/ but if you can't, be a good fellow and stop telling me over and over again that I ought to leave this place without official permission./ I am very anxious to obtain your approval before I adopt the course which I have in mind;/ I don't want to act against your convictions./

Now give your attention to the starting point of this inquiry/--I hope that you will be satisfied with my way of stating it/--and try to answer my questions to the best of your judgement.

CRITO: Well, I will try.

SOCRATES: Do we say that one must never willingly do wrong, or does it depend upon the circumstances?/ Is it true, as we have often agreed before, that there is no sense in which wrongdoing is good or honourable?/ Or have we jettisoned all our former convictions in these last few days?/

Can you and I at our age, Crito, have spent all these years in serious discussions without realizing that we...
were no better than a pair of children?/ Surely the truth is just what we have always said./ Whatever the popular view is, and whether the alternative is pleasanter than the present one or even harder to bear, the fact remains that to do wrong is in every sense bad and dishonourable for the person who does it./ Is that our view, or not?

CRITO: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: Then in no circumstances must one do wrong.

CRITO: No.

SOCRATES: In that case one must not even do wrong when one is wronged, which most people regard as the natural course.

CRITO: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: Tell me another thing, Crito:/ ought one to do injuries or not?

CRITO: Surely not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And tell me:/ is it right to do an injury in retaliation, as most people believe, or not?

CRITO: No, never.
concludes

R Socrates: Because, I suppose, there is no difference between injuring people and wronging them.

affirms

R Crito: Exactly.

concludes

R Socrates: So one ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is. Now be careful, Crito, that in making these single admissions you do not end by admitting something contrary to your real beliefs.

cautions

D I know that there are and always will be few people who think like this; and consequently between those who do think so and those who do not there can be no agreement on principle; they must always feel contempt when they observe one another's decisions. I want even you to consider very carefully whether you share my views and agree with me, and whether we can proceed with our discussion from the established hypothesis that it is never right to do a wrong or to return a wrong or defend one's self against injury by retaliation, or whether you dissociate yourself from any share in this view as a basis for discussion.

acknowledges

R

concludes

R

concludes

D
D I have held it for a long time, and still hold it; /

but if you have formed any other opinion, say so and tell

me what it is. / If, on the other hand, you stand by what

you have said, listen to my next point.

R,D CRITO: Yes, I stand by it and agree with you. / Go on.

D SOCRATES: Well, here is my next point, or rather question. /

Ought one to fulfil all one's agreements, provided that

they are right, or break them?

R CRITO: One ought to fulfil them.

D SOCRATES: Then consider the logical consequences. / If we leave

this place without first persuading the State to let us go, are we or are we not doing an injury, and doing it in

a quarter where it is least justifiable? / Are we or are we not abiding by our just agreements?

R CRITO: I can't answer your question, Socrates; /

I am not clear in my mind.
The Speech of the Laws of Athens

D SOCRATES: Look at it in this way./ Suppose that while we were preparing to run away from here (or however one should describe it) the Laws and Constitution of Athens were to come and confront us and ask this question:/ Now, Socrates, what are you proposing to do?/ Can you deny that by this act which you are contemplating you intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole State as well?/ Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judgements which are pronounced in it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?—how shall we answer this question, Crito, and others of the same kind?/ There is much that could be said, especially by a professional advocate, to protest against the invalidation of this law which enacts that judgements once pronounced shall be binding./ Shall we say 'Yes, I do intend to destroy the laws, because the State wronged me by passing a faulty
CRITO: What you have just said, by all means, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then what supposing the Laws say:/ Was there provision for this in the agreement between you and us, Socrates?

Or did you undertake to abide by whatever judgements the State pronounced?/ If we expressed surprise at such language, they would probably say:/ Never mind our language, Socrates, but answer our questions;/ after all, you are accustomed to the method of question and answer./ Come now, what charge do you bring against us and the State, that you are trying to destroy us?/ Did we not give you life in the first place? was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you?/ Tell us, have you any complaint against those of us Laws that deal with marriage?/ 'No, none', I should say./ Well, have you any against the laws which deal with children's upbringing and education, such as you had yourself?/
| questions | Are you not grateful to those of us Laws which were instituted for this end, for requiring your father to give you a cultural and physical education?/ 'Yes', I should say./ Very good./ |
| answers | R |
| expresses approval | E |
| questions | Then since you have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny in the first place, that you were our child and servant, both you and your ancestors?/ And if this is so, do you imagine that what is right for us is equally right for you, and whatever we try to do to you, you are justified in retaliating?/ You did not have equality of rights with your father, or your employer (supposing that you had had one), to enable you to retaliate; you were not allowed to answer back when you were scolded or to hit back when you were beaten, or to do a great many other things of the same kind./ Do you expect to have such licence against your country and its laws that if we try to put you to death in the belief that it is right to do so, you on your part will try your hardest to destroy |
| questions | D |
questions

your country and us its Laws in return?/ and will you, the true devotee of goodness, claim that you were justified in doing so?/ Are you so wise as to have forgotten that compared with your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors your country is something far more precious, more venerable, more sacred, and held in greater honour both among gods and among all reasonable men?/ Do you not realize that you are even more bound to respect and placate the anger of your country than your father's anger?/ that if you cannot persuade your country you must do whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment?/ And if it leads you out to war, to be wounded or killed, you must comply, and it is right that you should do so;/ you must not give way or retreat or abandon your position./ Both in war and in the law-courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country commands, or else persuade it in
asseverates R accordance with universal justice;/ but violence is a
queries D sin even against your parents, and it is a far greater
questions sin against your country./ -- What shall we say to this, 5
answers Crito?/ -- that what the Laws say is true, or not?

directs, conjectures D,R SOCRATES: Consider, then, Socrates,/ the Laws would probably
propounds continue,/ whether it is also true for us to say that what
prefaces you are now trying to do to us is not right./ Although

d we have brought you into the world and reared you and
educated you, and given you and all your fellow-citizens
a share in all the good things at our disposal,

nevertheless by the very fact of granting our permission 5

declares R we openly proclaim this principle:/ that any Athenian,

propounds on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the
political organization of the State and us its Laws,
is permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his

property and go away wherever he likes./ If any of you 10
chooses to go to one of our colonies, supposing that he
should not be satisfied with us the State, or to emigrate to any other country, not one of us Laws hinders or prevents him from going away wherever he likes, without any loss of property. On the other hand, if any one of you stands his ground when he can see how we administer justice and the rest of our public organization, we hold that by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we tell him; and we maintain that anyone who disobeys is guilty of doing wrong on three separate counts: first because we are his parents, and secondly because we are his guardians; and thirdly because, after promising obedience, he is neither obeying us nor persuading us to change our decision if we are at fault in any way; and although all our orders are in the form of proposals, not of savage commands, and we give him the choice of either persuading us or doing what we say, he is actually doing neither. These are the charges, Socrates, to which we say that you will be liable if you do what you are
asseverates  
contemplating;/ and you will not be the least culpable
prefaces  
of your fellow-countrymen, but one of the most guilty./ If
queries, postulates  
I said/ 'Why do you say that?'/ they would no doubt
prefaces, apprises  
pounce upon me with perfect justice and point out that
D,R  
there are very few people in Athens who have entered
substantiates  
into this agreement with them as explicitly as I have./
substantiates  
They would say/ Socrates, we have substantial evidence
that you are satisfied with us and with the State./
substantiates  
You would not have been so exceptionally reluctant to
substantiates  
cross the borders of your country if you had not been
substantiates  
exceptionally attached to it./ You have never left the
substantiates  
city to attend a festival or for any other purpose,
substantiates  
except on some military expedition;/ you have never
substantiates  
travelled abroad as other people do, and you have never
substantiates  
felt the impulse to acquaint yourself with another country
substantiates  
or constitution,/ you have been content with us and with
substantiates  
our city,/ You have definitely chosen us, and undertaken
substantiates  
to observe us in all your activities as a citizen;/
and as the crowning proof that you are satisfied with our city, you have begotten children in it. Furthermore, even at the time of your trial you could have proposed the penalty of banishment, if you had chosen to do so; that is, you could have done then with the sanction of the State what you are now trying to do without it. But whereas at that time you made a noble show of indifference if you had to die, and in fact preferred death, as you said, to banishment, now you show no respect for your earlier professions, and no regard for us, the Laws, whom you are trying to destroy; you are behaving like the lowest type of menial, trying to run away in spite of the contracts and undertakings by which you agreed to live as a member of our State. Now first answer this question: Are we or are we not speaking the truth when we say that you have undertaken, in deed if not in word, to live your life as a citizen in obedience to us? What are we to say to that Crito? Are we not bound to admit it?
CRITO: We cannot help it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: It is a fact, then, they would say, that you are breaking covenants and undertakings made with us, although you made them under no compulsion or misunderstanding, and were not compelled to decide in a limited time; you had seventy years in which you could have left the country, if you were not satisfied with us or felt that the agreements were unfair. You did not choose Sparta or Crete—your favorite models of good government—or any other Greek or foreign state; you could not have absented yourself from the city less if you had been lame or blind or decrepit in some other way. It is quite obvious that you stand by yourself above all other Athenians in your affection for this city and for us its Laws;—who would care for a city without laws? And now, after all this, are you not going to stand by your agreement? Yes, you are, Socrates, if you will take our advice; and then you will at least escape being laughed at for leaving
We invite you to consider what good you will do to yourself or your friends if you commit this breach of faith and stain your conscience. It is fairly obvious that the risk of being banished and either losing their citizenship or having their property confiscated will extend to your friends as well. As for yourself, if you go to one of the neighboring states, such as Thebes or Megra, which are both well governed, you will enter them as an enemy to their constitution, and all good patriots will eye you with suspicion as a destroyer of law and order. Incidentally you will confirm the opinion of the jurors who tried you that they gave a correct verdict; a destroyer of laws might very well be supposed to have a destructive influence upon young and foolish human beings. Do you intend, then, to avoid well governed states and the higher forms of human society? and if you do, will life be worth living? Or will you
approach these people and have the impudence to converse
with them? What arguments will you use, Socrates? The
same which you used here, that goodness and integrity, 10
institutions and laws, are the most precious possessions
of mankind? Do you not think that Socrates and everything 20
d about him will appear in a disreputable light? You
certainly ought to think so. But perhaps you will
retire from this part of the world and go to Crito's
friends in Thessaly? That is the home of indiscipline
and laxity, and no doubt they would enjoy hearing the
amusing story of how you managed to run away from prison
by arraying yourself in some costume or putting on a
shepherd's smock or some other conventional runaway's
disguise, and altering your personal appearance. And 30
t will no one comment on the fact that an old man of your
e age, probably with only a short time left to live, should
dare to cling so greedily to life, at the price of violating
the most stringent laws? Perhaps not, if you avoid
irritating anyone./ Otherwise, Socrates, you will hear a
good many humiliating comments./ So you will live as the
toady and slave of all the populace, literally "roistering in Thessaly", as though you had left this country for
Thessaly to attend a banquet there;/ and where will your
discussions about goodness and uprightness be then, we
should like to know?/ But of course you want to live
for your children's sake,/ so that you may be able to
bring them up and educate them./ Indeed!/ by first taking them off to Thessaly and making foreigners
of them, so that they may have that additional enjoyment?/
Or if that is not your intention, supposing that they are
brought up here with you still alive, will they be better
cared for and educated without you, because of course
your friends will look after them?/ Will they look after
your children if you go away to Thessaly, and not if you
go away to the next world?/ Surely if those who profess
to be your friends are worth anything, you must believe
entreats

explains

forecasts

forecasts

entreats

that they would care for them."

No, Socrates; be advised by us your guardians, and
do not think more of your children or of your life or
of anything else than you think of what is right; so
that when you enter the next world you may have all
this to plead in your defence before the authorities
there. It seems clear that if you do this thing,
neither you nor any of your friends will be the better
for it or be more upright or have a cleaner conscience
here in this world, nor will it be better for you when
you reach the next. As it is, you will leave this
place, when you do, as the victim of a wrong done not
by us, the Laws, but by your fellow-men. But if you
leave in that dishonourable way, returning wrong for
wrong and evil for evil, breaking your agreements and
covenants with us, and injuring those whom you least
ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country,
and us—then you will have to face our anger in your
lifetime, and in that place beyond when the laws of the other world know that you have tried, so far as you could, to destroy even us their brothers, they will not receive you with a kindly welcome./ Do not take Crito's advice, but follow ours./

That, my dear friend Crito, I do assure you, is what I seem to hear them saying, just as a mystic seems to hear the strains of music;/ and the sound of their arguments rings so loudly in my head that I cannot hear the other side./ I warn you that, as my opinion stands at present, it will be useless to urge a different view./

However, if you think that you will do any good by it, say what you like.

CRITO: No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

SPCRATES: Then give it up, Crito,/ and let us follow this course, since God points out the way.
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS OF SPEECH ACT VERBS USED IN ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO

Representative Speech Act Verbs
(speaker commits himself to the truth of a proposition)
accept—to receive something offered, usually gladly.
acknowledge—to express recognition.
acquiesce—to consent or comply passively or without protest.
admit—to accept or allow as true or valid.
affirm—to positively or firmly maintain to be true. To provide the anticipated response to a speaker's inquiry.
agree—to grant consent; accede.
allege—to assert without proof.
answer—to reply to a question or query for which the speaker does not reveal the response he prefers in the asking.
apprise—to give notice; inform.
assert—to state one's position boldly, either in response to an inquiry or within a monologue.
assess—to evaluate; appraise.
asseverate—to declare seriously or positively; more emphatic than assert.
attest—to affirm to be correct, true, or genuine.
aver—to declare in a positive manner; affirm. (Less forceful than assert, asseverate, or declare, aver stresses the speaker's confidence in the validity of his statement.)
avow—to acknowledge openly, emphasizing moral commitment to a statement.

characterize—to describe the qualities or peculiarities of someone or something.

cite—to mention as support, illustration, or proof.

clarify—to make clearer or easier to understand; elucidate.

conclude—to form a final judgment; to reach a decision or agreement.

conjecture—to infer based upon inconclusive or incomplete evidence.

contest—to attempt to disprove or invalidate; challenge.

corroborate—to attest truth or accuracy based upon another person or person's evidence.

declare—to proclaim one's choice, opinion, or resolution. (Suggests the speaker's formality and authority.)

deduce—to infer from a general principle.

defer to—to comply with or submit to another's wishes, opinion, or decision.

describe—to verbally transmit a mental image or impression.

differ—to state a contrary opinion; disagree.

enumerate—to count off or name one by one; list.

evaluate—to examine and judge carefully.

explain—to offer reasons for or a cause of; justify.

express confusion—to reveal a state of perplexion.

forecast—to estimate or predict.

infer—to conclude from evidence or consequences.

judge—to make a discriminating appraisal.
maintain—to declare as true; affirm.
opine—to hold or state an opinion.
point out—to bring to notice or attention.
postulate—to assume as a premise or axiom.
propound—to put forth for consideration.
quote—to repeat or copy another's words, usually acknowledging the source.
remind—to cause to remember; to make mindful.
report—to retell or tell about; present.
stipulate—to specify as a condition of an agreement.
substantiate—to support with proof or evidence.

**Directive Speech Act Verbs**
(speaker attempts to elicit action from his listener)
accuse—to charge with a shortcoming or error.
admonish—to reprove mildly but seriously; to advise or warn so that a fault may be rectified or a danger avoided.
advice—to recommend; suggest.
beseech—to request earnestly or urgently; implore with great anxiety.
caution—to warn against danger; to put on guard.
challenge—to take exception to; dispute.
charge with a task—to entrust with a duty, responsibility, or obligation.
command—to direct with authority; to give orders.
counsel—to urge the adoption of a recommendation.
denounce—to condemn openly and vehemently.
direct—to move or guide toward a goal.
enjoin—to direct with authority and emphasis.
etreat—to ask for earnestly; to petition.
instruct—to give a mild order directing a person to act in a specified way.
invite—to request one's presence or participation.
pray—to make a devout or earnest request.
preface—to introduce or provide with a preliminary statement.
query—to question a person in order to settle a doubt. (An inquiry that seeks more explanation than a "yes" or "no" response provides.)
question—to inquire, seeking a "yes" or "no" response. (Implies continuous and careful asking during a given period.)
rebuke—to criticize or reprove sharply.
reprehend—to sharply disapprove of the actions or attributes of a person.
reproach—to criticize sharply out of regret or disappointment.
reprove—to rebuke for a fault or misdeed. (Implies gentle criticism and constructive intent.)
request—to ask for; express a desire for.

**Commissive Speech Act Verbs**

(speaker commits himself to a future act)

commit—to bind or obligate by a pledge.
express intention--to disclose a design or a plan of action.

vow--to promise or pledge solemnly.

Expressive Speech Act Verbs

(speaker reveals some aspect of his psychological state)

express admiration--to express esteem or respect.

express approval--to reveal favorable regard or commendation.

express regret--to reveal sorrow or disappointment.

greet--to address in a friendly and respectful manner.

thank--to express gratitude.

wish--to desire or long for.
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**Authority**

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APPENDIX D
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<th>Crito's Exhortation</th>
<th>Socrates' Reply</th>
<th>Two Premises</th>
<th>Speech of the Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Time of Day**

- Future
- Relationship between Past and Present

**Execution**

**Life/Death**

- Death
- Relationship between Life and Death
- Life

**Crito's Socrates', Socrates' Questioning**

- Simple, Direct, Nonchallenging
- Serious and Challenging

**Crito's Responses**

- Demonstrate Independence
- Affirmative Replies

**Authority**

- Combination of Motifs

---

Figure 1 -- Schema of Sequence in the *Crito*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introductory Conversation</th>
<th>Crito's Exhortation</th>
<th>Socrates' Reply</th>
<th>Two Premises</th>
<th>Speech of the Laws</th>
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<td>Demonstrate Independence</td>
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<td>Metamorphosis in Progression of Motifs</td>
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Figure 2 -- Schema of Image Cluster Progressions in the *Crito*
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<th><strong>Introductory Conversation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Crito's Exhortation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Socrates' Reply</strong></th>
<th><strong>Two Premises</strong></th>
<th><strong>Speech of the Laws</strong></th>
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<td>-very short</td>
<td>-longer incident</td>
<td>-longer incident</td>
<td>-although</td>
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<tr>
<td>(37 lines)</td>
<td>(93 lines)</td>
<td>(137 lines)</td>
<td>shorter than</td>
<td>-comprised almost entirely of Socrates' monologues</td>
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<td>-speeches average</td>
<td>-speeches very long, Socrates giving four,</td>
<td>-questions are the most serious</td>
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<td>O/A (1-3 sentences)</td>
<td>questions</td>
<td>monologues</td>
<td>and monologue</td>
<td>-conversation is the most rigorous</td>
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<td>-rapid exchange of questions</td>
<td>-all questions</td>
<td>serious and</td>
<td>growing intensely</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and responses</td>
<td></td>
<td>challenging</td>
<td>intellectionally</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-conversation</td>
<td></td>
<td>serious</td>
<td>growth strongly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-lacks focus and depth</td>
<td></td>
<td>growing intellectually</td>
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**Lengthening Chronological Durations**

**Decreasing Significance of Psychological Weighting**

**Figure 3 -- Schema of Duration in the Crito**
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<td>F</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>D A</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>with</td>
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<td>S</td>
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<td>O</td>
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<td>U T</td>
<td>W</td>
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</table>

Tempo determined by

determined by

depth

structure's interaction

with

chronological duration.

D(C) → T

Figure 4 -- Schema of Tempo in the *Crito*
APPENDIX E
I am writing to request permission to reprint the following material from your publication:


This material is to appear as originally published in the following master's thesis to be submitted at the University of Northern Iowa:

"Plato's Crito: A Structuralist Analysis for Performance."
This thesis will be approximately 150 pages in length.

I am requesting nonexclusive world rights in the English language, for one edition. Approximately seven copies will be printed.

If you are the copyright holder, may I have your permission to reprint the material described above in my thesis? Unless you request otherwise, I shall use the conventional scholarly form of acknowledgment, including author, title, translator's name, publisher's name, and date.

Thank you for your consideration of my request. I have enclosed a duplicate copy of this letter for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Gary Gute

The above request is approved on the conditions specified below and on the understanding that full credit will be given to the source.

There is no fee.

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Penguin Books Ltd.
536 Kings Road
Harmondsworth, Middlesex
England UB70DA

I am writing to request permission to perform as a dramatic work the following material from your publication:
"Crito," pages 79-96, from Hugh Tredennick's translation of  

This material is to be performed as originally published as a portion of the following master's thesis to be submitted at the University of Northern Iowa:
"Plato's Crito: A Structuralist Analysis for Performance."
This thesis will be approximately 150 pages in length.

This material will be performed only once, tentatively on 29 October 1984. Admission will not be charged.

If you are the copyright holder, may I have your permission to perform the material described above as part of my thesis? Unless you request otherwise, I shall use the conventional scholarly form of acknowledgment, including author, title, translator's name, publisher's name, and date.

Thank you for your consideration of my request. I have enclosed a duplicate copy of this letter for your convenience.

Sincerely,

Gary Gates

The above request is approved on the conditions specified below and on the understanding that full credit will be given to the source. There is no charge.

Approved by:  PERMISSION GRANTED BY

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Plato's CRITO

You are invited to a production of Plato's dialogue Crito. Set in Socrates' prison cell shortly before his death, this performance dramatizes the compelling dialogue between Crito, who pleads with Socrates to escape from prison, and Socrates, who will be guided solely by Reason and Truth.

Bertha Martin Theatre
Thursday, 27 March
Sunday, 30 March
Performances at 8:15 p.m.
A discussion will follow both performances

Socrates: Bill O'Brien
Crito: Jan Robbins

To receive tickets free of charge, complete and redeem the attached form by Tuesday, 25 March, 5:00 p.m., at the Department of English Language and Literature, Philosophy and Religion, or Communication and Theatre Arts.

Circle day of performance for which you desire tickets:

Thursday
Sunday

Number of tickets desired:
Name:

(319)273-6386
The unexamined life is not worth living.

—Socrates
PLATO’S CRITO
Bertha Martin Theatre
27, 30 March 1986
A discussion will follow tonight’s performance.

SOCRATES ..................... Bill O’Brien
CRITO ............................ Jan Robbins

DIRECTED BY
Gary Gute

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY
Paul Sannerud

—DIRECTOR’S NOTE—
This production is the culmination of a master’s thesis entitled “Plato’s Crito: A Speech Act and Structuralist Analysis for Performance.” The Study’s primary hypothesis is that many of Plato's early dialogues, such as the Crito, are not merely philosophical treatises, but also theatrically rich dramatic works.

—ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS—
Theatre UNI Studio Series Board • Departments of Communication and Theatre Arts, Philosophy and Religion, English Language and Literature • College of Humanities and Fine Arts • Deanne Steiner Gute • Becky Burns • John Swensen

APPENDIX I
A VHS videotape of the 30 March 1986 performance of Plato's *Crito* is available from the University of Northern Iowa Library.